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OF FUZZY STANDARDS AND INSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRAINTS: A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE
JURISPRUDENTIAL HISTORY OF EDUCATIONAL
FINANCE REFORM LITIGATION
William S. Koski*
The standards problem is essentially one of achieving intelligibility. If the present state financing systems are condemned, it is not enough simply to declare them invalid. If
the court hopes to generate the consensus necessary to meaningful change it must identify with reasonable clarity the locus and nature of the constitutional defect. Society cannot or
will not respond to canons incapable of communication ....
Where substantive rights depend upon Delphic distinctions
the court stands endlessly on flypaper, unable to clear more
than one foot at a time. Unless the court can find an effable
essence, its judgments tend to be ad hoc and unpredictable,
qualities which in the school finance case will evoke nothing
but criticism of the court and evasion by the legislatures.
-

John Coons, William Clune, and Stephen Sugarman'

We... hold that Wisconsin students have a fundamental
right to an equal opportunity for a sound basic education.
An equal opportunity for a sound basic education is one that
will equip students for their roles as citizens and enable them
to succeed economically and personally.
-Justice N. Patrick Crooks, Wisconsin Supreme Court2
I. INTRODUCTION
Although obviously intended as advice to advocates and
* Associate Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. B.B.A., University of
Michigan; J.D., University of Michigan School of Law; Ph.D., Stanford University
School of Education.
1. JOHN COONS, WILLIAM CLUNE & STEPHEN SUGARMAN,
AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 290-91 (1970).

2. Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 396 (Wis. 2000).
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judges alike to ensure clarity and intelligibility in framing legal
issues and designing standards for what is a constitutional educational finance system, the words of John Coons, William
Clune, and Stephen Sugarman appear three decades later to
have been largely disregarded by the courts. In their influential
book, Private Wealth and Public Education, Coons, Clune, and
Sugarman argued for a constitutional standard for educational
finance systems that is clear and easy to apply. Otherwise, they
argue, the political system will not respond to the judicial decree
and the courts will lose legitimacy. With this argument, Coons,
Clune, and Sugarman recognized early the institutional constraints facing courts that embark upon educational finance reDespite this warning,
form. Their prescription: clarity.
choose
to intervene at all,
courts,
if
they
supreme
however, state
have done little more than declare funding systems unconstitutional. The locus and nature of the constitutional defect is often
unclear and the judicial standard, to the extent one is articulated
at all, is bereft of definitive guidance for a legislature prone to
evasion. For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court articulated
a right to an education that "will equip students for their roles as
citizens and enable them to succeed economically and personally" 3-hardly a model of clarity. The court left many questions
unanswered: What are the roles of citizens? What does it mean
to succeed economically and personally? And, more vexing,
what kind of schooling does it take to achieve those goals? Yet
Coons, Clune, and Sugarman's fear of widespread criticism and
the risk of legislative evasion have been in large part unrealized.
On the contrary, judicial use of fuzzy and flexible standards may
have resulted in a species of jurisprudence of the least intrusive
variety-a jurisprudence that recognizes courts' institutional constraints, while at the same time understanding the courts' obligation to ensure a "just" educational finance system.
This article examines the jurisprudential history of educational finance reform litigation, focusing on the role of legal doctrine and theory in state supreme court decision-making in this
arena and the courts' awareness of their own institutional capacities. To be precise, this article may better be described as a
"re-examination" of the judicial history of educational finance
reform as this history has already been extensively addressed by

3. Id.
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other commentators. 4 Section II of the article provides a background and framework for discussing the problem of educational finance reform. Section III briefly examines the very
minimal role of the federal courts in school finance reform and
argues that the primary contribution of the federal courts has
been the sounding of a note of caution regarding the institutional limitations on courts when intervening in such a complex
social policy area.
Section IV then extensively reconsiders the last three decades of educational finance reform litigation in the state supreme courts. That section first argues that the so-called
"second wave" of school finance litigation that arguably focused
on theories of fiscal and educational equity was, in fact, equally
concerned with the provision of a basic, "adequate" education to
children. That the courts often intertwined the language of equity and adequacy demonstrates both their inability to articulate
a clear standard for constitutional compliance and their desire to
4. As discussed in Section II, infra, scholars and commentators in recent years
have divided educational finance reform litigations into three separate "waves" of
litigation. See William H. Clune, New Answers to Hard Questions Posed by Rodriguez:
Ending the Separation of School Financeand EducationalPolicy by Bridging the Gap Between Wrong and Remedy, 24 CONN. L. REV. 721 (1992); William H. Clune, The Shift
From Equity to Adequacy in School Finance, 8 EDUC. POL'Y 376 (1994); Peter Enrich,
Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV.
101 (1995); Michael Heise, State Constitutions,School FinanceLitigation, and the "Third
Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151 (1995); Gail F. Levine, Meeting
the Third Wave: Legislative Approaches to Recent School Finance Rulings, 28 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 507 (1991); William E. Thro, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions in Public School Finance Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639 (1989); William E. Thro, The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of
Public School FinanceLitigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219 (1990); JudicialAnalysis During the
Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C.
L. REV. 597 (1994); Julie K. Underwood & William E. Sparkman, School Finance Litigation:A New Wave of Reform, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 517 (1991); Julie K. Underwood, School FinanceAdequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 493 (1995).
The first wave of litigation, which commenced in the late 1960's was fought in federal courts under federal Equal Protection theories but came to a halt after 1973's
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The second wave of litigation hinged on the interpretation of state constitutional equal protection provisions and state constitutional education articles as reformers argued that children
were entitled to an "equitable" education under those provisions. That litigation
began with California's 1971 Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1260 (Cal. 1971), decision and concluded at the end of the 1980's. The hallmark of the third wave of litigation was the argument that all children are entitled to an "adequate" education
under state education articles. This wave-which continues unabated through today-began with the Kentucky Supreme Court's declaration that its entire educational system was unconstitutional. See Rose v. Council for Better Education, 790
S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
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maintain flexibility in school finance jurisprudence. Second, the
section argues that, from the beginning, state supreme courts
have recognized their institutional limitations and paid significant deference to the legislative and executive branches in educational finance reform. Third, the section argues that courts in
some cases have deployed adequacy arguments to repel plaintiffs' equity claims, while in other cases they have used evidence
of inequity to support claims of inadequacy. That courts have
fused their equity and adequacy analyses suggests not only that
the supposed demarcation between "second wave" equity cases
and "third wave" adequacy cases is not so distinct, but also that
courts instrumentally adopt either equity or adequacy analyses
to meet their own policy objectives and maintain their institutional legitimacy and role in state governance. The article finally
concludes with some thoughts on the evolving-and fuzzyjurisprudence in school finance litigation and the role of courts
in school finance policy.

II.

BACKGROUND AND FRAMING THE PROBLEM

A.

A Brief Overview of School Finance Reform Litigation: Three
Waves of Reform
Ever since Coons, Clune, and Sugarman struggled to articulate a workable standard for what constitutes a constitutional
education, the evolution of school finance litigation has become
the sine qua non of the development of students' rights to some
identifiable level or quality of education.5 Launched in the late
1960's, school finance litigation initially focused on the federal
Constitution's Equal Protection Clause and was fueled by the
argument that per-student funding should be substantially equal
or at least not dependent upon the wealth of the school district
in which the student resided. 6 In 1973, however, the United
States Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez7 slammed the door on fiscal equity claims under the
Equal Protection Clause and thereby terminated school finance
reform litigation in the federal courts. Undaunted, school finance reformers turned to state constitutions as sources of educational rights. Only thirteen days after the Supreme Court
5. See Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 1, at 290-91.
6. See infra Part II.B.3.
7. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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handed down Rodriguez, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Robinson v. Cahill8 paved the way for school finance litigation based
solely upon state constitutions. Between 1973 and 1989, state
supreme courts issued twenty-two significant opinions in school
finance cases. 9 These cases all focused on interpretations of the
state constitutional equality provisions and/or the state education article, but continued to assert the right to an equitable allocation of educational resources. This round of state court
"1equity" litigation proved mostly unsuccessful for plaintiffs, al,
though the reformers did prevail in seven of those twenty-two
cases.10
These early cases demonstrate that the hallmark of judicial
decision-making was an unwillingness to interfere with school
finance policy on the grounds that judges are ill-equipped to
make such decisions and that no judicially manageable standards for what is a fair and equitable finance system exist. Two
early federal district court cases in which the plaintiffs alleged
that children were being denied the educational resources they
"needed" provide examples of judicial reasoning in these cases.
In Mclnnis v. Shapiro," the court rejected plaintiffs' claim because
it could not discern any "judicially manageable" standards for
defining what are children's educational needs and in Burrus v.
8. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).

9. The twenty-two "second wave" cases were Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590
(Ariz. 1973); Milliken v. Green, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); Robinson v. Cahill, 303
A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178 (Wash.
1974); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d

929 (Cal. 1976); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d
359 (Conn. 1977); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Board of

Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa.
1979); Pauley v. Kelley, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); Washakie County Sch. Dist.

No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156
(Ga. 1981); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. Of Educ, 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); Board
of Educ. Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E. 2d 359 (N.Y. 1982);
Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Hornbeck v. Somerset
County Bd. Of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Britt v. North Carolina Bd. Of Educ.,
361 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987); Fair Sch. Finance Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Ok.

1987); Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988); Kukor v. Grover,
436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989).
10. The seven "second wave" cases in which plaintiffs prevailed were Robinson
v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976); Horton
v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71

(Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelley, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); Washakie County Sch.
Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980); Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30,
651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983).

11. 293 F.Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
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Wilkerson 12 the court dismissed plaintiffs' claim and stated that
"courts have neither the knowledge, nor the means, nor the
power to tailor the public moneys to fit the varying needs of
these students throughout the State." With that line of reasoning, courts recognized early on that there may be limits to their
ability to reform educational finance schemes.
Specifically, courts seemed to be using "judicial manageability" as code for their own constraints to effectuate school fiCourts are not well-equipped to design
nance reform.
educational finance policy and do not have the latitude to make
the necessary tradeoffs among competing interests and obligations of state government and its limited budget. Moreover,
courts possess neither the power of the sword nor the power of
the purse and cannot implement their educational finance reform decrees. Indeed, even when courts do strike down educational finance schemes, they often order declaratory relief (as
opposed to injunctive, prospective, or coercive relief) and admonish the state legislature to develop and implement a new
school finance policy within the broad and often vague constitutional guidelines set forth by the court.
In a judicially ideal world, the translation of court order to
public policy would be seamless and precise. In reality, however, because courts rely on the political branches to design and
implement educational finance reform, they must persuade the
legislature to adopt and implement a funding scheme that is
consistent with the rights declaration. Getting the legislature to
act constitutes no easy feat, as a court cannot provide incentives
to or coerce the legislature and governor to act, save the largely
symbolic threat of civil contempt. This enforcement problem is
further exacerbated by subtle forms of noncompliance. Although outright defiance of educational finance decisions is not
unheard of,13 legislatures almost always "comply" to some degree with the order by crafting a remedial educational finance
scheme. The question is whether this "compliance" is so watered-down by the political process that it fails to bring about

12. 310 F.Supp. 572, 574 (W.D. Va. 1969).
13. Take, for example, the New Jersey legislature's 1976 refusal to fund the remedial school finance plan and the subsequent order of the state supreme court
shutting down the schools. See RICHARD LEHNE, THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE (1978), or

Alabama Governor Fob James's public refusal to allow some state court judge to tell
him what to do. See D. Frank Vinik, The ContrastingPolitics of Remedy: The Alabama
and Kentucky School Equity Funding Lawsuits, 22 J.EDUC. FIN. 60, 63-64 (1996).
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meaningful change in school funding. Many political interests,
including wealthy school districts and other groups with a legitimate claim to the public treasury, will oppose shifts of funds
to poor districts. Constituency and reelection pressures will
weaken the resolve of even compliance-minded legislators. And
what looked like a clear legal right and standard stated by the
court will become fuzzy and unworkable on the floor of the state
assembly. In short, law in the judicial opinion will not look exactly like law as passed by the legislature. Aware of this constraint, courts preserve their own institutional legitimacy, this
article argues, by only cautiously entering the school finance fracas.
Despite the limited success of the early litigation, however, reformers continued to press their cases in court until 1989 when
the tide turned. In that year, state high courts in Kentucky,
Montana, and Texas overturned their states' school finance systems. With that change in momentum, state high courts in the
years from 1989 to 2000 issued another twenty-four significant
decisions in educational finance reform cases and ruled in favor
of the plaintiffs in twelve of those opinions.1 4 Significantly,
many of those decisions turned almost exclusively on an interpretation of the state's education article and, perhaps more important, arguably focused on the substantive adequacy of the
education provided to the children of those states.15 Courts have
also become increasingly unafraid - at least in the abstract - to
14. The twenty-four "third wave" cases to reach final judgment by 2000 were
Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994); Sheff v.
O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996); Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in Sch.
Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So.2d 400 (Fla. 1996); Committee for Educ. rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1999); Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798 (Ill. 1999); Rose
v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 1

v. Comm'r, 659 A.2d 854 (Maine 1995); McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Exec. Off. Of Educ.,
615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993); Helena
Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d
349 (Neb. 1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993), later
proceeding, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990);
Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994); DeRolph v.

State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997); Coalition for Equitable Sch. Funding, Inc. v. State,
811 P.2d 116 (Or. 1991); Marrero v. Pennsylvania, 739 A.2d 110, (Penn. 1999); City of
Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995); Tennessee Small Sch. Systems v.
McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777
S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994); Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388 (Wis.
2000); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. Wyoming, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995).
15. See infra Section IV.F.
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make forays into educational policy-making and articulating the
rights of children to an education. Symbolic of this recent judicial activity is the Kentucky high court's pronouncement in Rose
v. Council for Better Education.16 There the Kentucky Supreme

Court held that the state legislature must provide its students
with an adequate education, which includes the opportunity to
develop seven capabilities, including, for example, sufficient oral
and written communication skills to enable them to function in a
complex and rapidly changing society and sufficient levels of
academic or vocational skills to enable them to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states. 17 In short,
courts in the last decade and a half seem more willing to intervene in educational finance policy and to define what are children's educational rights.
Consequently, scholars and commentators have argued
that the 1989 cases ushered in a new "third wave" of school finance litigation. In this wave, courts ostensibly have turned
away from equality provisions and towards education articles; 8
away from arguments based on "equity" and towards those
based on "adequacy," 19 and away from traditional legal standards of educational
"inputs" to those that measure educational
20
"outputs."

As one observer noted, this new wave of school fi-

nance reform reflects a sea change that "challenge[s] school finance systems not because some districts spend more money
than others, but because the quality of education in some districts... fails to meet a constitutionally required minimum." 21
Indeed, some have proclaimed this shift is "being driven by an
emerging consensus that high minimum outcomes should be the
orienting goal of both policy and finance." 22
Despite this momentous shift in the legal and substantive
16. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
17. See id. at 76-77.
18. See Levine, supra note 4; Thro, To Render Them Safe, supra note 4; Thro, The
Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Futureof Public School Finance Litigation, supra note 4; Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School
Finance Litigation, supra note 4; Underwood & Sparkman, supra note 4.
19. See Clune, New Answers to Hard Questions Posed by Rodriguez, supra note 4;
Clune, The Shift From Equity to Adequacy in School Finance, supra note 4, at 376; Enrich, supra note 4; Heise, supra note 4; Underwood, supra note 4.
20. See Clune, The Shift from Equity to Adequacy, supra note 4, at 376; William H.
Clune, Accelerated Education as a Remedy for High Poverty Schools, 28 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 655 (1995).
21. Heise, supra note 4, at 1153.
22. Clune, The Shift from Equity to Adequcay, supra note 4, at 376.
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educational underpinnings of school finance litigation and despite the modestly visible shift toward a more reform-oriented
state judiciary in school finance cases, a review of the judicial
opinions in the "third wave" cases suggests that educational reform litigation in the 1990's was hardly monolithic. First, in
those judicial opinions, one sees as much talk of "equity" as
"adequacy." Even as early as 1994, Julie Underwood recognized
that some courts in the third wave continued to rely on secondwave equity arguments in rendering their state school finance
schemes unconstitutional. 23 In Ohio, for instance, the primary
evidence supporting the plaintiffs' successful claim was testimony of breathtaking disparities between the state's richest and
poorest school districts. 24 Second, while some courts appeared
interested in student outcomes, others looked to educational inputs as the test for what is a lawful opportunity to learn. Hence,
the Wyoming Supreme Court directed its legislature to produce
a basket of educational resources that would provide an adequate opportunity for all children to learn. 25 Third, despite some
wins in the early part of the decade, plaintiffs have more recently lost cases. From 1989 through 1993, plaintiffs won six of
their nine cases that reached a final supreme court decision
(66%), but since then they have won only six of their last fifteen
bouts (40%).26 For instance, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the
spring of 2000 rejected without trial a finance equity claim on
behalf of 101 property-poor school districts, despite demonstrated gaps in spending between plaintiffs and the state's property wealthy districts. 27 Given the recent stumbles of the
adequacy theory, school finance scholars must question the util-

23. Julie K. Underwood, School Finance Litigation: Legal Theories, Judicial Activism, and Social Neglect, 20 J.EDUC. FIN. 143, 150 (1994).
24. DeRolph v. Ohio, 677 N.E. 2d 733, 746 (Ohio 1997).
25. See Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279 (Wyo. 1995).
26. The cases that plaintiffs won 1989-1993 were Rose v. Council for Better
Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State,
769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. V. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391
(Tex. 1989); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Tennessee Small Sch. Systems
v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive
Office of Educ., 615 N.E. 2d 516 (Mass. 1993). The cases that plaintiffs won during
1994-2000 were Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806
(Ariz. 1994); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. Wyoming, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995);
Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703
A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997); Brigham v.
State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997).
27. See Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388 (Wis. 2000).
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ity of equity and adequacy as explanations for judicial behavior
and re-examine the foundation upon which courts choose to intervene in educational finance policy.
The argument in this article is simple: jurisprudence in
school finance cases is not so much concerned with defining a
clear, enforceable right to some quality of education. 28 Rather, it
is concerned with carving out the proper role for a judiciary
wary of its ability to craft policy in such a complex area, while
mindful of its obligation to check the political branches and
maintain its own institutional presence in governance of the
state. Rather than dictate case outcomes, legal-policy concepts
such as "equity" or "adequacy" are shaped by courts to provide
them with flexibility and authority. None of this is to say that
legal theory and doctrine do not matter. On the contrary, even if
theory and doctrine are not determinative of case outcomes, the
development of legal doctrine provides the flexibility necessary
for courts to reach outcomes that are nominally grounded in the
law, responsive to the facts, but ultimately shaped by institutional concerns, among other considerations. 29

28. This article uses the term "jurisprudence" in a manner akin to Karl Lle-

wellyn's method of judicial decision-making he termed the "Grand Style." See Karl
Llewellyn, On the Current Recapture of the Grand Tradition, in JURISPRUDENCE:

REALISM IN THEORY ANY PRACTICE 217 (Karl Llewellyn ed., 1962) "The essence" of
the Grand Style, Llewellyn wrote, is "that every current decision is to be tested
against life-wisdom, and that the phrasing of the authorities which build our guid-

ing structure of rules is to be tested and is at need to be vigorously recast in the new
light of what each new case may suggest either about life-wisdom, or about a
cleaner and more usable structure of doctrine." Id.
29. This article was prepared as part of a larger study of the politics of judicial

decision-making in educational finance reform litigation. William S. Koski, Fuzzy
Standards, Institutional Constraints, and Judicial Attitudes: The Politics of State Supreme Court Decision-Making in Educational Finance Reform Litigation (2003)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University School of Education) (on file
with author). That study presented comparative case study data from two educational finance reform litigations and argued that judicial decision-making in educa-

tional finance reform cases is influenced by judges' own policy preferences and the
courts' institutional limitations.
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The Legal and Scholarly Roots of School FinanceReform
3
Litigationo
1.

The Issue

Local control is a central tenet of American public education. From the selection of teachers to the design of curriculum,
the primary locus of decision-making on educational issues has
been the local school board and its administrators. 31 Prior to the
very recent decades, state involvement in educational issues was
32
limited and federal involvement was virtually nonexistent.
By constitutional or legislative edict, all states (except Hawaii) had, until the 1970's, relied primarily on local property
taxes to finance local public schools. Although the details of any
local tax system are complex, a commonality among such systems was that the local voting public, either directly or through
elected officials, levied upon themselves a property tax intended to pay for basic municipal services, including educational facilities and the operation of schools. As property values
varied, so did local property tax bases and revenues earmarked
for school purposes. Consequently, property-rich school districts typically enjoyed lower tax rates and high tax revenues,
while property-poor districts generated lower tax revenues even
though they taxed themselves at rates equal to or greater than
their wealthy counterparts. Not only did this result in unequal
tax burden among districts within a given state, it also resulted
in unequal per-pupil spending among districts.
Recognizing the potential unfairness such a system worked
on people in low property wealth areas, particularly rural areas,
states in the first half of the twentieth century began to provide a
fixed amount per-pupil to its school districts to ensure that stu30. In addition to primary research, this paper draws on several excellent

sources of the history of educational finance reform litigation. See RICHARD ELMORE
& MILBREY MCLAUGHLIN, REFORM AND RETRENCHMENT: THE POLITICS OF
CALIFORNIA SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM (1982); Enrich, supra note 4; Heise, supra note

4; Paul A. Minorini & Stephen D. Sugarman, School Finance Litigation in the Name of
Educational Equity: Its Evolution, Impact, and Future, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN
EDUCATION: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 34 (Helen Ladd et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter
Educational Equity]; Paul A. Minorini & Stephen D. Sugarman, Educational Adequacy
and the Courts: The Promise and Problems of Moving to a New Paradigm,in EQUITY AND
ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 175 (Helen Ladd et al. eds.,

1999) [hereinafter EducationalAdequacy].
31. See FREDERICH M. WIRT & MICHAEL W. KIRST, THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF
AMERICAN EDUCATION, 126-50 (1997) (describing local governance of schools).
32. See id. at 246-52 (describing the federal role in education policy).
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dents received at least the necessary, basic resources of education. 33 These "foundation plans," however, were often modestly
funded - if funded at all - and failed to keep pace with the rising
costs of educating children, particularly children in urban com34
munities.
For its part, the federal government continues to do very little by way of funding local public schools. That which the federal government does provide is in the form of categorical grants
that earmark the monies for specific purposes such as compensatory education services for "educationally disadvantaged" youth
under Title 1,35 special education services for children with disabilities under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 36
or vocational education services and equipment under the Perkins Vocational-Technical Education Act. 37 The result of modest
state and federal contribution to funding of local schools has
been an often vast differential between property-wealthy communities that can generate sufficient revenues from local property tax and property-poor communities that cannot generate
the same level of revenues even with equal tax effort. The nowinfamous comparison between the San Antonio school districts
of Alamo Heights and Edgewood Independent demonstrates the
disparities that existed by the end of the 1960's.38 Alamo
Heights enjoyed an assessed per-pupil property value of $49,000
and spent $594 per pupil in 1970, while the predominantly
Mexican-American Edgewood Independent School District had
a property tax base of $5,960 per pupil and spent only $356 on
each student. 39 To further dramatize the difference, Edgewood
taxed itself at a rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed property value,
while Alamo Heights levied only a rate of 85 cents. 40
Although the extent of the intrastate inequality in educational funding had long been recognized by educational finance
33. See, e.g., Koski, supra note 29 (describing Wisconsin's early foundation
plan).
34. See, e.g., id. (describing Wisconsin's efforts in the 1960's to study and address the underfunding of property-poor school districts).
35. Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 6301. (West Supp.

2002).
36. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400 (West

Supp. 2002).
37. Carl D. Perkins Vocational-Technical Education Act Amendments of 1997,
H.R. 1853, 105th Cong. (1998).
38. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
39. See id. at 11-14.
40. See id.
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experts, it received little outside attention until the late 1960's.
Perhaps emboldened by the victories of the Civil Rights movement or disappointed with the pace of change in educational
equality in the wake of early desegregation efforts, social activists and scholars began to notice the differences in educational
resources available to students in different districts. Buoyed by
the victories in front of the Warren Court, these reform-minded
scholars and activists began to look to federal law and litigation
as a potential remedy for what they viewed as an unfair distribution of educational opportunities.
2.

The Legal Environment

In the United States, public education has been intertwined
with law since its inception. As David Tyack, Thomas James,
and Aaron Benavot have made abundantly clear, the law influenced and shaped education long before the Supreme Court
41
handed down the Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954.
Beginning even before the Civil War and accelerating during Reconstruction, policy-makers and educational evangelists used
law - particularly state constitutions - to mandate that the state
provide a system of common schools, specify how funds should
be raised for those schools, require that teachers be certified, and
even prescribe that certain subjects be taught.42 Guided by a
nearly religious belief in "a strong ideological connection between an educated citizenry and the success of a republican
form of government," 43 these elites used constitutional and,
later, statutory law to compel the development of a common
school system.
Notably, however, this institution-building occurred largely
outside of the courtrooms. In examining educational cases and
litigation rates in state appellate and federal courts during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Tyack, James, and
Benavot concluded that education cases formed a "very small"
proportion of all reported litigation and that judges, who were
"in general highly deferential to the professional prerogatives of
educators," were "bulwarks of the system" rather than the architects of the system. 44 Courts seldom addressed educational is41. See DAVID TYACK, THOMAS JAMES & AARON BENAVOT, LAW AND THE
SHAPING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, 1785-1954 (1987).
42. See id. at 62-63.
43. Id. at 55.
44. Id. at 66-67.
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sues that were even tangentially related to actual teaching and
learning - the province of local school boards and principals but rather adjudicated cases dealing with educational governance (e.g., creation and alteration of school districts, district
meetings, and claims against districts) and finance (e.g., district
property, contracts, and liabilities, and district debt, securities,
and taxation).45 Indeed, even when they tackled nominally
"education cases," courts most often relied on traditional common law contract and tort principles and statutory interpreta46
tion.
In the early twentieth century, however, courts paid somewhat more attention to the rights of parents to direct their children's education and the rights of ethnic and religious minority
47
groups to be free from government educational oversight.
However, the judiciary paid relatively little attention to the substantive educational opportunities to which children were entitled, save the odd case dealing with school busing 48 or fees for
tuition or instructional materials, 49 both of which potentially
45. See id. at 67-69.
46. See id. at 74-76.
47. The standard citation here is to Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925),
in which the Court crafted the delicate "Pierce Compromise," allowing parents to
send their children to private schools, while at the same time recognizing the state's
right to compel school attendance and modestly regulate private school education.
As with almost any compromise, the terms of Pierce were sufficiently vague to engender decades of litigation regarding parents' rights to direct their children's education and the rights of religious/ethnic groups to tailor their children's education
to meet their religious and cultural needs. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 218 (1972) (excepting a group of Old Order Amish students from the state's
compulsory school attendance laws after eighth grade because "secondary schooling, by exposing Amish children to worldly influences.., and by substantially interfering with the religious development of the Amish child and his integration into
the way of life of the Amish faith community at the crucial adolescent stage of development, contravenes the basic religious tenets and practice of the Amish faith,
both as to the parent and the child").
48. By the 1930s, children in many states enjoyed statutory rights to free transportation to and from public schools. See, e.g., Lyle v. State, 88 N.E. 850 (Ind.1909);
Lanphier v. Tracy Consol. Sch. Dist., 277 N.W. 740 (Iowa 1938); State ex rel. Brand v.
Mostad, 148 N.W. 831 (N.D. 1914). This right was typically not embodied in state
constitutions, however, and was ultimately found not to be a federal constitutional
right even though the failure to provide free transportation resulted in great hardship to the student's family in the case. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487
U.S. 450 (1988).
49. See, e.g., Morris v. Vandiver, 145 So. 228 (Miss. 1933) (holding that the board
of trustees had no power to make payment of athletic, literary, and library fees a
condition precedent to the right of the student to enter school); State ex rel. Roberts
v. Wilson, 297 S.W. 419, 420 (Mo. App. 1927) (noting that "[tlhe right of children...
to attend the public school established in their district for them is not a privilege
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could work to deprive students of an education. From the student's perspective, the only significant constitutionally or statutorily guaranteed right was the right to attend a common school
for free. 50 Therefore, judicial policy-making regarding students'
educational rights was virtually non-existent and is often seen as
a post-Brown phenomenon.
Yet all of this apparent judicial complacency cloaks one significant area in which courts, almost by neglect, defined the educational rights of children: race and equality of educational
opportunity. Equal treatment under the law is a fundamental
canon of American constitutional law. In a putative effort to
honor this principle, enfranchise the newly-freed slaves, and to
ensure that the political rights of African Americans are on par
with those of their white counterparts, states added the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1868. The
Amendment provides, in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any per51
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Although this fundamental precept is known to any American
high school student as a straightforward requirement that everyone is to be treated the same by the law, most high school students also understand that African Americans and other
minority groups have not enjoyed such equality in actuality.
The provision "equal protection of the laws" proved to be language malleable as clay in the hands of lawyers and jurists. So
flexible was this language that, under Plessy v. Ferguson5 2 and its
progeny, it countenanced the now-reviled practice of segregating schoolchildren on the basis of race.

dependent upon the discretion of any one, but is a fundamental right which cannot
be denied except for the general welfare" and holding that the district could not
withhold the student's certificate of attainment merely because she did not pay a
$20 tuition fee).
50. See, e.g., Bryant v. Whisenant, 52 So. 2d 525 (Ala. 1910) (reading a state statute to require that tuition shall be absolutely free, but permitting the school district
to collect a reasonable fee for heating and lighting); Maxcy v. Oshkosh, 128 N.W.
899 (Wis. 1910) (finding that Wisconsin's constitution requires the legislature to
provide for the establishment of district schools and that such schools shall be free
and without charge to children of specified ages).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
52. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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Yet in 1954, the Supreme Court wielded the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate Plessy's "separate but equal" doctrine
and abolish the practice of state-enforced racial segregation of
schoolchildren. In language quoted by courts to this day, Justice
Earl Warren, writing for a unanimous court, stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance
laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our
most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed
forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it
is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In
these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of
an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.5 3
Although segregation was a ubiquitous practice in the Jim Crow
south affecting public accommodations, transportation, and
education alike, it is no accident that the Court chose to address
the "separate but equal" doctrine in the context of education. As
Richard Kluger explained in his landmark history of the Brown
litigation, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund orchestrated a systematic attack on segregation by demonstrating that separate
educational facilities could never be equal.5 4 In Brown, not only
did the Court recognize the evils of enforced segregation and
hold that the Equal Protection Clause prevents the state from
passing legislation that discriminates among certain classes of
persons, but it also identified the importance of providing equal
educational opportunities to all children, irrespective of their
race, and as some would later argue, irrespective of zip code,
wealth, or community standing.
By the time scholars and advocates began to turn their attention to the issue of unequal school funding, the United States
Supreme Court had significantly refined its Fourteenth

53. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954).
54. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY

OF BROWN V. BOARD OF

EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976) (chronicling the

history of the NAACP's struggle for desegregation).
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Amendment analysis, employing two distinct approaches to
claims asserted under the Equal Protection Clause for discrimi55
nation among persons in different legislative classifications.
Acknowledging the role of the Court in policy-making, the separate approaches differed in the level of deference paid to the policy choice made by political branches, depending on the policy's
subject matter and character. The first and more relaxed standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause, known as the
"rational review" test, upholds a state's policy decision so long
as it reflects some rational relation between the state policy objective and the means the regulation used to achieve that objective. Most legislation falls under this category.
The second approach, which requires closer scrutiny of the
state law by the Court, is triggered when either a "fundamental
interest" is at stake or the state employs a "suspect classification." In finding the state legislation subject to strict scrutiny, the
Court requires the state to provide a compelling interest to
which the challenged legislation is narrowly tailored, and a
showing that the interest cannot be satisfied by any other
57
means.5 6 For example, in Shapiro v. Thompson, the Court struck
down a state residency statute denying welfare benefits to persons who had not resided in the state for more than a year. In
that case, the Court held that while a state had an interest in
preventing fraud in applications and in reducing costs of welfare
programs, the classification imposed was an impermissible intrusion on the constitutional right to travel from one state to another where less drastic measures were available to protect a
state's interest. 58 What would constitute "fundamental interest,"
however, was not at all clear. And whether education - which
Brown had deemed a "most important" function - was a "fundamental interest," was a question that had not been considered
by the Court.
In addition to finding a fundamental interest, the Court had
begun to invoke more intense scrutiny for legislation adversely
affecting a "suspect class" of persons. Clearly, race was recog55. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961).
56. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); see also Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Harper v. Virginia State
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395
U.S. 621 (1969).
57. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
58. See id.
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nized as a suspect class. But by the late 1960's, the Court had
begun to show a marked antipathy toward legislative classifications that discriminated on the basis of wealth. "Lines drawn on
the basis of wealth or property, like those of race... , are traditionally disfavored." 59 In the Harpercase, the Court struck down
a Virginia poll tax on the grounds that it discriminated against
voters on the basis of wealth: "To introduce wealth or payment
of a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications is to introduce a
capricious or irrelevant factor."60 The Court further stated that
"a careful examination on our part is especially
warranted
where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth... [a] factor which
would independently render a classification highly suspect and
thereby demand a more exacting judicial scrutiny." 61 For those
seeking to challenge educational finance schemes on the ground
that they discriminate against children in property poor school
districts, it may have seemed logical that such schemes discriminated against those children on the basis of wealth.
The legal groundwork had been laid. Beginning with
Brown, the Supreme Court increasingly involved itself in complex issues of social policy, particularly when those policies discriminated against persons who were categorized by suspect
classifications or when the policies infringed upon one's exercise
of a fundamental right. To scholars and advocates alike, school
finance systems that provided fewer educational opportunities
to children solely because they lived in property-poor communities appeared to be easy targets for this new jurisprudence.
However, unlike a poll tax or a policy requiring one year of state
residency before receiving public assistance, the courts could not
simply strike down the school finance scheme without providing guidance toward what would be a constitutional replacement. At least, this was the early conventional wisdom on the
subject.
3. The Strategies and Proposed Standards
Writing and plotting independently and simultaneously in
the second half of the 1960's, several legal scholars and advocates were preparing the assault on school finance systems that
provided vastly different educational opportunities to children.

59. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966)
60. Id.
61. Id.
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Although differing slightly on the details, all seemed to agree
that the legal basis for the attack Was the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the proper forum would be the federal courts, as those courts seemed to be
more willing to step in to protect the rights and liberties of persons than their relatively complacent state counterparts. Where
these scholars and advocates disagreed, however, was in their
interpretation of what was the specific constitutional wrong in
the system and what should be the judicial standards for constitutional compliance. From this early thinking, four contenders
emerged: per-pupil spending equality or "horizontal equity;"
needs-based funding equality or "vertical equity;" equal opportunity for an equal outcome or "effective equality," and the "fiscal neutrality" principle.
One Scholar, One Dollar
As a doctoral student in education at the University of Chicago, Arthur Wise became one of the early architects of the assault on the inequality produced by educational finance
systems. 62 Wise's dissertation work, which was published in
1967 under the title Rich Schools, Poor Schools, set forth not only
the factual basis and legal strategy for challenging school funding schemes, it also developed a standard that courts - specifically, federal courts - could employ in urging the development
of a constitutional educational finance system. To Wise, the central evil of educational finance schemes was their classification
of students based upon the accident of geography. Because such
schemes classify students in the state on the basis of the school
district in which they reside, and because such classification
largely determines the quality of the educational opportunity
the students receive, educational finance schemes that rely on
local property tax bases unlawfully discriminate against children
in low property wealth districts.
Wise's legal strategy wove together three independent areas
of Supreme Court equal protection jurisprudence: racial equality
in education, equality of treatment of the indigent criminal and
indigent voter, and equality among voters who reside in different geographic areas. Relying on Brown and its progeny, Wise
first argued that education was a central function of state govi.

62. See ARTHUR WISE, RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS: THE PROMISE OF EQUAL
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1967).
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ernment and must be provided to all on equal terms. 63 In examining criminal justice, Wise traced a trend in Supreme Court jurisprudence that seemed to require equality among rich and
poor in the administration of a state's criminal justice system.
For instance, the Court had held that states must provide indigent criminal defendants a free copy of their respective trial
transcripts if they wished to appeal their convictions. Similarly,
analogizing from the poll tax cases, Wise argued that the right to
vote could not be conditioned upon one's wealth. Wise reasoned
that this principle of non-discrimination of the poor in criminal
justice and voting may suggest that such equal treatment among
rich and poor should be required in education just as equal
treatment among black and white in education is required. Finally, Wise analyzed the legislative reapportionment cases and
culled the principle that the state cannot discriminate against
voters on account of their geographic residence - the Court
ruled that "one man, one vote" was the proper way to draw district voting lines. If discrimination in education on account of
race was unconstitutional and discrimination in voting on account of geography was unconstitutional, Wise reasoned that
discrimination in education on account of geography also
should be unconstitutional. 64
Even if legal precedent supported judicial intervention in
educational finance schemes, Wise cautioned, the courts would
have to fashion a definition of equal educational opportunity to
guide legislative remedies. Wise exhaustively reviewed nine
separate potential definitions of equal educational opportunity,
and ultimately concluded that the courts would most likely select a "negative definition" of equality of educational opportunity. This definition would require that a child's educational
opportunity should depend upon neither his or her parents'
economic circumstances nor his or her location within the state.
Wise believed that such a negative anti-discrimination principle
would be adopted because it is consistent with the antidiscrimination principles in the jurisprudential areas from which
his precedent was drawn and because of the simplicity of its application to the facts. The difficulty with this definition, however, is that it provides little guidance to states for what would
be a constitutional educational finance system. Thus, Wise ar63. See generally id.
64. See generally id.
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gued, states would likely adopt the "basic standard of equal dollars per pupil in order to alleviate the agonizing burden of deciding whether students of lower ability or students of higher
ability should receive higher expenditures on their education." 65
In their seminal work on the measurement of equality in educaLeanna Stiefel later called this
tional finance, Robert Berne and
66
standard "horizontal equity."
Simplicity of application aside, the "one scholar, one dollar"
standard appeared to many, including Wise, to be unsatisfying
in that it would not take into account the differential costs of doing business among districts, the differing needs of students, or
the differing pressures on the municipal budget for social services. As Wise himself suggested, courts might stray from this
absolute equality standard to allow deviations in spending for
different classifications of students.
ii. Student Needs
Writing at about the same time as Wise, Professor Harold
Horowitz of the University of California, Los Angeles Law
School was crafting a slightly different legal theory to attack
educational finance schemes and an arguably more ambitious
standard for equality of educational opportunity under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 67 To Horowitz, the constitutional infirmity of educational finance schemes was that they treated
students differently on the sole basis of geography. Horowitz
argued that a state could not discriminate among individuals in
different areas when providing public administration and services such as criminal justice, economic regulation, and legislative apportionment, unless the state could demonstrate that the
classification was "reasonable" and that there were no less onerous alternatives that the state could employ. 68 Similarly, the
state could not provide unequal educational opportunities
among territories, particularly where there are reasonable alternatives to district-based educational financing, such as redistrict65. See id. at 159.
66. See ROBERT BERNE

& LEANNA STIEFEL, THE MEASUREMENT OF EQUITY IN

SCHOOL FINANCE (1984).

67. See Harold Horowitz, Unseparate But Unequal: The Emerging Fourteenth
Amendment Issue in Public School Education, 13 UCLA L. REV. 1147 (1966); Harold
Horowitz & Diana Neitring, Equal ProtectionAspects of Inequalities in Public Education
and Public Assistance Programsfrom Place to Place Within a State, 15 UCLA L. REV. 787
(1968).
68. See Horowitz & Neitring, supra note 67, at 803-04.
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ing on a more functional basis or changing financing formulae to
equalize revenue among districts.
At first blush, Horowitz appeared to be calling for a horizontal equality standard for remedial financing schemes. But
Horowitz's original writing suggested a radically different approach. 69 There, Horowitz argued that equal protection jurisprudence could support a claim to strike down the state's
educational finance scheme where "a school board, though providing substantially the same educational programs and services
in all schools, fails to provide programs and services which adequately compensate for the inadequate educational preparation
of culturally deprived children." 70 Relying on empirical evidence that children in schools in "disadvantaged" neighborhoods perform poorly on academic achievement tests and
receive fewer educational resources, Horowitz maintained that
such children could only enjoy "equality" if they received "special programs, adapted to the specific needs of these children." 71
In Berne and Stiefel's terminology, this type of equality of educational opportunity is deemed "vertical equity." 72
As a judicial standard, however, vertical equity would pose
a serious problem for manageability on a case-by-case basis. Is
each child to receive a program that meets his or her needs?
Horowitz dismissed this concern:
The principle contended for.., is that a school board denies
disadvantaged children the equal protection of the laws if,
having a "rational basis" to do so, it fails to provide them
with an educational program as well designed to permit
achievement to the full extent of their capacities as it provides to other children. There would be no unique problem
for a court in applying such a principle: the question would
be whether there were any rationally-based alternatives
which the school board had not utilized, and, if there were,
the issuance of a decree requiring the board ... to develop a
plan for utilization of such alternatives. 73
This dismissal may have been too cavalier, however. Will the
school board know what programs, if any, will permit its students to achieve to the full extent of their capacities? For that
69. See Horowitz, Unseparate,But Unequal, supra note 67.
70. Id. at 1148.

71. Id. at 1166-67.
72. See BERNE & STIEFEL, supra note 66.
73. Id. at 1171.
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matter, how do we know what are their respective capacities?
And who will pay for these programs? Any court employing a
needs-based standard would have to address these questions
when passing on the constitutionality of a school funding
scheme.
iii. Equal Opportunityfor an Equal Outcome
Perhaps the most aggressive standard for equality of educational opportunity to arise from the early equal protection scholarship is David Kirp's call for effective equality. Kirp argued
that
[a] reconsideration of effective equality in the light of recent
and extensive educational research studies.., suggests that
the state's obligation to provide an equal educational
opportunity is satisfied only if each child, no matter what his
social background, has an equal chance for an equal
educational outcome, regardless of disparities in cost or effort that the state is obliged to make in order to overcome
such differences. 74
Drawing from the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence in the criminal procedure and voting rights domains, Kirp
opined that "[t]he right to an equal educational opportunity
merits special judicial solicitude because education shares with
criminal process and suffrage the attributes of a fundamental
right." 75 Therefore, any legislative classification schemes that
impact this fundamental right - including those that treat students differently depending upon the school district in which
they reside - are subject to searching judicial review.
But Kirp was far less concerned with what it takes to establish legal liability than he was with what it would take to ensure
equality of educational opportunity. For such a standard, Kirp
relied on the findings of educational research - particularly the
Coleman Report, an extensive study that sought to identify the
factors affecting educational achievement - and argued that any
remedy must help poor and minority youth to overcome the
conditions of their educational background. 76 Two remedial
schemes appeared most promising: integration and resource re74. David L. Kirp, The Poor, the Schools, and Equal Protection, 38 HARV. EDUC.

REV. 635, 636 (1968).
75. Id. at 642.
76. JAMES S. COLEMAN, ET AL., U.S. OFFICE OF EDUCATION, EQUALITY OF
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966).
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allocation aimed at effective equalization. Kirp argued that redistricting local school districts such that poor and minority
youth would be integrated among their wealthier and whiter
peers would "do most to better the chances of the poor, presently locked into predominantly lower class schools." 77 But
what about those districts, such as Washington D.C., for which
such redistricting would be politically or geographically unfeasible due to the sheer density of concentrated poverty among
minority children and the resistance of wealthy suburbs? Kirp's
response was reallocation of resources pursuant to the principle
of effective equalization - an equal chance for equal achievement.
Theoretically, a meaningful distinction exists between the
needs-based standard proposed by Horowitz and the outcomesoriented standard proposed by Kirp. Horowitz would have the
state compensate for educational deprivation and needs without
regard to outcome, whereas Kirp's model would focus on outcomes and what it would take to get each student to the same
high outcome. In practice, however, the technology of education
was not then so developed that it could reliably ensure educational outcomes, and even the language the scholars used to talk
about inputs and outputs standards tended to blur. Thus, Kirp
argued for a state aid formula that would "compensate as fully
as possible for inequalities of prior training and background." 78
To that end, Kirp cited with apparent approval a then-pending
lawsuit that sought a school funding formula that would consider differences in the quality of facilities presently available,
differences in the cost of providing the same facilities in different
parts of the state, and the added costs of adequately educating
disadvantaged children. Similarly, to begin to provide programs
that would help children achieve to their full capacity under the
Horowitz model, one would inevitably need to work backwards
from potential outcomes to the necessary programmatic interventions. This blurring of the lines among standards was and is
inevitable where theory vastly outpaces empirical knowledge of
what it takes to provide equal chances for equal outcomes or an
adequate education. But ambiguity is not a principle upon
which courts can act and act effectively, some would argue. The
constitutional standard must be clear.

77. Kirp, supra note 74, at 661.
78. Id. at 665.
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iv. FiscalNeutrality
Coons, Clune, and Sugarman believed fiscal neutrality was
the answer. Less than two pages into Private Wealth and Public
Education, Coons, Clune, and Sugarman set forth their modest
and clear standard for what would be a constitutional provision
of educational opportunities within a state: "The quality of public education may not be a function of wealth other than the
wealth of the state as a whole." 79 What they then called Proposition One, and what would later be dubbed the "fiscal neutrality"
principle, is a simple negative statement of what the state could
not do-discriminate against students on the basis of the wealth
of the community in which they live. Mindful of the complexity
and inherent contradictions in defining equality of educational
opportunity, Coons, Clune, and Sugarman designed a simple
and elegant principle that courts could apply, in which educational opportunity was boiled down to one simple measure: dollars. And the availability of those dollars could not depend upon
the wealth of one's neighbors. Moreover, from a separation of
powers perspective, the fiscal neutrality principle allowed the
courts to spark a major reform in educational finance policy
while permitting the legislature to tackle the intricate difficulties
of designing a fair and efficient system. A court could at once be
activist and restrained. Finally, the negative statement of fiscal
neutrality largely sidestepped the complex and evercontroversial issue of whether and how money matters in education, then known as the cost-quality debate. Under Coons',
Clune's and Sugarman's formula, there was no need to demonstrate the link between educational resources and educational
outcomes. Even today's most sophisticated educational production functions have only begun to give us reliable data on this
issue. At the time Coons, Clune, and Sugarman were writing
80
their book, the question was wide open.
Coons, Clune, and Sugarman were also mindful, however,
that their principle would continue to permit vast disparities
79.

See COONS, CLUNE, & SUGARMAN, supra note

1, at 2.

80.
[Tihe basic lesson to be drawn from the experts at this point is that the cur-

rent inadequacy of social science to delineate with any clarity the relation
between cost and quality. We are unwilling to postpone reform while we
await the hoped-for refinements in methodology which will settle the issue. We regard the fierce resistance by rich districts to reform as adequate
testimonial to the relevance of money.
Id. at 30.
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among educational opportunities and student outcomes. Their
principle did not dictate that the state must compensate for prior
inadequate schooling, "cultural disadvantage," or natural
(in)abilities. Nor did their principle prevent some localities from
choosing to spend more on their children's education than others, so long as that choice was not dependent upon the wealth of
a municipality. Indeed, Coons, Clune, and Sugarman saw the
fact that some communities could tax themselves at higher rates
to provide more educational resources to their children as a
strength of their proposal. This system would encourage educational experimentation, enhance local control, and recognize the
independence and liberty interests that communities and parents should enjoy. Coons, Clune, and Sugarman went so far as
to refuse to recommend a specific remedial finance scheme that
would jibe with Proposition One, though they clearly preferred
a form of "power equalizing" in which the state would ensure
an equal tax base among all school districts by providing aid to
those districts with low property wealth. Stated differently,
equal tax rates should provide equal spendable dollars.
Yet the fiscal neutrality principle and power equalizing
could do very little for those districts that needed the most. By
the late sixties, educational failure had become synonymous
with large, urban, minority districts. Children in such districts
often faced multiple handicapping conditions, ranging from
deep and persistent poverty to racial and cultural isolation to
greater rates of physical, emotional, and mental disabilities. Under a needs-based standard, such children required more assistance and resources. Paradoxically, however, those districts
often enjoyed greater than average commercial or industrial
property wealth. The obstacle was not the tax base, but the tax
rate. Urban residents already taxed themselves to the limit to
pay for municipal services that included amplified law enforcement, social services programs, or even waste disposal. Suffering from such "municipal overburden" and already enjoying
tax-base equalization, urban communities simply could not afford to tax themselves any more. Yet fiscal neutrality as a principle was unconcerned with this problem.
Coons, Clune, and Sugarman also parted ways with Wise,
Horowitz, and Kirp on the question of whom the attack on educational finance reform schemes was intended to benefit. Under
the horizontal, vertical, and outcome equity principles, the assumption was that children, specifically poor children, were to
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benefit from school finance reform. Under the fiscal neutrality
principle, the target of equity reform is as much the taxpayer in
low property wealth districts as it is the student in such districts.
But one could argue that this proposition would be true of any
other reform standard. Any scheme that would shift state monies or reallocate local monies to low property wealth areas
would, at least indirectly, benefit taxpayers in those property
poor communities. More nettlesome, however, is whether fiscal
neutrality would benefit poor children. It takes a modestly heroic leap of faith to suggest that poor children can be found in
property-poor school districts. Indeed, given the relative property wealth of urban school districts with high concentrations of
children in poverty, this leap is likely unwarranted. Under the
fiscal neutrality principle it is entirely possible that suburban
school districts and rural districts with little residential property
value with low concentrations of poverty, but little commercial
or industrial property wealth, would benefit most.
Judicial modesty and manageability were the touchstones
for judicial intervention and the guiding principles behind
Proposition One. Courts should only apply a negative test for
constitutionality of an educational finance system and refuse to
prescribe specific components of equality of educational opportunity. This decision was best left to the legislature, Coons,
Clune, and Sugarman argued. Yet this modesty put Coons,
Clune, and Sugarman directly at odds with the more ambitious
proposals to equalize opportunities of rich and poor children.
From the work of Wise, Horowitz, Kirp, and Coons, Clune, and
Sugarman, four theoretically distinct principles for judicial intervention in educational financing emerged. Wise, Horowitz,
and Kirp argued that courts should pay attention to the educational opportunities children received and equalize those opportunities on a dollar-for-dollar basis or compensate children for
the educational and social deprivation they suffered. How the
courts grappled and continue to grapple with these standards
demonstrates that all of the early thinking was right and all was
wrong.
III. THE EARLY FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE CASES

Presented with an issue ripe for reform and armed with coherent and potentially winning legal strategies, educational finance reform advocates were prepared to take their cases to
court. From our twenty-first century vantage point, it may be
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worth asking why the reformers chose the judicial route, rather
than the traditional avenue for policy reform: the legislature.
Perhaps this choice was due to the perception that the legislatures had proven unreceptive to claims of fiscal inequality
among school districts or that entrenched suburban interests
would be unwilling to equalize school funding absent external
pressure. Or perhaps it was because reform was being driven by
legal scholars and advocates who were comfortable with legal
forums and tools and had crafted elegant and persuasive legal
theories for why reform should occur. In any event, this institutional choice made by the advocates has left an indelible mark
on educational finance in the United States. No state legislature
undertakes finance reform without an eye toward the bench.
Many state legislatures have in fact undertaken reform because
of the bench. In the realm of school finance, unlike most other
areas of social policy, the courts have consistently played an integral role, a role that began in 1968 when the first of a tidal
wave of litigation reached the courts' dockets.
A.

The Federal Courts' Early Refusals
In February 1968, the school board of the city of Detroit and
certain individual school children in the District filed the first of
the modern school finance cases in a Wayne County, Michigan
state Circuit Court. 81 The suit alleged that the state's school aid
formula resulted in substantial disparities in the financing of
public education, and, therefore in the quality and extent of
availability of educational services and facilities.8 2 According to
David Kirp, the theory of the case was that "even equal expenditures in all districts would not be sufficient; that equally effective
education should be the end sought."8 3 Because Detroit enjoyed
a relatively strong tax base, fiscal neutrality would not be
enough: a needs-based or outcome-oriented remedy was required.
At about the same time that the Detroit case was being
pressed, legal aid attorneys representing individual students in
Chicago were bringing a similar suit before a federal three-judge
panel in the Northern District of Illinois. 84 Like the Detroit case,
81. See Kirp, supra note 74, at 665-66 (describing the litigation).
82. See id.
83. Id. at 666.
84. See Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Il1.1968), affd sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
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the lawyers in the Chicago case, Mclnnis v. Shapiro, argued that
any school finance system that did not account for differences in
student needs was violative of the federal Equal Protection
Clause.85 Unlike the Detroit case, which languished in a Michigan appellate court, the Mclnnis case was quickly heard by a
86
three judge panel.
The result of Mclnnis seemed to vindicate the Coons, Clune,
and Sugarman stance that courts should not act in the realm of
school finance unless they could articulate a clear standard for
constitutionality. 87 The "student needs" standard was anything
but clear. The court rejected the student lawyers' claim on two
separate grounds. First, although acknowledging the breathtaking disparities that result from the property-tax-based finance
scheme, the court refused to adopt the then-novel concept of
heightened scrutiny of the educational finance scheme, instead
applying the rational review test.88 Finding that the school funding scheme was rationally related to the state's interest in providing local control over educational decision-making, the court
ruled that the finance scheme passed constitutional muster. 89 As
a second, independent ground, the court held that the lack of
judicially manageable standards prevented it from venturing
into the thicket of student needs. 90 Fresh in the court's memory
was the recent perceived failure of the judiciary to bring about
meaningful desegregation in the aftermath of Brown. In a
footnote, the Mclnnis court noted that the recent bussing-related
upheavals were accomplished legislatively, not judicially; at
another point, the court warned of wealthy flight from public
schools should their local taxes be recaptured and reallocated to
property poor school districts. 91 Institutional limitations sufficed
for the court to uphold the state's funding scheme. Shortly after
the Mclnnis decision, a federal district court in Virginia cited
93
Mclnnis and adopted its reasoning. 92 In Burruss v. Wilkerson,
the court, with scant analysis, flatly stated that "the courts have
85. See id.
86. See id. at 328-29.
87. See id. at 335.
88. See id. at 331-32.
89. See id. at 332.
90. See Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 335-36 (N.D. Il1. 1968), affd sub
nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
91. See id. at 332 n.14.
92. See Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), affid. 397 U.S. 44
(1970).
93. Id. at 572.
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scant analysis, flatly stated that "the courts have neither the
knowledge, nor the means, nor the power to tailor the public
moneys to fit the varying needs of these students throughout the
state."94
The Mclnnis plaintiffs appealed the adverse ruling and, per
federal appellate procedure, the case went directly to the U.S.
Supreme Court.95 In a per curiam memorandum decisionwithout a written opinion-the high court affirmed the trial
court's ruling. 96 Technically, this disposition was a decision on
the merits, binding on all lower federal courts - and state courts
- seeking to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment in educational
finance cases. But, as argued by Coons, Clune, and Sugarman,
the high court's ruling need not have been taken as the final
97
word on school finance litigation under the federal theory.
Due to the hurried nature of the litigation and the perfunctory
development of the underlying facts and legal theories throughout several jurisdictions, the Supreme Court may have been
waiting for a better moment to express its thoughts on the issue.
That moment would inevitably come.
B.

98
The Bellwhether Case? Serrano v. Priest

1. The Setting
All the necessary people were in California in 1968. Derrick
Bell, Jr. had recently taken the helm at the Western Center on
Law and Poverty in Los Angeles, a federally-funded public interest law office whose mission was to provide litigation support
for legal services agencies in the region and taking on cases having a widespread impact for poor people. 99 Although the Western Center had little experience with educational issues, Bell was
impressed with the idea of tackling what seemed to be an obvious roadblock to success for poor children.1 00 Professor Harold
Horowitz at the University of California, Los Angeles was eager
to put to the test the theories he developed in the legal jour94. Id. at 574.

95.
96.
97.
98.

See Burrus v. Wilkerson, 397 U.S. 44 (1970).
Id.
See COONS, CLUNE & SUGARMAN, supra note 1, at 311-15.
487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (Serrano I). The historical description in this sec-

tion relies heavily on Reform and Retrenchment: The Politics of California School Finance
Reform. See ELMORE & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 30, at 13-73.

99. See id. at 21-22.
100. See id. at 22.
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nals. 101 Later, David Kirp would join the faculty at the School of
Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley and John
Coons would visit at the Boalt School of Law in Berkeley, inviting his student, Stephen Sugarman, to join him for the year.102
The lawyers would find the ideal plaintiff in John Serrano, Jr., a
social worker and father of children who attended a poorly
funded school in East Los Angeles.
That the Western Center was involved in the issue of school
finance litigation in California was in itself noteworthy. In later
years, educational finance reform cases were often spearheaded
by school district administrators, school board members, and
their lawyers. They sought a greater share of the state's education budget. But in the early days of school finance reform litigation, the civil rights attorneys like those at the Western Center
and a network of school finance reform advocates were the ones
pushing the agenda. 103 The American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) and the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People's Legal Defense Fund (NAACP) routinely cocounseled the cases on behalf of plaintiffs or filed amicus curiae
briefs in support of the plaintiffs.
This attention of civil rights activists reflected a shift in the
focus of educational rights advocacy away from desegregation
to a direct assault on the provision of equal resources to students. The NAACP's ultimate strategy was not to enforce Plessy
v. Ferguson's"separate but equal" doctrine and seek equalization
of educational resources in black in white schools, but rather, to
attack the very existence of segregated schools. As Richard Kluger noted, state-sponsored segregation itself was the evil to be
attacked. 104 Others may have believed that integration, effectively "tying" the fortunes of black children to those of white
children, was the only way that equal resources would ever be
provided in a racist society.
Whatever the motivation for the desegregation strategy, the
focus of advocacy began to shift by the late 1960's and early
1970's as disappointment grew over the inefficacy of the desegregation strategy and disillusionment grew over the ideal of in-

101.
102.
103.
(1984).
104.

See id. at 26-27.
See id. at 29.
See Michael W. Kirst et al., Policy Issue Networks, 13 POL'Y STUD. J. 247, 253
See Kluger, supra note 54, at 718-19.
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tegration. 105 Although aided by the carrot of Title I monies and
the stick of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the pace of integration
had been agonizingly slow since the 1954 Brown decision, due to
southern massive resistance and the difficulty of demonstrating
unlawful segregation in northern and western states. 10 6 Although the Supreme Court did not definitively address the issue
until 1973,107 it was becoming evident due to the appointment of

conservatives to the high court in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
that the Court would require evidence of intentional (de jure)
segregation to prove a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
rather than mere de facto segregation. Because legally enforced
segregation in the northern and western states was seldom
clearly evidenced, proof of such de jure segregation was more
difficult. This difficulty was coupled with the increasing inefficacy of the desegregation remedy in the face of "white flight"
from the urban centers. Desegregation litigation was becoming
more difficult and providing less fruitful remedies. Additionally, a rift was growing within the African American community
over the desirability of integration as a remedy, as opposed to
neighborhood or separate schools. Harkening back to W.E.B.
Dubois's suggestion that blacks might be better off with truly
equal and separate schools, 10 8 some (including Derek Bell) began
to question whether the African American community uniformly supported integration. 10 9 Given desegregation's growing
difficulty, inefficacy, and undesirability (for some), turning toward resource equalization made sense for civil rights litigators.
All the facts were present in California in 1968. The state
school funding system relied heavily upon local property taxes.
About 55% of local revenues came from local property taxes,
while 35% of those revenues came from state sources, mostly
through a traditional foundation plan. 10 More significant, there
was considerable disparity in property wealth, tax rates, and local revenues among districts in the state. Per pupil assessed
valuation varied by a ratio of 1 to 10,000 from the poorest to the
105. See Minorini & Sugarman, EducationalAdequacy, supra note 30, at 187-188.
106.

See MARK G. YUDOF, ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW, 389-99 (4th

ed. 2002).
107. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).

108. See W.E.B. Dubois, Does the Negro Need Integrated Schools?, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC.
328 (1935).
109. See Derrick A. Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests
in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976)
110. See ELMORE & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 30, at 3.
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wealthiest districts."' Plaintiffs would contrast the fortunes of
Baldwin Park with those of nearby Beverly Hills. In 1968-69,
Beverly Hills enjoyed a per-pupil assessed valuation of $50,885,
while the largely minority Baldwin Park suffered a $3,706 valuation. 112 These disparities were naturally reflected in per-pupil
expenditures, where Beverly Hills lavished $1,231.72 on each of
its students, whereas Baldwin Park could afford to spend only
$577.49 per student.11 3 This difference prevailed in spite of the
fact that Baldwin Park taxed itself more aggressively than Bev114
erly Hills.
Finally, the California Supreme Court seemed like the right
court. Under the direction of the legendary Chief Justice Roger
Traynor, the court enjoyed a national reputation for tackling
complex legal issues that would ultimately shape the social and
policy landscape in the state and nation.1 15 The court had developed novel theories of liability against manufacturers and retailers of products that injured the public, even where the injured
persons could not prove that the product actually caused the injury. 116 The court also was where other state courts looked for
developments in criminal law, including the rule excluding from
trial all evidence seized illegally by police. 117 Further, the court
had applied its intellectual prowess to reshape the arcane and
technical choice-of-law doctrine so that it maintained its theoretical consistency and rigor.118 Traynor and the California Supreme Court enjoyed the respect of jurists and courts
throughout the country. Although Chief Justice Traynor would
111. See id. at 3.
112. See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Cal. 1971) (Serrano1).
113. See id. at 1248

114. See id. at 1252, 1260.
115. See Benjamin Thomas Field, Justice Roger Traynor and His Case for Judicial
Activism vi-vii (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California,
Berkeley) ("Traynor and his brethren gained the reputation as the leading state
court in the nation.").

116. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring) (setting forth Traynor's theory that manufacturers should be held
strictly liable for consumer injuries caused by design or manufacturing defects);

Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (becoming the
first court in the nation to adopt the rule of strict products liability); see also Field,
supra note 115, at 150-89.
117. See People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955); see also Field, supra note 115, at
110-49.
118.

See Grant v. McAulliffe, 264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953)(holding that the choice of

law question is procedural in nature).
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retire by the time the Serrano case reached the high court, all the
ingredients seemed present for a revolution in educational finance led by well-crafted legal theory and a court unafraid to
adopt that theory.
2.

The Decision

On August 30, 1971, the California high court concluded
that a line of U.S. Supreme Court cases established the twotiered test for constitutionality under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 119 For most public policies and legislation, a presumption of constitutionality existed
and the mere rationality test would apply. For those legislative
decisions that drew lines on the basis of a suspect class or those
that infringed upon a fundamental interest, heightened scrutiny
applied-the state would be required to justify its policy or legislation by demonstrating that the law served a compelling state
interest and that the distinctions drawn by the law were necessary for fulfilling that interest.
The Serrano I court found both a fundamental interest in
education and a suspect class in those who suffered from poverty. 120 Although there was no direct authority for this position,
the court relied on language from Brown regarding the indispensable role of education in the modem industrial state and the influence of education in the development of citizens for
participation in community life to proclaim that education was a
fundamental right.12' Focusing on criminal procedure and voting rights decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, the California
court concluded that the Supreme Court had established that
classifications based on an individual's wealth required exacting
scrutiny. 22 The court made this finding even though it was not
at all clear that poor people necessarily lived in property poor
districts. The constitutional evil here, the California court clarified, was not only that poor people may live in low property
wealth school districts, but also that any funding scheme that
makes the child's educational funding dependant upon the
wealth of the district-that is, the wealth of her neighbors-must
be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. 123 The Serrano court
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249-50 (Cal. 1971) (Serrano1).
See id. at 1254-55.
See id. at 1256-57.
See id. at 1257-58.
See id. at 1260.
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thereby adopted the fiscal neutrality principle.
In defending its school finance scheme, the state first argued
that the scheme was narrowly tailored to meet the compelling
state interest of maintaining local control over educational decision-making. 124 The Serrano.court rejected this argument for two
reasons. First, even if rejection of the current school funding
scheme resulted in a greater role for the state in the way that
schools are financed, there was no reason local school districts
should lose any control over decision-making in administrative
matters. 25 Second, if the state were truly interested in local control to encourage experimentation and account for differences in
regional educational needs, the state should be willing to amplify funding for those poor school districts that could not afford
such experimentation. 126 Indeed, local control was little more
than a "cruel illusion" for poor school districts.
Second, the state employed the classic "slippery slope" argument, contending that if the court invalidated the educational
finance scheme as discrimination on the basis of the wealth of
the political district in which the plaintiffs resided, the next logical conclusion would require the invalidation of statutes providing for numerous government activities supported by local
taxes, ranging from waste disposal to fire protection and the
concomitant destruction of local government. 127 The court
summarily dismissed this argument, citing the "uniqueness" of
education among government services. 128 The court concluded
that education is unique because of its centrality in the state constitutional scheme, the role it plays in developing the ability of
citizens to participate in the political process, and the importance it has in ensuring that citizens may compete in the modem
economy. 129 In sum, the court held that the plaintiffs had adequately plead their complaint and that a trial should be held to
determine whether the plaintiffs could present evidence to sus30
tain the allegation that the system was unconstitutional.
The California Supreme Court would not issue a decision
on the merits in the Serrano case until December 30, 1976, some

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See id.
See Serrano, 487 P.2d. at 1260 (Serrano1).
See id.
See id. at 1262-63.
See id. at 1263.
See id.
See id. at 1266.
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five years and four months after the Serrano I decision. 131 Much
happened in the interim. As discussed below, the United States
Supreme Court weighed in on the educational finance issue and
held that the federal Equal Protection Clause did not prohibit
disparities in educational funding among districts and did not
require state systems to be fiscally neutral.132 The state-level policy actors and some of the legal players changed, and the California State Assembly enacted SB 90 in an effort to preempt a
finding that the state's educational finance system was unconstitutional. 133 Senate Bill 90, by all accounts, "did not radically alter
the existing school finance system." 134 The legislation maintained the state's foundation plan but increased the flat grants
provided to all school districts, thus potentially exacerbating
inequality, rather than closing the gap. 135 The state did attempt
to equalize the funding formula by including a "revenue limit"
that capped spending in high wealth districts and narrowed the
spending gap over time, 136 but even this modest equalizer was
rendered meaningless by another provision that allowed local
districts to override the spending cap. 37 Naturally unsatisfied
with SB 90, the Serrano lawyers argued in the trial court that the
legislative attempt at equalization fell short of the constitutional
mark.138
After a sixty-day trial, a Los Angeles Superior Court Judge
agreed with the plaintiffs and struck down the state's educational finance system, including SB 90, under the principles set
forth in Serrano .139 Plaintiffs' lawyers had demonstrated to the
satisfaction of the court that SB 90 would result in much the
same inequality as the previous system 40 The trial court, unsurprisingly, ordered that the legislature pass a new school
funding system that meets the dictates of Serrano 1.141 But it also
ordered that the new system should produce per-pupil expenditure differences among districts of no more than $100.142 This
131. See Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) (SerranoII).
132. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1.
133. See ELMORE & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 30, at 51, 106-11.
134. Id.
135. Id.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 51
Id. at 52.
Id.
See ELMORE & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 30, at 65.
Id. at 65-66.
Id. at 66.
Id.
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order was puzzling in light of the fact that Serrano I purportedly
focused on fiscal neutrality, not equality of educational opportunity in terms of dollars spent. The decision was appealed di143
rectly to the California Supreme Court.
The California Supreme Court's Serrano II decision largely
reiterated the applicable legal test, with one small modification.' 44 In light of the U.S. Supreme Court's Rodriguez decision, 145 the California court applied the California constitution's
equal protection provision, rather than the federal Constitution's
Equal Protection Clause. 146 The decision upheld the trial court's
conclusion, holding that California's funding system, including
SB 90, was unconstitutional. 47 But the Serrano II court did little
to clarify whether the constitutional concern was fiscal neutrality
or equality of educational opportunity. 48 Nor did it do much to
reconcile the concept of fiscal neutrality with concerns about
revenue-raising ability in those districts plagued by municipal
and educational overburden. The court cryptically stated:
Substantial disparities in expenditures per pupil among
school districts cause and perpetuate substantial disparities
in the quality and extent of availability of educational opportunities. For this reason the school financing system before
the court fails to provide equality of treatment to all the pupils in the state. Although an equal expenditure level per
pupil in every district is not educationally sound or desirable
because of differing educational needs, equality of educational opportunity requires that all school districts possess an
equal ability in terms of revenue to provide students with
substantially equal opportunities for learning. The system
before the court fails in this respect, for it gives high-wealth
districts a substantial advantage in obtaining higher quality
staff, program expansion and variety, beneficial teacherequipment and materipupil ratios and class sizes, modern
149
als, and high-quality buildings.
The first two sentences and the first clause of the third sentence
seem to point to an equality of educational opportunity standard, one that takes into account educational needs. But the re143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976) (SerranoII).
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1.
See Serrano, 557 P.2d at 949-51 (Serrano II).
Id. at 940.
Id. at 939-47.
Id. at 939.
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mainder of the paragraph retreats to the language of fiscal neutrality. Clearly the court found something wrong with the educational finance system, but it did not articulate the precise locus
and nature of the constitutional defect. 150 The court's choice of
remedy also provided little guidance. Rather than setting forth
the outlines of a constitutional system, the court simply repeated
that there are "several" systems of educational financing that
would not violate the wealth-neutrality principle and sent the
matter back to the legislature with the following entreaty:
We are confident that the Legislature, aided by what we have
said today and the body of scholarship which has grown up
about this subject, will be able to devise a public school financing system which achieves constitutional conformity
from the standpoint of educational opportunity through an
equitable structure of taxation. 151
Nothing was said about the trial court's $100 band of constitutionality.
The Serrano litigation's political aftermath was as tumultuous as the case itself. The legislature eventually passed a funding scheme that did much to equalize expenditures, but the
public revolted against local property taxes and passed Proposition 13-a property tax limitation measure which has had a stifling effect on public school expenditures in the state.1 52 The
California Supreme Court, however, has not directly ruled on
the constitutionality of the system since Serrano II.
The impact of Serrano I cannot be understated. In the immediate aftermath, a United States District Court in Minnesota
adopted the fiscal neutrality standard, and struck down Minnesota's educational finance scheme.153 Litigation quickly was
150. It is worth noting that in a 1992 case, Butt v. California,842 P.2d 1240, 1251
(Cal. 1992), the California Supreme Court had the opportunity to interpret the
Serrano I & II decisions and found that those decisions and the California Constitution embraced the equality of educational opportunity principle:
It therefore appears well settled that the California Constitution makes
public education uniquely a fundamental concern of the State and prohibits maintenance and operation of the common public school system in a
way which denies basic educational equality to the students of particular
districts. The State itself bears the ultimate authority and responsibility to
ensure that its district-based system of common schools provides basic
equality of educational opportunity.
Id.
151. Serrano, 557 P.2d at 957 n.54 (SerranoI1).
152. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA.
153. See Van Duzartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
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filed in dozens of other state courts. State legislatures convened
task forces to study the extent to which their funding schemes
were susceptible to a Serrano-style attack. 54 And, in what would
be the federal courts' controlling case, a federal three-judge
panel in Texas adopted the fiscal neutrality principle and
155
Serrano'sreasoning to invalidate Texas' school finance system.
Once again, the bellwhether state with the bellwether court appeared to be setting the tone for reform across the nation.
C.

Rodriguez and the End of Federal Equal Protection Clause
Litigation

Under Chief Justice Earl Warren, the U.S. Supreme Court
launched the Equal Protection Revolution that provided greater
protections for the rights of the criminally accused, voters, people of color, and the poor.156 Writing at the crest of this Revolution, school finance scholars believed it almost inevitable that the
Court would wield the Equal Protection Clause to strike down
unequal educational finance schemes. 157 Even University of
Chicago Professor Phillip Kurland, who was critical of Wise's
work, conceded that the Supreme Court would recognize some
kind of equal protection right to equality of educational opportunity. 158 By 1973, when the Rodriguez case reached the high
court, however, the Court's composition had changed. Gone
was Justice Earl Warren and the more liberal bench. In his stead
sat three conservative Nixon appointees - Chief Justice Warren
Burger and Associate Justices Harry Blackmun and William
Rehnquist. William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall still anchored the left-leaning side of the Court. Justices Byron White
and William Douglas often cast votes similar to those of Brennan
and Marshall, but Justices Potter Stewart and Lewis Powell were
wildcards. The optimism of the early school finance thinkers
may have been premature.
At the time, many school finance reform advocates were
critical of the stubborn lawyer from San Antonio who doggedly

154. See KOSKI, supra note 29 (describing the response of the Wisconsin legislature to the Serrano decision).
155. See Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex.
1971).
156. See supra Part II.B.3.i.
157. See supra Part 11.B.3.
158. See Phillip Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional JurisprudenceUndefined, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 583 (1968).
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pressed his case and intentionally chose a three-judge district
court panel so that his cases would be on the fast-track to the
U.S. Supreme Court. 159 Lacking the appellate experience and
perhaps the theoretical sophistication to master the intricacies of
school finance reform, attorney Arthur Gochman may not have
been the ideal candidate to bring the school finance issue before
the Supreme Court. 160 Critics felt that he was being too hasty in
taking the issue to the Court, allowing insufficient time for theory and practice to develop among the states. 161 Yet the facts of
Gochman's Rodriguez case could hardly be more compelling.
Poor Latino families were taxing themselves at a higher rate in
their Edgewood Independent School District than their wealthier peers in Alamo Heights, but Edgewood's children were enjoying much narrower educational opportunities than Alamo
Heights children. 62 If fiscal neutrality was the test - as the district court held - then the basic facts were there for a plaintiff
63
victory.1
In the end, the plaintiffs and the school-finance reform
movement lost by the narrowest five-to-four margin,-with Powell and Stewart joining the Nixon appointees in the majority. 64
Gochman argued that under an equal protection analysis wealth
was a suspect class, and that education was a fundamental right
that triggered strict scrutiny1 65 The majority was not persuaded
and refused to apply any form of heightened scrutiny. 166
1. No Suspect Classification
A subtle elegance-some might say sleight of hand-of the
fiscal neutrality principle was that the actual flesh-and-blood
plaintiffs need not necessarily be identified. These plaintiffs
could be the taxpayers who labored under a burdensome tax
rate, reaping little revenue. They could be children whose parents and neighbors owned property that had a relatively low assessed value. The only certainty was that the current funding
159. See ELMORE & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 30, at 53.
160. See id.
161. Id.
162. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 11-13.
163. Admittedly, this oversimplifies the complexity of the factual determinations
to be made, but the fundamental factual findings could have been made on Gochman's record.
164. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 3.
165. Id. at 17-18.
166. Id. at 18.
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system in Texas, like that in California, made a link-unlawful
under the fiscal neutrality principle-between assessed property
values and educational expenditures.
But it was precisely this ambiguity upon which the Court
seized. The majority specifically charged that "there is reason to
believe that the poorest families are not necessarily clustered in
the poorest property districts." 167 For this proposition, the Court
cited a student note from the Yale Law Journal that published
data from a study of Connecticut's financing system and was not
a part of the record in the case. 168 Plaintiffs never had a chance
to subject the study and its author to cross-examination. To the
Court, however, the failure to identify a "suspect class" of poor
people was fatal.169 Noting that the plaintiffs identified only a
"large, diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth," the Court concluded that:
[t]he system of alleged discrimination at the class it defines
have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class
is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a
history of purposeful treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process. 70
The Court also distinguished this case from the indigent
criminal and poll tax cases by arguing that in those cases, the
plaintiffs suffered an absolute deprivation of the desired bene.fit.' 71 On the contrary, Edgewood children still attended school,
even though the quality of education they received was allegedly lower than their Alamo Heights peers. 72 Although the
Equal Protection Clause could not countenance the absolute
deprivation of education to a suspect class of children - a principle the Court later applied to strike down a state statute that denied public education to undocumented children 173 - no such
deprivation had been demonstrated in the Rodriguez case. The
Court thus had found the Achille's Heel of the fiscal neutrality
167. Id. at 23.
168. Id. at 23 n.53 (citing Michael J. Churgin et al., A Statistical Analysis of the
School Finance Decisions:On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303, 132829 (1972)).
169. Id. at 28-29.
170. Id. at 28.
171. See id. at 21.
172. See id.
173. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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principle. Despite its apparent clarity, it was not at all clear
whose rights would be vindicated by enforcement of the principle.
2. No FundamentalInterest
Although the Brown Court proclaimed that education was
"perhaps the most important function of state and local governments," the Rodriguez Court did not find it so important as
to earn "fundamental interest" status. 174 The Rodriguez Court
recognized that education may affect other fundamental interests such as the right to vote and participate in First Amendment
freedoms, but it felt that this mere relationship was not enough,
given that there had been no demonstration that the Texas educational system failed to provide each child with the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of free speech
and participation in the political process. 175 Instead, the Court
looked to the text of the federal Constitution to determine
whether education was among the rights afforded explicit protection. 7 6 The word "education" does not even appear in the
Constitution. Nor could the Court find education in the "penumbra" of the explicit rights within the constitution. .177 Thus,
education was not among those rights, which when infringed,
would merit strict scrutiny.
3. Local Control
Finding no suspect class to protect and no fundamental interest to police, the Court analyzed the state's school finance
scheme under the traditional rational relation test that applied to
most reviews of social and economic legislation. 178 The Court
easily found a legitimate state interest in the form of local control over education. 179 Noting first that it was ill-suited to make
complex decisions regarding state and local taxation, the Court
also found that judicial intrusion was ill-advised in cases in
which it was not at all clear whether educational expenditures
correlated with the quality of education delivered. 180 The Court

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 18.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 35-36.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 44.
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 43.
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supported this proposition by citing the progeny of the Coleman
Report, which indicated that the cost-quality debate was far from
settled. 181 Better to leave such decisions to local educational
agencies, the Court reasoned. 82 The Texas school funding
scheme furthered the legitimate goal of local control.
Writing for three of the dissenters, Justice Marshall at83
tempted to systematically take apart the majority opinion.
Granted, there is a good deal to complain about in the logic of
the majority. However, there is also much to complain about in
the logic of the dissent. Singling education out for fundamental
status may not be completely arbitrary, but it borders on such
when compared with other needs such as housing and police
protection. Equating the poor with those who live in propertypoor school districts is a leap of faith. While there is much that
is irrational about a system that ties educational expenditures to
property wealth of a district, similar difficulties would inhere in
a one-scholar, one-dollar system, or in the potential impracticalities of a needs-based system. Attitudes toward the poor aside,
the Court may well have felt that the policy implications were
too far reaching for the Justices to resolve. Thus school finance
litigation came to an end in the federal court system.
IV. JUDICIAL FEDERALISM: SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION
IN STATE COURTS AFTER RODRIGUEZ

Recognizing the conservative tendency of his brethren on
civil rights and civil liberties issues, U.S. Supreme Court Justice
William Brennan, in an article in the Harvard Law Review,
called for a re-awakening of state constitutional law:
[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections of the federal Constitution. State
constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law. The legal
revolution which has brought federal law to the fore must
not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of
state law - for without it, the full realization of our liberties

181. See id. at 43 n.86 (citing U.S. Office of Education, Equality and Educational
Opportunity (1966); The Coleman Report: On Equality of Educational Opportunity (F.
Mosteller & D. Moynihan eds., 1972)).

182. See id. at 49-52.
183. See id. at 70-133 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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cannot be guaranteed. 84
Brennan's admonition highlights a peculiarity in our federal system of government. Not only do state legislatures develop significant law and policy wholly apart from Washington, D.C., but
so too do state supreme courts. One caveat applies, however,
state supreme courts can always interpret their own constitutions to provide greater protections for individual rights and liberties than the U.S. Constitution, but they can never interpret
those documents as providing less protection. In other words,
state constitutional interpretation of civil rights and liberties is a
one-way ratchet that can move up from the Bill of Rights, but
not down.
Even before Justice Brennan's article, several state supreme
courts had begun to exercise this "new judicial federalism" to
provide greater protections for individuals in areas in which the
federal courts had demonstrated reluctance. For instance, California had expanded the Miranda protections to preclude the introduction into evidence of statements taken from criminal
suspects prior to receiving their Miranda warnings, even if the
statements were to be used for impeachment purposes.185 Likewise, contrary to U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the Michigan
Supreme Court held that criminal suspects were entitled to assistance of counsel at any pretrial lineup or photographic identification procedure. 186 More germane in this context, just thirteen
days after the U.S. Supreme Court handed down Rodriguez, the
New Jersey Supreme Court looked to its own constitution to accomplish what the Nixon appointees would not. 187
A.

Robinson v. Cahill Sets the (Flexible) Standard

1. The Setting
In Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub, the New Jersey Supreme
Court had its own Roger Traynor. In 1973, when Robinson v. Cahil188 reached the New Jersey high court, Weintraub was in his
final year of a fifteen-year stint as Chief Justice. 189 The Wein184. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).

185. See People v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272, 275 (Cal. 1976).
186. See People v. Jackson, 217 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Mich. 1974).
187. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. V. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1.

188. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
189. See LEHNE, supra note 13, at 44-46.
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traub court's actions supported Weintraub's belief that the court
had a creative responsibility to make the law, as the court revamped the law of product liability to provide greater protections for consumers, intervened in legislative reapportionment
policy, and openly criticized the U.S. Supreme Court's constitutionalization of criminal procedure because it lacked the sensitivity to current conditions that the common law possessed. 190
This court was not one to back down from a policy fight.
In its school finance system, New Jersey also had the functional equivalent of California. According to the Robinson
court's opinion, local property taxes provided 67%of the statewide total of school operating expenses, state aid provided 28%,
and federal aid provided the 5% balance.1 9' There was no disagreement among the parties that there was a disparity among
districts in the dollars spent per pupil and that such a disparity
was due to differential property tax bases. The state aid formula, in short, did little to equalize these disparities. There was
disagreement, however, on whether these financial differences
led to a disparity in the quAlity of education. Both sides provided expert witness testimony on the cost-quality issue, but in
the end the court relied primarily on logic rather than social science for its answer.
[I]t is... clear that there is a significant connection between
the sums expended and the quality of the educational opportunity. And of course the Legislature has acted upon that
premise in providing State aid on formulas designed to ameliorate in part the dollar disparities generated by a system of
local taxation. Hence we accept the proposition that the quality of educational opportunity does depend in substantial
measure upon the number of dollars invested, notwithstanding that the impact upon students may be unequal because of
192
other factors, natural or environmental.
Accordingly, all the necessary factual findings for a traditional equal protection analysis were present. Weintraub, writing for a unanimous court, however, had a different view of the
law.

190. See id.
191. See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 276 (N.J. 1973).
192. Id. at 277.
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2. A New Legal Hook and a Fuzzy Standard
i. Equal Protection
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez made it
easy for Weintraub to dispose of plaintiffs' federal Equal Protection Clause claim. But plaintiffs' lawyers were prepared for just
such a circumstance and had preserved for appeal their argument that the funding scheme violated the equal protection provision implicit in the New Jersey state constitution. 193 Although
the New Jersey constitution does not have an equal protection
clause per se, like most other states' constitutions, New Jersey's
constitution has an equality provision that state courts had interpreted much like the federal Equal Protection Clause. Weintraub quickly pointed out that there was no reason why the state
supreme court could not interpret the state equality provision
differently from the Fourteenth Amendment to provide greater
protections to the citizens of New Jersey. 194 Weintraub specifically noted that principles of federalism, which caution the federal courts about intervening in matters that are of a strictly state
or local nature, are not present when state courts are interpreting
their own constitutions. 195
However, the New Jersey court was unwilling to use the
state's equal protection provision to strike down the school finance scheme. 196 First, the court was highly critical of the concepts of "fundamental rights" and "compelling state interests"
because they were too vague to be meaningfully applied. 197
Granted, if the discrimination perpetrated by the state was invidious, the court would hold the state action to a higher level of
scrutiny. But the mechanical invocation of "fundamental rights"
does not advance the inquiry, Weintraub wrote. 98 Nor did
Weintraub find the Supreme Court's "textual basis" analysis
helpful99 After all, he wrote, both the federal and state constitutions provide that citizens have the right to acquire and hold
property, but surely this interest could not be singled out for

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

See id. at 276.
See id. at 286.
See id. at 282.
See id. at 286-87.
See Robinson, 303 A.2d at 282.
See id. at 282.
See id.
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heightened protection. 200 Finally, the concept of a "compelling
state interest" shed little light. Rather, Weintraub wrote that
under the equal protection provision of the New Jersey constitution, the proper test was a flexible balancing calculus that
weighed the "nature of the restraint or the denial against the apparent public justification, and decide[d] whether the State action [was] arbitrary." 20 1 If bright-line clarity and predictability
are supposed to be the hallmarks of a judicial standard, this ad
hoc balancing test misses the mark. But if flexibility and responsiveness to current conditions are the goals, as Weintraub believed, the fuzzy balancing test hits its mark.
Applying the balancing test to the educational finance system, the court was quick to point out that education "is handled
no differently than sundry other essential services" and there20 2 Other services,
fore should receive no heightened protection.
such as police, fire protection, and public assistance were
equally essential to people who received them. To ensure equality among local governments in the provision of one such service would require equality in the provision of all such services.
Merely because a state provided a service, Weintraub wrote,
does not mean that the service must be provided on an equal basis.203

To equate differentials in spending on government ser-

vices among local governments with discrimination on the basis
of wealth would result in the fundamental alteration of the political structure. Thus, in sharp contrast to the California Supreme Court, the New Jersey Supreme Court employed the
slippery slope argument to buttress its rejection of the fiscal neutrality principle.
ii. The EducationArticle and the "Adequacy" Standard
Virtually every state constitution addresses the issue of providing a public education. The specific language of these
constitutional provisions differs, sometimes dramatically, from
state to state, depending upon the historical conditions under
which the language was adopted. In the New England states,
whose provincial charters and constitutions often predated the
Common School movement, the language is aspirational in calling upon the legislatures to "cherish" or "encourage" literature,
200.
201.
202.
203.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 283.
See Robinson, 303 A.2d at 285-86.
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the arts and sciences, and the establishment of grammar
schools.204 In the western states, whose admission to the union
was routinely conditioned upon the establishment of common
schools, the education provision frequently makes it the duty of
the legislature to provide a "uniform," "thorough," "common,"
or "general" system of schools. 205 Finally, the state constitutions
of the former Confederacy often bear the marks of the radical
Reconstructionists who sought to ensure that public education
was available to all children in the state - black and white - and
that such education be provided "uniformly."206

In the New Jersey case, the Robinson attorneys argued that
New Jersey's constitutional education article placed an independent duty upon the state to provide to students some minimally adequate quantum of education. 207 One clause of New
Jersey's education article required that "[t]he legislature shall
provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the
children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen
"

years.

2

08

Plaintiffs' argument based on this "thorough and effi-

cient" clause, which had not been forcefully advanced prior to
the Robinson case, was championed in an amicus brief filed on
behalf of the NAACP and the ACLU by Professor Paul Tractenberg of Rutgers Law School.209 Tractenberg was concerned primarily with the state's failure to ensure that the inner city school
districts had the ability to raise sufficient money to finance an
adequate education, a requirement, he argued, of constitutional
proportions. 210 The state's obligation went further than simple
fiscal neutrality. Rather, the state was constitutionally required
to ensure that each child received an education of a specific quality under the education article. This strategy - requiring that the
state provide some minimally adequate level of education to a
student, rather than ensuring that equal educational opportunities be provided or fiscal neutrality be observed - was novel.

Though the term "adequacy" would not be en vogue until after
the 1989 Kentucky decision, the basic theory had been put for204. See generally TYACK, JAMES AND BENAVOT, supra note 41.
205. See id.

206. See id.
207. See N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1.
208. Id.

209. See LEHNE, supra,note 13, at 34-35.
210. See id.
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ward in Robinson.
This strategy possessed many advantages - and at least one
significant disadvantage - that the fiscal neutrality principle did
not possess. First, by relying upon the education provision of the
state constitution, judges would be less likely to create spill-over
effects in other areas of public policy. Changing the black-letter
law of equal protection might apply not only to education, but
also to other government policies and legislation. This possibility was a risk that not even Weintraub would take.
Second, adequacy arguments seem to flow naturally from
the language of the education articles, which generally require
that the legislature provide a "thorough," "efficient," or even
"quality" education to its children. The court need not bend the
language of these provisions beyond recognition to reach the
adequacy standard or search for elusive "fundamental rights"
and "suspect classes."
Third, a standard that relied on absolute levels of educational opportunity rather than relative levels of educational opportunity would, at least in theory, avoid the ire of the political
and economic elite in the state. For instance, a constitutional
floor of adequacy would permit some local districts to provide
their children more than what the court would deem "adequate." Thus, less political resistance to those schemes that
would potentially "level down" the wealthier districts could be
anticipated with an adequacy remedy. 211 More cynically stated,
the political and economic elite would not have to fear that their
privileged status would be challenged. Similarly, an adequacy
standard seems to intrude less upon that hallowed value of local
control. The decision-making authority of well-to-do districts
need not be curtailed simply because of a court order to the state
that a failing school district be fixed. Indeed, giving that failing
school district the financial wherewithal to improve itself enhances local control. Thus, the symbolic value of the adequacy
standard was great and school finance reformers today recog212
nize its political potency.
Fourth, an adequacy standard may simply be more appeal211. Note that, even under an adequacy standard, there would be no guarantee
that Robin Hood financing schemes that took from wealthier persons or districts
and gave to poorer persons or districts could be avoided.
212. For example, the fledgling group of school finance reformers in Ohio, decided early on to dub their group the Coalition for EqLu-ty and Adequacy to capture
the broader political base. See Koski, supra, note 29.
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ing to accepted norms of fairness and opportunity. In modern
American society, we view education as among those keys to
economic success and social mobility. In fact, it is not much of a
stretch to say that social and economic inequality are better tolerated in this country because Americans believe that the necessary tools for success are provided through public education.
When one learns that some children are not receiving even the
minimally adequate education that will help them better their
lot, one feels that an injustice has been perpetrated. Images of
children in crumbling schools with no textbooks and incompetent teachers outrage onlookers. But Americans do not seem to

feel this way if one child - most often our own - receives a better

education than another child, so long as that "other child" is getting an "adequate" education.
Finally, at least upon initial examination, the adequacy
standard appears to enjoy a clarity that equality of educational
opportunity lacks. Nettlesome concerns for taxpayer versus
student equity, input versus outcome equity, and vertical versus
horizontal equity are avoided. All the legislature is required to
do is define what is a minimally adequate education and provide schools the resources and conditions necessary to deliver
that education.
The hidden pitfall, however, is that legislatures, and ultimately courts, are given absolutely no guidance as to what is an
adequate education. There is no standard for the skills, competencies, and knowledge necessary for an adequate education.
Moreover, the level of competency is, after all, a matter of degree. A legislature could adopt various standards for competency in math, depending on the lawmakers' tastes for rigor and
the chosen purposes of mathematics competency. For instance,
a student may be deemed competent in math so long as she can
divide fractions, solve simple algebraic equations, or comprehend matrix algebra; it all depends on the policy-makers' desired goals. Once settled upon, this definition cannot remain
static, in any event. "Adequacy" must change with the times. It
is unlikely that the Robinson plaintiffs would have demanded
computer literacy as part of a basic education, but they would
likely do so now. 213

213. For an extended discussion of the difficulties in establishing an "adequacy"
standard, see William S. Koski and Henry M. Levin, Twenty-Five Years After Rodriguez: What Have We Learned?, 102 TCHRS C. REC. 480 (2000).
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Even if the legislature and courts were to craft those standards from whole cloth, there is no magic formula that equates
educational resources and conditions with the provision of those
standards. Indeed, it is not at all clear whether a student's failure to achieve those standards demonstrates that an adequate
education was not provided or whether provision of resources
that would permit the "average" child to reach those standards
is sufficient. Inputs and outcomes become hopelessly blurred.
Moreover, if legislatures or courts talk about adequacy for a particular student or narrowly defined class of students, are they
not talking about what the student needs in order for the education to be adequate for their needs. Or as Professor Underwood
214
put it, perhaps adequacy is merely a case of vertical equity.
Whether Chief Justice Weintraub and his colleagues debated these technical points is unknown, but unlikely. If anything, the portion of the Robinson opinion in which the court
struck down New Jersey's educational finance system under the
education provision reflects a tension between the equity standards and an adequacy standard. 215 After reviewing the history
of public education in New Jersey, the court first concluded that
the education article did not prevent the use of local taxes to
fund education. Rather, the court held "[t]he Constitution's
guarantee must be understood to embrace that educational opportunity which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip
a child for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor
market."

216

This seems to be a clear, albeit broad, minimum adequacy
standard. But only a paragraph later, the standard became
murkier:
The trial court found the constitutional demand had not been
met and did so on the basis of discrepancies in dollar input
per pupil. We agree. We deal with the problem in those
terms because dollar input is plainly relevant and because
we have been shown no other viable criterion for measuring

compliance with the constitutional mandate. The constitu-

tional mandate could not be said to be satisfied unless we
were to suppose the unlikely proposition that the lowest
level of dollar performance happens to coincide with the
constitutional mandate and that all efforts beyond the lowest

214. See Underwood, School FinanceAdequacy as Vertical Equity, supra note 4.
215. See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (N.J. 1973).
216. Id.
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level are attributable to local decisions to do more than the
State was obliged to do. 217
Rather than holding up the yardstick of what is an adequate
education, the court relied on evidence of financial discrepancies - namely, inequity - to support its adequacy claim.

The

clever rhetorical device of refusing to equate the lowest spending district with constitutional adequacy is by no means a logical
conclusion. As will be noted below, other courts have found to
the contrary. In what may have been an effort to relieve the apparent tension between adequacy and equity, the court identified the specific failure of the legislature:
Indeed the State has never spelled out the content of the educational opportunity the Constitution requires. Without
some such prescription, it is even more difficult to understand how the tax burden can be left to local initiative with
any hope that statewide equality of educational opportunity
will emerge. 218
Perhaps it was nothing more than the vernacular of the
times, perhaps the court felt boxed in by the evidentiary record
which provided clear evidence of inequity without a clear demonstration of educational inadequacy, or perhaps the court did
not want to define what it meant by adequacy at all, but even
when the court was spelling out the constitutional duty to provide some minimum standard of adequacy, it could not help itself but retreat to the language of equality of educational
opportunity. If the court merely was saying that the state had to
provide the minimally adequate education equally, that is no
different from saying that the state's duty was to provide a
minimally adequate education. On the other hand, if the court
was saying the state constitution's "thorough and efficient"
clause embraced both an equality and adequacy principle, then
the court could have been more explicit about the clause's meaning. Unfortunately, the imprecise language would plague the
court throughout the 1970s as it attempted to implement Robinson 219 and into the 1990s when the court revisited educational fi217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Robinson v. Cahill, 306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1973) (Robinson II), cert. denied sub nom.
Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Robinson v. Cahill, 335 A.2d 6 (N.J. 1975)
(Robinson III); Robinson v. Cahill, 351 A.2d 713 (N.J.1975) (Robinson IV); Robinson v.
Cahill, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976) (Robinson V); Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457 (N.J.
1976) (Robinson VI).
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220
nance in Abbott v. Burke.
Finding a violation of the state constitution's education article, the court appeared uncertain as to how best to remedy the
wrong. Plaintiffs had requested retrospective relief in the form
of damages and a prospective relief in the form of declaratory
and injunctive relief, ordering the state to fulfill its constitutional
obligations. 221 The court denied the retrospective relief because
of the complexity of unraveling the "fiscal skein" and scheduled
further hearings to determine the form of the prospective relief. 222

iii. The Judicial-LegislativeShowdown
Upon further hearing, the Robinson court order did not set
forth any more specific principles for what is an adequate education.223 Nor did it craft a remedy to bring the system into compliance with the state constitution. Rather, the court left the
remedy to the legislature, ordering it to enact new legislation in
31, 1974.224
compliance with its Robinson I decision by December
Declaring the school finance system unconstitutional and ordering the legislature to come up with a new plan would eventually
become the exclusive "remedy" that plaintiffs would receive after successfully prosecuting an educational finance case in states
throughout the country. Although the legislature set about to
craft a compliant funding system for New Jersey, the various
legislature. 225
proposals received substantial opposition in the
When the compliance deadline passed, the court extended the
time for the legislature to act until October 1, 1975 before the
scheme. 226
court would step in and disturb the existing statutory
Four months later, with no legislation pending, the court
held a hearing to determine whether it should authorize a provisional remedy to effectuate the constitutional entitlement to a
227 In deference to the separathorough and efficient education.
tion of powers doctrine, the court remained reluctant to intervene. "[T]he Court's function is to appraise compliance with the
220. 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990) (Abbott II).
221. See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d at 298.
222. See id. at 298.
223. See Robinson, 306 A.2d at 65 (RobinsonII)
224. See id.
225. See LEHNE, supra, note 13, at 90-123 (describing the legislative aftermath of
the Robinson decision).
226. See Robinson, 335 A.2d at 6 (Robinson III).
227. See Robinson, 351 A.2d at 717-18 (Robinson IV).
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Constitution, not to legislate an educational system, at least if
that can in any way be avoided." 228 But the court could not
stand by idly this time, and thus developed a provisional remedy to be implemented for the 1976-77 school year. 229 The ex-

traordinary action was grounded in the principle that when
legislative inaction threatens to abridge a central right such as
education, the judiciary must afford an appropriate remedy: "To
find otherwise would be to say that our Constitution embodies
rights in a vacuum, existing only on paper." 230
Before the provisional remedy became effective, however,
the legislature acted. The goals of the legislature's plan - the
Wiley-Burstein education bill, also known as the 1975 Act - fit
well with the court's directive to define what is a "thorough and
efficient" education.231 The legislation aimed to provide, among
other things, the following: establishment of educational goals at
both the State and local levels; instruction intended to produce
the attainment of reasonable levels of proficiency in the basic
communications and computational skills; adequately equipped,
sanitary and secure physical facilities and adequate materials
and supplies; and evaluation and monitoring programs at both
state and local levels.232

Mirroring the tension in the court's

marriage of adequacy and equity, however, the primary fiscal
mechanism the Wiley-Burstein bill proposed was a form of
power equalizing. The bill permitted districts to levy the tax rate
of their choice, but ensured that all districts would be equalized
to 135% of the average per-student assessed value. 233

The court was divided in its determination whether this legislation complied with the mandate of Robinson I. A majority of
the court focused on the adequacy considerations. 234 It found
that the legislature had sufficiently defined a "thorough and efficient" educational system, had chosen to share power with local districts in implementing that system, had provided for the
ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the system by the commissioner of education, and perhaps most important, provided

228.
229.
230.
(1961)).
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at 719.
See id. at 718.
Id. at 720 (quoting Cooper v. Nutley Sun Printing Co., 175 A.2d 189, 197
See LEHNE, supra note 13, at 21, 91-123.
See id.
See id.
See Robinson v. Cahill, 351 A.2d 713, 717 n.3 (N.J. 1975) (Robinson IV).
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235
what appeared to be adequate resources to fund the system.
Emphasizing that the case was a challenge to the statute on its
face (rather than as applied), the court held that the legislation
was in compliance with Robinson 1.236 The concurring and dissenting opinions, however, focused on the equalizing aspects of
the legislation and found them wanting. 237 The dissent, in particular, argued that the power equalizing plan may not provide
adequate funds for a thorough and efficient education and, more
telling, that the plan would not equalize expenditures, but rather
238 Notwithwould only equalize tax rates up to a certain point.
standing these criticisms, however, the court approved the fund239
ing scheme on its face.
Serrano and Robinson are landmark decisions not only because they were the first of their kind for state supreme courts,
but also because they shed light on how judges might make decisions in this brave new world of educational finance litigation.
First, it cannot be seen as a coincidence that the first two state
supreme courts to tackle this issue and invalidate their states'
educational finance schemes were the venerable California and
New Jersey courts. Both courts possessed reputations for activism and policy-making and both upheld those reputations when
confronting head-on their sister branches over what is likely the
most expensive line item in the state budget-education finance.
At least where courts are presented with a legal tabula rasa, judicial attitudes toward their roles would seem to influence their
decisions.
Second, both courts strayed from the judicial penchant to
craft bright line rules that can be easily understood and translated into action. Rather both established constitutional standards, although very different from each other, that were
ambiguous in their target and vague in their command. Although the Serrano I decision appeared initially to embrace

235. Id. at 717 n.2.
236. See id. at 723-24.
237. See id. at 731-35.
238. Id. at 733-34.
239. Unfortunately, this did not end the judicial-legislative standoff. After Abbot
V, the legislature failed to enact a tax package that would fully fund the 1975 Act,
prompting the court to issue an order on May 13, 1976, forcing state officials to stop
expending funds on elementary and secondary education on July 1, unless the legislature acted. On July 1, the legislature had not acted and the schools closed. On
July 9, the legislature passed the tax package and the schools re-opened. For the
moment, a truce was called in the school finance wars in New Jersey. See LEHNE,
supra note 13, at 156-63.
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wholeheartedly the clear fiscal neutrality standard, the legislature's inability to determine the beneficiary of the court's edict Are poor children to receive equal educational opportunities or
is the elimination of property wealth as a factor in educational
financing the goal? - and the Serrano II decision made clear that
the court was equally concerned with equality of educational
opportunity in terms of educational expenditures. Elimination
of a finance system wedded to local property wealth was only
part of the legislative solution. The court also wanted the gap in
spending to be closed. Robinson I was even more puzzling. The
constitutional standard set forth by the court clearly lent itself to
an adequacy remedy, but the evidence upon which the court relied and the rhetoric it employed seemed to call for equality of
educational opportunity. Critics may argue that this type of judicial lawmaking is inappropriate because it fails to provide
guidance to persons seeking to order their behavior in compliance with the law and because it makes the law unpredictable. A
more generous interpretation of the courts' use of fuzzy standards in this case is that they were actually exercising restraint
in a new policy arena and permitting the political bodies to help
them define the contours of their state constitutions through the
remedial phase.
But perhaps the most telling and pragmatic justification for
such judicial ambiguity is the desire to preserve flexibility. The
courts' decisions provided the legislature with sufficient flexibility to get a proposal through the political mill that met the ambiguous decree and garnered a sufficient coalition of support. It
is likely, in addition, that the courts wanted to preserve their
own flexibility. Should conditions change and an unforeseen
legislative finance scheme reach their dockets again, the New
Jersey and California courts may need broad and ambiguous
precedent to either uphold or strike down the system, depending upon each court's respective attitude and the political
dynamics in the state at the time. The use of fuzzy standards
promotes adherence to precedent and adaptation to current
conditions - the ideal combination of restraint and activism.
Finally, despite the activist rulings in the liability phase of
these litigations, both the Serrano and Robinson courts stood
down when it came to the remedial phase of the litigation and
allowed their respective legislatures to craft suitable remedies.
Indeed, the Robinson court paid substantial deference to the first
legislative remedy proposed and approved it on its face, in spite
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of vociferous objections to how the new funding schemes would
play out in practice. After Serrano II's rejection of SB 90 - a
school finance scheme patently out of line with either a fiscal
neutrality principle or any equal educational opportunity principle - the California Supreme Court never again reviewed the
constitutionality of the legislative remedy - AB 65 - which was
severely criticized by the Serrano lawyers, but included at least
the basic ingredients of power equalizing and modest guarantees of more equalized expenditures. This pattern of judicial
veto followed by a legislative remedy would become the routine
in school finance litigation. Including Serrano and Robinson, in
all nineteen final state supreme court educational finance decisions that favored plaintiffs, the courts issued declaratory relief
and ordered the legislature to develop a remedial finance
scheme. On the one hand, hawkish educational finance reform
advocates may criticize this judicial behavior as being nothing
more than an issuance of an improper advisory opinion, insufficient to remedy the constitutional wrongs perpetrated by the
state legislatures. Of what consequence is a constitutional right
if there is no judicial remedy? On the other hand, opponents of
judicial intervention in educational finance policy may characterize this same behavior as mere "Monday morning quarterbacking" by exercising the constitutional veto power without
specifically delineating what is a constitutional educational finance scheme. Without sufficient guidance, how can the legislature develop a constitutionally sound plan?
Both positions have merit, but both also may miss the mark.
The California and New Jersey supreme courts may have been
seeking a compromise between their activist tendencies and
their respect for separation of powers. Not wanting to ignore a
harm being perpetrated against a political minority - in this
case, children not receiving an equitable or adequate education but also recognizing the futility of unilaterally forcing a specific
remedy upon the political branches, the courts may have been
carving out a new role in state policy-making-that of a catalyst
for legislative action. When legislative policy produces results
that fall below some constitutional expectation, the court need
not stand on the sidelines, no matter how complex the policy
arena. On the contrary, the court may act as the backstop
against legislative failings.
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The ClassicEquity Cases: Inequality By Design
The period between Robinson and the watershed Kentucky
decision of 1989 was not fruitful for school finance reform litigators. After Robinson, twenty school finance cases reached final
state supreme court decisions prior to 1989. Plaintiffs won only
five of those cases. Those five cases, however, demonstrate the
remarkable diversity in judicial analysis during this early unsettled phase of educational finance litigation, as courts looked to
both equal protection provisions and state education articles,
and put forth tentative theories of fiscal neutrality, equality of
educational opportunity, and adequacy. This section briefly
considers three of those five state supreme courts that championed the fiscal neutrality and equity theories - Connecticut,
Wyoming, and Arkansas.
Six years after the 1971 Serrano I decision, educational funding in Connecticut remained in the Strayer-Haig "foundation
plan" era. The state contributed 20-25% of local operating expenditures compared to the 41% nationwide average. 240 Of the
state's 20-25% contribution, 80.1% was a flat grant given to all
districts on the basis of average daily student attendance, 12.6%
was reimbursement for special educational services, and the remaining 7.3% was from miscellaneous categorical grants. 241
None of these revenue streams was equalized or tied to the local
district's ability to pay. Seventy percent of school expenditures
were raised through local property taxes that were, not surprisingly, drawn from highly unequal property tax bases. 242 In turn,
these unequal tax bases generated greatly different revenues,
even for school districts that taxed themselves aggressively. The
statistics were dramatic. Those districts in the highest decile
property wealth enjoyed an average $102,901 per-pupil assessed
value, taxed themselves at an 11.1 millage rate, and generated
$1245 dollars per student in operating expenditures. 243 By contrast, the districts in the lowest decile, had an average assessed
value of $25,474, an average millage rate of 26.3, and an average
per-pupil expenditure of $813.244 These expenditure differentials
translated into significant differences in average teacher salaries,
curricular offerings, student-teacher ratios, and library re240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

See Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 366 (Conn. 1977).
See id.
See id.
See id. at 367.
See id.
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sources. 245 From an equity perspective, this was an easy case. 246
In a 5-1 decision, the Connecticut Supreme Court agreed.
Its analysis in Horton v. Meskill, which sprung almost naturally
from the facts, was based on the state's equal protection provision.247 In applying that provision, the court adopted the twotiered equal protection analysis of the federal Constitution for
the most part, but rejected the Rodriguez test for what was a
"fundamental" interest. 248 Rather than calling every right or interest identified in the state constitution a "fundamental" interest, the court weighed the importance of the provision of
education among other services that the state provides and con249
cluded that education was indeed a fundamental interest.
Finding a fundamental interest, the court applied strict scrutiny
to the state's foundation aid educational finance scheme and easily found it unconstitutional. 250 The court held that students in
the state are entitled to equal enjoyment of the fundamental
right to an education. 251 Although clearly requiring the state to
ensure that students receive equal educational opportunities, the
court left unclear what such equality meant. 252 This definition,
the court stated, was a matter for the legislature to determine
253
with its remedial scheme.
Interestingly, the Horton court's decision may have been facilitated by the legislature itself. In 1973, Connecticut's General
Assembly had established the Commission to Study School Finance and Equal Educational Opportunity, which issued a report concluding that the current system of financing education
in Connecticut was "inherently unequal" and was not affording
24
the children of Connecticut an equal educational opportunity.
No charge could then be made against the Connecticut Supreme
Court that it had made an incorrect finding of fact or was incapable of understanding a complex area such as public education.
With the report as support and confirmation of the court's findings, the Horton justices were left to what they do best - interpret
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

See id. at 368.
See Horton, 376 A.2d at 376.
See id. at 374-75.
See id. at 373-74.
See id.
See id. at 375.
See id. at 374.
See Horton, 376 A.2d at 374-76.
See id. at 375.
See id. at 376.
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and apply legal standards.
In Washakie County School District No. 1 v. Herschler,255 the
Wyoming Supreme Court similarly relied on the state's equal

protection provision to strike down the state's educational finance system that produced large spending disparities among
property poor and property rich districts. The Washakie court,
however, focused on wealth discrimination as being the trigger
for the equal protection analysis and concluded that the Wyoming educational finance system, which relied on local property
taxes, discriminated against students on the basis of the school
districts' property wealth. 256 Relying heavily on the California
Supreme Court's Serrano I analysis the Wyoming court then
adopted a fiscal neutrality standard to declare the state's system
unconstitutional:
[T]he quality of a child's education in Wyoming, measured in
terms of dollars available for that purpose, is dependent
upon the property tax resources of his school district. The
right to an education cannot constitutionally be conditioned
on wealth in that such a measure does not afford equal protection. 257
But, again, what seemed like a clear constitutional test became
muddy when the court sent the remedy back to the legislature
with instructions to craft a new educational finance scheme that

would not discriminate on the basis of wealth, but instead
would take into account cost differentials among the districts.258
Three years after the Washakie decision, equal protection
analysis in educational finance cases remained unsettled, as the
Arkansas Supreme Court overturned its school finance system
under a mere "rationality" test. 259 In DuPree v. Alabama School
District No. 30, the court held that it could find no legitimate in-

terest in the state's school finance system and that system "bears
no rational relationship to the educational needs of the individual districts, rather it is determined primarily by the tax base of
each district." 260 Moreover, the Arkansas court was unwilling to
pin itself down to any single constitutional standard and stated
that the state's school finance system suffered from two defects:
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).
See id. at 334-35.
Id. at 332.
See id. at 336.
See DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983).
Id. at 93.
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(1) that property wealth was the primary dictator of educational
opportunities to students, and (2) that the state distributed educational resources on an irrational basis. 261 Thus, the court allowed for the possibility to challenge the educational finance
system as to both how the money is raised and whether the
funds are distributed on a rational basis among districts in the
state.
For those states that pursued the fiscal neutrality or equality
of educational opportunity standard prior to 1989, diversity was
the norm. In interpreting their state equal protection provisions,
the Connecticut Supreme Court diverged from the "fundamentality" test of Rodriguez, whereas the Wyoming Supreme Court
looked to wealth as the trigger for heightened scrutiny, and the
Arkansas Supreme Court found the system unconstitutional under a mere rationality test. Perhaps even more frustrating from
the legislative perspective was that none of these courts was
willing to specify whether the constitutional infirmity was basing the system on local property wealth or failing to provide
equal educational opportunities to children in the state. Each
court seemed to "fuzz up" this distinction so that it would not
have to analyze itself into a corner.
Washington, West Virginia,and the FurtherDevelopment of the
Adequacy Standard
The constitution of the State of Washington proclaims that it
is "the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for
the education of all children" and that the legislature shall establish a "general and uniform system of public schools." 262 On its
face, this provision of the education article seems to suggest (1)
that an adequate (indeed ample) education must be provided to
all children, (2) that it is the state's duty to provide that education, (3) that this duty cannot be subordinated to other state obligations or preferences, and (4) that the education provided
must be uniform (some might argue equal) in all districts
throughout the state. To educational finance reformers in the
early 1970's, this language must have seemed like a silver bullet.
When the Washington Supreme Court first interpreted this
language in the context of a school finance case, however, the
school finance reform plaintiffs found out just how malleable
C.

261. See id. at 95.
262. WASH. CONST., art. IX,§ 1.
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this text could be. 263 By a 6-3 vote, the court in Northshore School
District No. 417 v. Kinnear upheld the state's educational finance
system in the face of a challenge to the adequacy and equity of
the entire educational system (not merely the financial aspects of
the system). 264 Despite the clear majority, however, no single
opinion spoke for a majority of the court. Rather, a plurality of
four became the lead opinion with two justices joining in a concurring opinion upholding the system based on the plaintiffs'
failure to present sufficient evidence of inadequacy alone. 265
This evidentiary finding was harshly attacked by the dissent,
which noted that, at the extremes, assessed property valuations
in districts ranged from a low of $1,925 per pupil to a high of
$776,567 per pupil. 266 Moreover, among the state's 320 school
districts, per-pupil expenditures ranged from $4,517 per pupil to
$470, the mean basic expenditure being $819 and the standard
deviation between the basic expenditures per pupil being
$392.267 The trial court found that these discrepancies were directly a function of property wealth.268 Moreover, the system itself perpetuated inequality by paying sums to those districts that
are better able to recruit, train, and retain qualified staff (read:
wealthy districts). 269 Finally, the dissenters pointed out, the trial

court had specifically found that the educational finance system
did not provide sufficient funds to operate and maintain schools
(particularly without the infusion of cash from special property
270
tax levies).
Although none of the opinions issued in the Kinnear case
speaks for a majority of the court, the four-justice plurality opinion is instructive in its treatment of the facts and the law.271 The
plurality argued, and the concurring justices agreed, that there
was insufficient evidence presented by the plaintiffs to establish
263. See Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178 (Wash. 1974).
264. See id. at 203.
265. See id. at 179, 203.
266. See id. at 210-11 (Stafford, J., dissenting).
267. See id. at 211.
268. See id. at 211-12.
269. See Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178, 213 (Wash.
1974).
270. See id. at 212-13.
271. Technically speaking, none of the opinions issued by the court would be
binding authority on other courts or have precedential value in later supreme court
decisions. That said, those areas in which the plurality and concurrences converged
arguably bind later judicial decision-makers and all opinions may be cited for their
persuasive value.
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a claim that an "ample" provision for education was not being
provided to any student.272 Specifically, the plurality noted that
there was no evidence of the specific failure to provide ample
education to any child, nor evidence that any child had been denied promotion or admission to other schools based on a the
prior school's failings.273 Moreover, there was no evidence that
the district failed to provide classes in accordance with the
state's required curriculum; and no suggestion as to the curriculum or content standards that should have been provided. 274 In
terms of equity, the plurality recognized the existence of financial disparities, but relied upon a dubious statistical analysis to
deny the inequality claim. The plurality found that the financial
disparities were not caused by differences in local taxable
wealth, but rather by differences in pay for teachers and the differences in by the certificated staff-student ratio among districts.275 (Naturally, those districts with higher pay for teachers
had higher teacher:student ratios and cost more to run on a perpupil basis.) Finally, the plurality found that there was no correlation between parental wealth and property wealth among districts, a finding that the fiscal neutrality principle would not
276
have required.
In applying the law to these facts, the Kinnear plurality first
rejected the equal protection claim by adopting in toto the Rodriguez reasoning and the fact that the alleged discrepancies in
property values were not correlated with spending differences
or differences in educational quality. 277 In responding to the
claim that the state failed in its "paramount" duty to make "ample" provision for the education of all children, the plurality first
denuded this clause by deferring its interpretation and application to the political branches: "the nature and extent of that duty
and the means of carrying it out rest upon the legislature and the
state superintendent." 278 Moreover, there was no evidentiary
showing that that duty had not been met. Finally, the plurality
rejected the claim that the state had failed to provide a "general
and uniform system of public schools." 279 Focusing on the word
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

See id. at 203.
See id. at 184.
See id. at 184-85.
See id. at 187-88.
See Kinnear,530 P.2d at 189.
See id. at 190-91.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 201.
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"system," the court reasoned that, despite variation in size, taxable property wealth, and expenditures, the state had provided a
uniform system of public schools with
certain minimum and reasonably standardized educational
and instructional facilities and opportunities to at least the
12th grade-a system administered with that degree of uniformity which enables a child to transfer from one district to
another within the same grade without substantial loss of
credit or standing and with access by each student of whatever grade to acquire those skills and training that are reasonably understood to be fundamental and basic to a sound
280
education.
Looking only at the structure, not the actual delivery of education, the plurality then upheld the system under the "general
281
and uniform" clause.
Although seemingly a crushing defeat for the plaintiffs, the
Kinnear plurality and concurring opinions provided clues to
plaintiffs as to how they might prove that the state had failed in
its paramount obligation to provide an ample education to all
children. The task is to demonstrate that specific children in certain districts are not receiving an ample education according the
state's own standards, to the extent that such standards exist.
This was precisely the strategy taken by Seattle School District
No. 1 in its 1978 attack on the state's funding system under the
"ample provision" and "general and uniform" clauses of the
education article. 282 Due to budget shortfalls in the mid-1970's,
Seattle (and other Washington school districts) were forced to
rely on "special excess levy funding" which required local voter
approval. The difficulty was that the Seattle voters had rejected
such levies in the prior two local elections and the district was
forced to make budget cuts. 283 These budget cuts, in turn, deprived children of certain educational opportunities required by
284
state statutes and regulations of the state board of education.
This time, in a 6-3 vote with three justices in the majority
who did not participate in the Kinnear case, the Washington Supreme Court agreed. 285 From the outset, the court's tone was

280. Id. at 202.
281. See id. at 203.

282.
283.
284.
285.

See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978).
Ste id. at 78, 81.
See id.
See id. at 98-99.
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less deferential to the legislature, as it argued that the "paramount" duty of the education clause was placed on the "state,"
including the judiciary; that the obligation of the court was to interpret this clause; and that there might even be a conflict or confrontation with the legislature over this interpretation. 286 Then
the court set about to define what is an "ample" education. Recognizing that changing times and conditions may dictate changing definitions of what is an "ample" education, the court held
that it is for the legislature to specifically define what the "basic"
education required by the clause is and the level of funding and
deployment of resources necessary to provide that basic education.287 The court noted that discretion to the legislature lies
within the broad parameters set by the constitution and the
court's interpretation of the constitution.288 Citing New Jersey's
Robinson, decision, the court then said that
the State's constitutional duty goes beyond mere reading,
writing and arithmetic. It also embraces broad educational
opportunities needed in the contemporary setting to equip
our children for their role as citizens and as potential competitors in today's market as well as in the marketplace of
ideas.... Education plays a critical role in a free society. It
must prepare our children to participate intelligently and effectively in our open political system to ensure that system's
survival.... It must prepare them to exercise their First
Amendment freedoms both as sources and receivers of information; and, it must prepare them to be able to inquire, to
study, to evaluate and to gain maturity and understanding. 289
Thus, the Washington Supreme Court developed an adequacy
standard that went much further than the Robinson court's standard, but left much room for legislative interpretation. Indeed,
the court required that the legislature identify the specific educational components that would meet that standard and provide
the funding necessary for those components to be achieved.
The adequacy standard was further refined by the West
Virginia Supreme Court in Pauley v. Kelly. 290 On appeal from a
trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint, the court faced

286. See id. at 93-94
287. See id. at 95.
288. See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 95.

289. Id. at 94 (citations omitted).
290. 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va. 1979).
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the question of whether the state constitution's "thorough and
efficient" clause had been violated by the legislature. 291 After an
exhaustive review of the educational finance cases that had been
litigated to date, the interpretations of other states' "thorough
and efficient" clauses, and the constitutional history of West
Virginia's clause, the court - mirroring the New Jersey and
Washington standards - concluded that a "thorough and efficient" education in West Virginia embraces a specific quality of
education. 292 "It develops, as best the state of education expertise allows, the minds, bodies and social morality of its charges
to prepare them for useful and happy occupations, recreation
and citizenship, and does so economically." 293 The court did not
stop there. Rather, it went on to define more specifically the
components of a minimally adequate education in West Virginia:
Legally recognized elements in this definition are development in every child to his or her capacity of (1) literacy; (2)
ability to add, subtract, multiply and divide numbers; (3)
knowledge of government to the extent that the child will be
equipped as a citizen to make informed choices among persons and issues that affect his own governance; (4) selfknowledge and knowledge of his or her total environment to
allow the child to intelligently choose life work to know his
or her options; (5) work-training and advanced academic
training as the child may intelligently choose; (6) recreational
pursuits; (7) interests in all creative arts, such as music, theatre, literature, and the visual arts; (8) social ethics, both behavioral and abstract, to facilitate compatibility with others
in this society. 294
Quite apparently, these components of a thorough and efficient
education go far beyond the financial aspects of the educational
system to policies, service delivery structures, curricula, and the
like. The court recognized this fact and held that, implicit in this
definition of "thorough and efficient" are supportive services,
including "good physical facilities, instructional materials, and
personnel; [and] careful state and local supervision to prevent
waste and to monitor pupil, teacher and administrative competency." 295 Because there had been no evidentiary record devel291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

See id. at 861.
See id. at 877-78.
Id. at 877.
Id.
Id. at 877.
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oped in the case, the court remanded the case back to the trial
court for further hearings.
Current commentators often point to 1989's Rose v. Council
for Better Educ., Inc. decision by the Kentucky Supreme Court as
the case that ushered in the adequacy standard. 296 Prior to 1989,
these commentators argue, educational finance reform litigation
focused on an equity standard, whether it was the fiscal neutrality or equality of educational opportunity standard. 297 Yet this
assertion is puzzling in light of the New Jersey Supreme Court's
articulation of the standard in Robinson and the further refinement of the standard by the Washington and West Virginia Supreme Courts. Granted, courts and commentators prior to
1990's may not have been as self-conscious about the novelty of
the standard or they may not have dubbed it "adequacy," but
judicial decision-making nonetheless reflected the central tenet
of adequacy: the entitlement to an absolute level of education.
The pre-1989 cases also were not concerned merely with the
fiscal aspects of the educational system. The remedial plan in
New Jersey set forth the specific components of a "thorough and
efficient" educational system. The Washington Supreme Court
noted that the plaintiffs' attack was on the entire system and that
the appropriate remedy should start with a definition of a "basic" education in the state. The West Virginia Supreme Court
specifically identified the importance of goals, educational resources, and assessment and monitoring to a constitutional educational system (what educational policy-makers might now
loosely refer to as "standards-based" or "systemic" reform).
After remand to the trial court in the Pauley case and the
trial court's finding that the education provided in the plaintiff
districts was "woefully inadequate," the state legislature and
department of education, aided by expert assistance, developed
the "Master Plan for Education." 298 That Master Plan was intended to revamp educational service delivery in West Virginia
beginning with education standards and curricula tied to those
standards, moving to programmatic reforms, and then to adequate and equalized funding. 299 As discussed below, this reform
package went as far as that adopted in Kentucky after the Rose
decision. Finally, as was the case in New Jersey, the remedial
296.
297.
298.
299.

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
See 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W.Va. 1979).
See Minorini & Sugarman, EducationalEquity, supra note 30, at 52.
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plan promulgated by the West Virginia legislature eventually
found its way back before the state supreme court, which ap300
proved the plan on its face and ordered its implementation.
That the conceptual and potential strategic distinctions between equity and adequacy did not capture the attention of
commentators prior to the Rose case is perhaps the most meaningful difference between litigation in the second and third
waves. However, this difference and the potential to use these
flexible constitutional standards strategically was not lost on the
courts in the 1970's and 1980's-especially those that wielded the
adequacy standard to defeat equity claims.
D.

The Era of State Wins: 1973-1988

Although commentary and research often focus on the
handful of cases that school finance reformers won in the first
and second waves of educational finance reform litigation, this
obscures the fact that the state defendants won fifteen of the
twenty-two cases that reached the state's highest court after Robinson.301 Although each of the decisions reflects the idiosyncrasies of the procedural posture of the case, the school finance
formula in question, and the law applied by the court, four unified themes arise from the analyses in these decisions to uphold
the educational finance system. First, in a number of cases, the
courts relied upon the state's interest in preserving local control
to justify any inequity in expenditures or educational opportunity, irrespective of the type of equal protection analysis
adopted. 302 At the same time, these courts downplayed the alleged harm of spending less on education by arguing that more
money may not matter anyway. Second, despite plaintiffs' reliance in some cases on Robinson or the language of "uniformity"
in the state constitution's education provision, several courts rejected the notion that the education provision embraces any
equality standard. 30 3 Third, courts in a number of cases disposed of plaintiffs' claims by citing the separation of powers
doctrine and noting that the political branches enjoy near plenary power in the field of public education. 30 4 Others used the
doctrine to buttress the denial of plaintiffs' claims. Finally, in re300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

See Pauley v. Bailey, 324 S.E.2d 128 (W.Va. 1984) (Pauley III).
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.D.1.
See infra Part IV.D.2.
See infra Part IV.D.3.
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jecting both equity and adequacy claims, many courts found that
the state had provided to plaintiffs a minimally adequate education and that nothing more was required by the equal protection
30 5
provision or education article of the relevant state constitution.
This final judicial strategy highlights the dual-edged nature of
adequacy as a standard. Whether an adequate education is being delivered all depends upon where the bar is set.
1.

The Hallowed Status of Local Control and the Harmlessness
of Underfunding Education

Scholars and jurists alike have attempted to discredit the
myth of local control in public education as a justification for the
30 6
state to offer unequal educational opportunities to its children.
Calling local control a "cruel illusion" or a "hoax" for those districts that cannot raise enough money to effectively exercise it,
some judges have dismissed local control as a justification for
inequality. 307 Others have noted that there is no necessary connection between local funding of public schools and local decision-making in public schools. 30 8 More recently, some have
pointed out that states have so pervasively regulated public
education that there is little left of local control. 30 9 Yet local control is uniformly cited by state supreme courts as a reason for upholding educational finance systems in the face of equal
protection challenges. Local control is often the cited "legitimate" or "compelling" state interest used to defeat an equal protection claim.
Examples of courts' reliance on local control abound. Having found no fundamental interest in education and upholding
305. See infra Part IV.D.4.
306. See Michael A. Rebell, Fiscal Equality in Education: Deconstructing the Designing Myths and Facing Reality, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 691 (1994); M.D.
Blanchard, The New Judicial Federalism: Deference Masquerading as Discourse and the
Tyranny of the Locality In State Judicial Review of Education Finance, 60 U. PiTr. L. REV.
231 (1998).

307. See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1260 (Cal. 1971) ("under the present
financing system, such fiscal freewill is a cruel illusion for the poor school
districts"); Milliken v. Green 203 N.W.2d 457, 471 (Mich. 1972) ("For poorer school

districts it is a hoax that they can follow the richer school districts into the green
pastures"), vacated by 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973).
308. See Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1260 ("even assuming arguendo that local administrative control may be a compelling state interest, the present financial system cannot be considered necessary to further this interest. No matter how the state
decides to finance its system of public education, it can still leave this decisionmaking power in the hands of local districts").

309. See Rebell, supra note 306.
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the educational finance system under a rationality review, the
New York Supreme Court found that "[a]ny legislative attempt
to make uniform and undeviating the educational opportunities
offered by the several hundred local school districts... would
inevitably work the demise of the local control of education
available to students in individual districts." 310 This conclusion,
of course, ignores the fact that poor districts may already not enjoy local fiscal control. Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court
stated: "local control allows for local participation in the decision-making process that determines how these local tax dollars
will be spent. Each school district can develop programs to meet
perceived local needs." 31 ' It is difficult to understand how poor
districts can develop programs to meet their needs when they do
not have the money to do so. The Maryland Supreme Court
noted:
[I]t is readily apparent that a primary objective [of the funding system] is to establish and maintain a substantial measure of local control over the local public school systemscontrol exercised at the local level through influencing the
determination of how much money should be raised for the
local schools and how that money should be spent. 312
These decisions speak for themselves. In Olsen v. State,
however, the Oregon Supreme Court, confronted head-on the
argument that poorer school districts do not enjoy the fiscal
flexibility to exercise meaningful local control. 313 The court was
unpersuaded by this argument:
The local control argument is generally based upon the political principle that the governmental body supplying the
funds, despite initial protestations to the contrary, ultimately
directs how the funds shall be spent.... While it is no doubt
true that reliance on local property taxation for school revenues provides less freedom of choice with respect to expenditures for some districts than for others, the existence of
'some inequality' in the manner in which the State's rationale
is achieved is not alone a sufficient basis for striking down
the entire system. 314

310.
1982).
311.
312.
313.
314.

Levittown Union Free School District v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 367 (N.Y.
Bd. of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 821 (Ohio 1979).
Hornbeck v.Somerset County Bd.of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 788 (Md. 1983).
554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976).
Olsen, 554 P.2d at 146-47.
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At least the court was honest. According to the court, local control over educational expenditures is necessarily diminished under a local property-tax funded educational system, but not to
the point that it raises constitutional concerns. 315 Eschewing the
Rodriguez test for fundamentality and the two-tiered equal protection analysis altogether, the court then balanced the state's interest in preserving local control against the detriment to the
education of children in lower expenditure districts, concluding
31 6
that local control outweighed that detriment.
On the local control issue, courts could go either way. On
the one hand, courts could summarily reject the local control justification as a hoax for poor districts or they could point out that
state control over funding does not require state control over
administration. Of course these approaches ignore the old adage about the piper, who pays him, and who calls the tune. On
the other hand, rhetoric and convenient disregard of financing
realities allow many courts to justify an unequally funded educational system on the grounds of local control. These courts argue that fiscal control cannot be separated from administrative
control and blithely forget that those districts with less money
are less able to make decisions in the best interests of their children. However, such legal gymnastics need only be performed
because traditional equal protection analysis - under either a
multiple-tiered analysis or a balancing test - required that the alleged harm of unequal funding be balanced against some state
interest. Apparently finding no other candidates, states were
compelled to rely on local control as the justification for the system. The weight of such a nebulous concept as local control
leaves much room for judges to manipulate the scale.
Some courts that sought to uphold educational finance
schemes not only put a finger on top of the balance on the local
control side, but also placed a finger underneath the alleged
harm side. To the extent that the target of equity in these cases
were students (as opposed to taxpayers), plaintiffs inevitably
had to argue that students in property-poor school districts or
districts that faced municipal and educational overburden suffered from the harm of inadequate or inequitable educational
opportunities. To make this argument work, plaintiffs were
sometimes compelled to logically and empirically demonstrate

315. See id.
316. See id. at 147.
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that harm by showing that money matters in terms of educational opportunities. From the outset, courts bickered over
whether "educational opportunity" should mean resource inputs or student performance and outcomes. If it means the former, then plaintiffs would have a much easier time
demonstrating that unequal funding results in unequal opportunities. If the meaning of educational opportunity is the latter,
the parties and the courts are swept into an empirical maelstrom. Beginning with the Coleman Report3l 7 and continuing today, a debate has raged as to whether and how much money
matters in terms of educational opportunities, student performance and student outcomes. This debate, and evidence on the
matter will not be discussed in detail here. However, suffice it
to say that sufficient social science data had been generated by
expert witnesses in these cases to allow for a factual finding in
either direction or no direction. Therefore, what the courts were
left with was logic and argument to support their factual findings on the cost/quality debate.
Some courts, such as the New Jersey Supreme Court, found
that as a matter of intuition, money matters.318 Less money results in fewer educational resources and diminished educational
outcomes. That money matters is further demonstrated by the
fact that wealthier school districts spend more on their children
and fight to maintain those funding levels.319 Why would people in those districts and their school boards be squandering
money? Further, reform advocates argue legislatures themselves must recognize the importance of money to educational
outcomes, otherwise they would not provide what foundation
aid they do provide. Finally, some may argue that the very importance of education to the future of the children and the state
suggests that money does matter, because the education of children cannot be put at risk merely because a definitive link between cost and quality cannot be demonstrated.
Other courts, however, have pointed to the ambiguity in the
research and opined that such ambiguity counsels in favor of a
finding that money does not matter, because it would be unwise
to intervene in legislative decision-making by ordering the
spending of good money when the value of such expenditures is
317. See Coleman, supra note 76.

318. See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 276-77 (N.J. 1973).
319. See, e.g., Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310
(Wyo. 1980).
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uncertain. 320 Strictly speaking, the burden of demonstrating
proof by some evidentiary standard (a preponderance of the
evidence or clear and convincing evidence) nearly always rests
with the plaintiffs in civil litigation. Thus, in the face of ambiguous evidence, a finding for the defendants seems procedurally
justified. Yet evidentiary burdens are as unsteady as other legal
standards and reasonable judges could differ on the cost/ quality
question.
Emblematic of this shifting evidentiary standard is the
Colorado case of Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Education.321 In
that case, the trial court struck down the educational finance system and specifically found that the level of educational expenditures affected the quality of education offered to Colorado's
children.322 On review, a majority of the Colorado Supreme
Court disagreed, stating that "a review of the record and caselaw shows that courts are ill-suited to determine what equal
educational opportunity is, especially since fundamental disagreement exists concerning the extent to which there is a demonstrable correlation between educational expenditures and
the quality of education." 323 In other words, when in doubt, err
on the side of non-intervention. One dissenting justice, however, applied another legally justified standard and took the majority to task. Reciting the trial court's findings as to the how the
differences in educational expenditures create differences in
educational opportunities, the dissenting justice accused the majority of ignoring the factual record and applying a de novo review of the facts rather than the presumption of correctness
usually applied by appellate courts to lower court factual findings. 324 In other words, when in doubt, the burden rests on the
appellate court to overturn a trial court's facts. Similarly, when
in doubt, the burden rests on those who would risk children's
education: "[E]ven the strongest advocates of Coleman's position have not declared that expenditures have no effect on a
child's education. Moreover, it is yet to be expressed by anyone
that increased expenditures are deleterious to a child's education." 325

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

See, e.g., Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982).
See id.
See id. at 1010-11.
See id. at 1018.
See id. at 1035-36 (Lohr, J., dissenting).
Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 666 (Idaho 1975) (Donaldson, J., dis-
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At the end of the day, judges and advocates are left without
a firm grasp on the facts. Under traditional equal protection
balancing tests, either side of the scale can be manipulated by
argument and rhetoric. Local control can be either severely
jeopardized by state intervention in educational funding, or it
can be enhanced in those districts that do not have the financial
wherewithal. Children may be harmed by lower educational
opportunities or they may suffer de minimis or educationally irrelevant disadvantages, depending on what "educational opportunity" means and who bears the burden of demonstrating that
unequal expenditures affect such opportunities.
2. The ConstitutionalFramers Did Not Require an Equitable
Education
If equality of educational opportunity or fiscal neutrality
could not be achieved through the equal protection provision of
the state, reform advocates - taking their cues from the Robinson
plaintiffs - argued that the state's education article required such
equality. Based on the texts of state education articles, for example, the requirement that the state provide a "uniform" or
"general" or "thorough and efficient" system of education,
advocates argued that such education clauses embrace an equality
standard.326 Although this argument enjoyed a modicum of success in the Robinson case, it was by and large rejected by the
courts in the "second-wave" litigation.
Judicial reasoning in these cases was straightforward. Some
courts, such as the Washington Supreme Court, noted that the
constitution provided only that the "system" be general or uniform.327

This requirement was met by provision of state-

mandated courses, a specified number of days of school per
year, and other state regulations such as teacher credentialing. 328
Other courts relied on the traditional tools of constitutional and
statutory interpretation and found that the plain meaning of
terms such as "general," "thorough," and "efficient" did not imply "equality" or that the constitutional framers had never intended that the terms would embrace equality of educational
opportunity, especially when the educational systems in place at
senting).
326. See infra notes 509-14 and accompanying text.

327. See Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178, 202-3 (Wash.
1974).
328. See id.
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the time of the constitutional ratification were so unequal or
when terms such as "equitable" and "equal" were proposed and
rejected for inclusion in the education clause. 329 Although Robinson and some later courts would recognize an equality standard
in their states' education articles, this claim carried little weight
during the 1970's and 1980's.
3. Deference to the Political Branches
Separation of powers manifested itself explicitly in the
school finance opinions of state supreme courts in three distinct
ways. First, every court that has ever held its state educational
finance system unconstitutional has affirmed its role as the "interpreter" of the constitution, yet acknowledged that the appropriate institution to craft the remedial scheme is the legislature.
Most courts support this deference to the legislature by vague
references to the proper role of the judiciary in state governance
and/or the constitutional mandate that it is for the legislature to
provide a constitutional educational system to the children of
the state.
While "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,' the fashioning of a
constitutional system for financing elementary and secondary education in the state is not only the proper function of
the legislative department but its expressly mandated duty
under the provisions of the constitution of Connecticut, article eighth, § 1. The judicial department properly stays its
hand to give the legislative department an opportunity to
act.

330

This apparent deference to the political branches, however,
masks the courts' own institutional concerns. Although the
separation of powers doctrine has proven flexible in describing
the role of the court at the liability stage of the litigation, all
courts that have overturned their educational finance scheme
invoke the doctrine at the remedial phase. This cannot be due to
respect for such a flexible doctrine. Rather, it is likely due to the
courts own unwillingness to specify a detailed standard,
whether it be an equity or adequacy standard, for what is a constitutional school finance system. Moreover, the same courts
that have little difficulty vetoing the work of the legislature on
329. See, e.g., Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 576-577 (Wis. 1989).
330. Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 375 (Conn. 1977).
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constitutional grounds recognize their inability to craft a technically and politically workable finance system.331 If a court were
to craft the remedial plan, that same court would be hardpressed to later find its own standards and system unconstitutional. A court might reason that it would be better to maintain
the constitutional trump card. This idea is noteworthy in light of
the judiciary's willingness to become involved with crafting a
remedy in other types of complex institutional reform litigation
such as prison reform, desegregation, and antitrust. Because
school finance reform litigation is sui generis in that it places the
state judiciary against the state legislature on an issue of statewide policy, the different remedial approach may well be warranted.
The second manner in which the separation of powers doctrine manifests itself in judicial opinions in educational finance
cases is when courts invoke the doctrine to support their decision on the merits to uphold an educational finance scheme.
Virtually every court that denies the plaintiffs' claim pursuant to
an analysis of the law and the facts presented bolsters its analysis with a statement of judicial deference. This could be based
on a constitutional textual commitment of the duty to the state
legislature:
[The Washington constitution] reserved to the proper state
officers the general supervision of the system and entrusted
to its various political subdivisions certain functions and details in which they were particularly interested and concerned... Thus, it is the legislature and the State
superintendent upon whom the constitution and statutes
impose the responsibility of discharging the paramount duty
of the State... to make ample provision for the education of
332
all children.
Or it could be based on general notions of deference to the legislature in areas of fiscal and educational policy:
"[O]ur approach to the case at bar has been with a 'disciplined perception of the proper role of the courts in the resolution of our State's educational problems, and to that end,
more specifically, judicial discernment of the reach of the
mandates of our State Constitution in this regard .. ' 'To do
331. See, e.g., DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997) (striking down the
state's school finance system and asking the state to systematically overhaul the financing scheme).
332. Kinnear, 530 P.2d at 197.
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otherwise would be an unwise and unwarranted entry into
the controversial area, of public school financing, whereby
this Court would convene as a 'super-legislature,' legislating
in a turbulent field of social, economic and political policy.' 333
In either event, separation of powers was not the sole articulated reason for the court's refusal to intervene; rather, it supported the court's analysis of the cases on its legal and factual
merits.
Finally, although courts would not explicitly and solely rely
on theories of "justiciability" or the "political question" doctrine
to reject the claims of reformers until the third wave, several
courts in the second wave emphasized the fact that the legislature enjoyed near plenary power in the fields of public education and tax policy. Any analysis of the legal and factual
grounds for the plaintiffs' claim took a backseat to this concern.
336
335
Courts in Maryland, 334 North Carolina, and South Carolina
all held that their constitutions placed primary responsibility for
determining what is a constitutional education with the legislative branch. South Carolina's supreme court recognized the
constitutional delegation of authority to the legislature:
[Tihe Constitution... places very few restrictions on the
powers of the General Assembly in the general field of public
education. It is required to 'provide for a liberal system of
free public schools,' but the details are left to its discretion ....The development of our school system in South
Carolina has demonstrated the wisdom of the framers of the
Constitution in leaving the General Assembly free to meet
337
changing conditions.
While it is true that the functional difference between those
courts that use the separation of powers doctrine to support
their holdings on the merits of the case and those that use the
doctrine as the primary justification for their holding is one of
degree, this latter group of cases was a definite precursor to the
even more deferential rulings issued by a number of courts in
the third wave.

333. Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 583 (citations omitted).
334. See Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at 758.
335. See Britt v. North Carolina Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987),
appeal dismissed, 361 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987).
336. See Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988).

337. Id. at 472.
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4. Adequacy to Justify Inequity
In the 1990's, educational "adequacy" became the rallying
cry for reformers seeking to shift the paradigm for judging the
constitutionality of educational finance system. Yet, as has already been discussed, adequacy is hardly a 90's phenomenon.
Of the seven plaintiff wins in the second wave of educational finance litigation, at least two can fairly be described as adequacy
decisions. 338 Perhaps more revealing, however, is not the number of plaintiff wins under an adequacy theory, but rather the
number of state wins under a theory of educational adequacy.
What constitutes an adequate education, after all, is in the eye of
the beholder. In the eyes of a handful of state high courts, all
that the state was required to provide was an adequate education to all students, not one that provides equality of educational
opportunity to those students. Therefore, what has been brandished as a weapon by plaintiffs has just as frequently been used
as a shield by defendants in educational finance cases. The issue
is where the constitutional adequacy line is drawn.
One convenient method to dispose of plaintiffs' equality of
educational opportunity claims during the second wave was
pointing out that the constitution only requires that children be
provided some minimally adequate or basic education or that
children enjoy a fundamental right to an education, but that the
fundamental right is to only a minimally adequate or basic level
of education. The court would then note that the plaintiffs had
either presented no evidence of educational failure or deprivation of an adequate education or find that the state had demonstrated that such a minimally adequate education had been
provided to- its children. Indeed, second-wave cases in Arizona, 339 Michigan,4 0 Washington,341 Idaho, 342 Oregon,343 Ohio, 344
Pennsylvania, 345

Georgia, 346 New York,347 Maryland, 348 and

338. See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v.
Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
339. See Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973).
340. Milliken v. Green, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973).
341. Kinnear, 530 P.2d at 178.

342. See Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975).
343. Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976).

344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

Bd. of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979).
Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979).
McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981).
Levittown, 439 N.E.2d at 359.
See Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at 758.
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Wisconsin 349 relied at least in part on this rationale. An example
of judicial reasoning along these lines is the New York case of
Board of Education, Levittown Union Free School District v. Nyquist.350 In Nyquist, plaintiffs alleged that, due to the property
tax-based financing system in the state, children in propertypoor districts did not receive the same educational opportunities
351 Plaintiffs also argued that
as children in wealthier districts.
children in urban districts could not raise sufficient revenue to
meet the needs of their special needs population, even though
352 In
they could raise as much as the average district in the state.
response, the court made several stunning findings. First, it acknowledged that differences in property wealth led to differences in revenue, which in turn led to differences in educational
opportunity. 353 It also found that the plaintiff districts suffered
from fewer educational resources, older and more deteriorated
educational facilities, and more limited educational programs
35 4 Finally, the court recognized that
than the wealthier districts.
these same children had, on average, lower levels of academic
355
achievement.
Yet none of this mattered to the Nyquist court. The state
constitution, which mandated the "maintenance and support of
a system of free common schools," required that the state provide a "sound basic education," not equality of educational opportunity. 356 In response, the plaintiffs contended that the fact
that few children in the plaintiff districts passed the state's own
minimum competency exams demonstrated the failure to provide such a sound, basic education. However, the court replied
by noting that the State of New York spent more money per pupil than all states but two and, perhaps more important, the
court stressed that the plaintiffs presented no evidence that
"educational facilities or services provided in the school districts... [fell] below the State-wide minimum standard of edu35 7
cational quality and quantity fixed by the Board of Regents."
Thus, the court concluded, there was insufficient evidence that
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.

Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 568.
439 N.E.2d at 359.
Id. at 361-62.
Id. at 362.
Id. at 363.
Id.

355. Id.

356. Levittown, 439 N.E.2d at 368.
357. Id. at 363.
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children were not receiving the constitutionally mandated
sound, basic education. With that, the court placed front-andcenter the debate that continues today over what evidence demonstrates the failure to provide an adequate education. Is it the
evidence of failure of students to achieve competency on state
exams? Or could it be evidence of the failure of schools to provide the requisite courses, curricula, or programs? Or, finally,
could it be the failure of the state to spend sufficient funds on
education? Any of these forms of evidence could be relevant,
and any and all could serve as the standard. Yet a definitive
standard remains largely unarticulated. Thus, the fuzzy standard of adequacy will continue to serve as both an offensive
weapon and a defensive shield.
By the end of the so-called second wave, the primary legal
theories for educational finance reform litigation had been developed. Plaintiffs had employed Equal Protection Clause theories, either alone or bolstered by the state's education article, and
theories based solely on the state's educational article. The relevant standards had been fleshed out and their shortcomings
identified. Fiscal neutrality, after an initial burst of victories,
diminished in importance as the main battle was waged between
an adequacy standard and an equality of educational opportunity standard. Perhaps most important, the courts confronted
their institutional boundaries and began to move and shape
those boundaries. From the vantage point of more than a decade after commentators identified a "third wave" of educational
finance reform causes, 358 one must then ask, what was so different about the third wave?
E.

The Kentucky Case and the Would-Be Revolution
Beginning in 1989, the tide seemed to turn, at least initially,
for educational finance reform advocates. From 1989 through
1993, plaintiffs won six of nine cases (66%) that reached a final
state supreme court decision.3 59 As a result, scholars sought to
characterize this new winning streak for school finance reformers and explain why plaintiffs were winning. The common account, that this was the "third wave" of educational finance
reform litigation in which the courts were focusing on educational adequacy and turning away from theories of equity, has
358. See supra note 4.

359. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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become dogma in the literature. 360 But adequacy was nothing
new in the courts. A number of the plaintiff wins prior to 1989
were based on an adequacy theory, even if the courts did not use
the term. Perhaps more perplexing, the effectiveness of the adequacy theory as a reform tool seemed to have been belied by the
track record of plaintiffs after 1993. From 1994 to 2000, plaintiffs
had prevailed in only six of fifteen cases (40%) that reached a fi361
nal state supreme court decision on the merits. Nonetheless, if
one includes those opinions that were final decisions, as well as
those that permitted plaintiffs to go forward on their claims after
an initial dismissal by the trial court, plaintiffs have enjoyed
much more success since 1989, as they won sixteen out of
twenty-eight (57%) of those cases (compared to seven of twentytwo (32%) in the second wave), six of which were reversals of
the courts' second-wave positions. 362 Something may be different between the eras, but it cannot be explained by the "discovery" of adequacy.
1. The "At-Risk" Nation and a Call to Arms
"Our Nation is at risk," wrote the National Commission on
Excellence in Education in April 1983, "[o]ur once unchallenged
preeminence in commerce, industry, science, and technological
innovation is being overtaken by competitors throughout the
world." 363 The report continued, "the educational foundations

of our society are presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a Nation and a people." 364 In response to a request by then Secretary of Education

T.H. Bell in the Reagan Administration, the Commission evaluated the quality of education in the United States as of the early
1980's.365 The Commission, which was made up of educators,

researchers, administrators, and policy-makers, conducted a
broad-based inquiry into the state of primary, secondary, and
post-secondary education in the United States and its conclusion
360. See supra note 4.
361. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
362. See id.
363. See NAT'L COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A Nation at Risk: The Impera-

at
1983,
Apr.,
Reform,
Education
of
tive
[herein2003)
9,
Apr.
visited
(last
http://www.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/risk.html
after A Nation at Risk].
364. Id.
365.

(1995).

See DIANE RAVITCH, NATIONAL STANDARDS h i AMERICAN EDUCATION 52
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was resoundingly clear: society had lost sight of the basic purposes of schooling and of the high expectations and disciplined
effort needed to attain those purposes. 366 The Commission's
prescription was equally clear: American education must be "directed toward reform and excellence throughout education." 367
Officially born in the Nation at Risk report, the excellence
movement would become the focal point for educational reform
in the 1980's. This reform movement manifested itself in development of competency exams for high school students, expansion of the movement to require that all teachers pass basic skills
tests before being placed in the classroom, and a renewed attention to the math and science curriculum that had purportedly
been disregarded during the building of "shopping mall" high
schools during the 1970's. 368 So widely accepted was the belief

that America's schools were in crisis and that the solution lie in
raising expectations for all students that by the close of the decade at a conference convened by President George Bush, with all
fifty of the nation's governors present, the group resolved to
adopt nationwide education goals that focused on achieving
academic excellence for all students. 369 One year later, in 1990,
President Bush announced the education goals that had been
adopted by the governors. 370 Among those goals were that students would demonstrate competence in challenging subject
matter and that American students would be first in the world in
math and science achievement. 71 During the Clinton administration, these goals were embraced by virtually all interests, as
the goals became the centerpiece of the standards-based reform
movement that sought to set high academic standards for all
children, building a coherent system of curriculum, assessment,
and accountability.3 72 This push for standards-based reform was
enshrined in the Goals 2000 Educate America Act of 1994, which
provided incentives for states to develop academic standards
and assessments tied to those standards. 373 In addition, the push
was bolstered by the 1994 passage of the Improving America's
366. A Nation at Risk, supra note 363.
367. Id.

368. See RAVITCH, supra note 365, at 48-56.
369. See MILBREY W. MCLAUGHLIN & LORRIE SHEPARD, IMPROVING EDUCATION
THROUGH STANDARDS-BASED REFORM 1-2 (1995).

370. See id. at 1-5; see also RAVITCH, supra note 365, at 135-50.
371. See RAVITCH, supra note 365, at 135-50.
372. See id.

373. Pub. L. No. 103-227 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 5861-6064 (2000)).
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Schools Act, which urged states receiving Title 1 funds to set educational proficiency standards and required those states to make
"adequate progress" toward bringing all students to the level of
374
those standards.
In less than a decade, the rallying cry of scholars and reformers - that American students should enjoy equality of educational opportunity - had been transformed into the belief that
all students can and should achieve at high levels and that the
focal point of educational reform should be excellence for all.
But even the language of the Nation at Risk report argued that
excellence should not come at the cost of equality:
We do not believe that a public commitment to excellence
and educational reform must be made at the expense of a
strong public commitment to the equitable treatment of our
diverse population. The twin goals of equity and highquality schooling have profound and practical meaning for
one to yield
our economy and society, and we cannot permit
375
to the other either in principle or in practice.
Under President Reagan, however, the legal infrastructure
that had been instrumental in the push for educational equity
was dismantled. No longer would the Justice Department affirmatively pursue school districts to abolish segregation practices. 376 On the legislative and budgetary front, Congress
virtually banned support for school districts that sought to intebodies in any other way than voluntary
grate their student 377
"magnet" programs.
Congress also nearly de-funded the federal legal aid program that had spearheaded much of the educational equity litigation movement in the 1960's and3781970's,
Couincluding litigation in Illinois, California, and Arizona.
ple these legislative and executive actions with the continued
rightward shift of the U.S. Supreme Court and the climate had
become decidedly chilly for equity-minded reformers. Indeed,

374. See Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat.
3518 (1994) (codified and amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6514).
375. A Nation at Risk, supra note 363.
376. GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 17 (1996).

377. Id. at 16-17.
378. See KENNETH F. BOEHM & PETER T. FLAHERTY, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION,
POLICY RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS WHY THE LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION MUST BE

RESEARCH BACKGROUNDER #1057 (Oct., 18, 1995), available at
7
http://www.heritage.org/Research/LegalIssues/BG105 .cfm (last visited Apr. 10,
ABOLISHED,
2003).
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by the early 1990's the Court had signaled its retreat from the
equity-minded integration ideal, in the trilogy of Dowell,379 Freeman,380 and Jenkins, 381 regardless of whether African-American
children had caught up with their white peers in the classroom.
In short, those cases significantly relaxed the standard for when
a school district could be deemed "unitary" and relieved of its
desegregation obligations. Even in those jurisdictions, such as
Kansas City, where creating racial balance among students was
numerically impossible because of the paucity of white students
and where the courts had ordered improvements in educational
facilities and services, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed districts
to liquidate consent decrees and court orders that required financial support for those services. 382 If educational reform had
any prayer in this environment, it would have to be in the name
of "excellence" and "adequacy," not "equity."
Fortunately for school finance reform advocates, there existed a ready legal hook for the argument that all children are
entitled to an adequate education - the state's education article and a developing adequacy standard that could be culled from
the New Jersey, Washington, and West Virginia cases. The
question was whether the advocates could convince the courts to
take advantage of the available constitutional text and precedent.
2. The Rose v. Council for Better Education Decision
In educational finance reform circles, the Rose v. Council for
Better Education, Inc. 383 decision is the stuff of legend. 384 By almost any measure, the school system in Kentucky was both
highly inequitable and inadequate. As the court put it, the Ken379. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
380. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
381. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 1139 (1995).
382. See id.
383. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
384. See Kern Alexander, The Common School Ideal and the Limits of LegislativeAuthority, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 341 (1991); Burt J. Combs, Creative Constitutional Law:
The Kentucky School of Reform Law, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 367 (1991); Ronald G. Dove,
Acorns in a Mountain Pool: The Role of Litigation, Law and Lawyers in Kentucky Education Reform, 17 J.EDUC. FIN. 83 (1991); Jacob E. Adams, Jr., School Finance Reform and
Systematic Change: Reconstituting Kentucky's Public Schools, 18 J. EDUC. FIN. 318, 324
(1993); C. Scott Tumble & Andrew C. Forsaith, Achieving Equity and Excellence in
Kentucky Education, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 599 (1995); Vinik, supra note 13, at 60;
Victor Kuo, Networks of Influence: Kentucky School Finance Reform and the Courts
(1994) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation).
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tucky educational system was "ranked nationally in the lower
20-25% in virtually every category that is used to evaluate educational performance." 385 In comparison to their peers in the
wealthiest school districts, children in property-poor school districts suffered from a more limited curriculum, insufficient facilities, lower standardized test scores, and less qualified
teachers. 386 Perhaps most troubling to the court, only 68.2% of
Kentucky's ninth graders were remaining in school long enough
to earn a diploma.387 The Rose case has attained legendary status
not because of these grim facts, however, but rather because of
the court's dramatic response to those facts and the unusual
level of constitutional "creativity" in that response.
Latching on to the Kentucky Constitution's requirement
that the state provide an "efficient system of common schools,"
the court held the entire statutory system of common schools to
be unconstitutional, stating that it is "up to the General Assem388
bly to re-create and re-establish a system of common schools."
But the court did not stop there. It also provided the legislature
with specific guidance on what would constitute an "efficient"
system of common schools:
[An efficient system of education must have as its goal to
provide each and every child with at least the seven following capacities: (i) sufficient oral and written communication
skills to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly
changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic,
social, and political systems to enable the student to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the student to understand the issues
that affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and
physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for
advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so
as to enable each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational
skills to enable public school students to compete favorably
with their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics

385. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 197.
386. See id.
387. See id.
388. Id. at 214.
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389
or in the job market.

The Court did not stop there, noting:
The essential, and minimal, characteristics of an "efficient"
system of common schools, may be summarized as follows:
1) The establishment, maintenance and funding of common schools in Kentucky is the sole responsibility of the
General Assembly.
2) Common schools shall be free to all.
3) Common schools shall be available to all Kentucky
children.
4) Common schools shall be substantially uniform
throughout the state.
5) Common schools shall provide equal educational opportunities to all Kentucky children, regardless of place
of residence or economic circumstances.
6) Common schools shall be monitored by the General
Assembly to assure that they are operated with no
waste, no duplication, no mismanagement, and with no
political influence.
7) The premise for the existence of common schools is
that all children in Kentucky have a constitutional right
to an adequate education.
8) The General Assembly shall provide funding which is
sufficient to provide each child in Kentucky an adequate
education.
9) An adequate education is one which has as its goal
the development of the seven capacities recited previously. 390
Contrary to commentators' discussion of the case, what is
striking about the decision is not that it invalidated the entire
educational system in Kentucky, nor that it identified the competencies that students should receive from a constitutional system, nor that it identified the minimum characteristics of a
constitutional system. Rather, what is striking about the decision
cannot be found in the opinion as written in the legal reporters.
The Kentucky Supreme Court's sweeping rejection of the state's

389. Id. at 212.
390. Id.
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educational system was facilitated by an unprecedented agreement among policy elites, the press, and the state courts that the
system needed to be scrapped.
The fact that the legislature, without additional cajoling
from the court, crafted and began to implement the landmark
Kentucky Educational Reform Act less than one year after the
court handed down its opinion is perhaps the most persuasive
piece of evidence that the court was merely providing the nudge
to get the legislature to act.391 As Kern Alexander, who was instrumental in developing the trial court's definition of what is an
"efficient" education, put it:
A most striking aspect of the Kentucky case was the breadth
of the court's ruling and the promptness of the legislative response. The court's decision led directly to a complete revision of the scheme of school finance and substantial
modification in the organization and administration of the
public schools.... The court provided the legislature with
both the nerve and the rationale to raise taxes, equalize
392
school funding, and make other necessary changes.
Unlike New Jersey, there were no judicial threats of shutting down the Kentucky system. Unlike California, passage of a
presumptively constitutional educational finance plan in Kentucky did not take six years from the time of the initial decision.
All of this came from a court that was not held in any particular
high regard by its peers and was not known for a tradition of activism.
In the flurry of commentary and analysis following the Rose
decision, most seemed to believe that the reasons for the rapid
legislative response was likely the unusual degree of agreement
among leaders in the state that the school system needed to
change. Bert T. Combs, the lead counsel for the plaintiffs and a
former governor of Kentucky, called the Rose court's transcendence of its institutional concerns "creative constitutional
law." 393 Mr. Combs noted that after the dust settled on the
court's decision, the General Assembly "announced that it
agreed with the supreme court decision and that it would comply with the court's mandate." 394 Combs concluded that "[1legal
391. See Alexander, supra note 384, at 343.
392. Id.
393. Combs, supra note 384.
394. Id. at 375. The governor, superintendent of public instruction, state board
of education, and state treasurer all apparently agreed, for they did not appeal the
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historians will note that Kentucky's School Reform Law is a classic example of how this democracy of ours can work for progress when the heads of the three coordinate branches of
government lay aside their egos and pride of turf and work together." 395 This is not to say that the legislative and executive
branches supported the litigation from the time of its inception
or even that most legislators supported the litigation. If that
were true, there might be no need for judicial pressure. As Kern
Alexander argued, the Kentucky case demonstrates that "judicial intervention and interpretation of state constitutional provisions is necessary to provide initiative and guidance for the
legislature if it is to abide by its constitutional obligations." 396
Yet this observation ignores the reality that the legislature could
well have ignored the court's decree, dragged its feet, or "complied" in only a superficial manner. That the legislature acted so
quickly and decisively suggests that leadership within the legislature desired change as much as the leadership in the judiciary.
Both Ronald Dove and Frank Vinik argue that the Rose decision was at least in part motivated by the unusual consensus
among state leaders in favor of school reform and the mobilization of the media to support that cause.397 Seeking to understand the mechanism for the high degree of consensus among
the judiciary and the policy elites in the state, Victor Kuo went
further to demonstrate that the plaintiffs in the case in the case
had tighter associational networks with the judges in the matter. 398 Using social network analysis, Kuo provided evidence
that the "friendship" and "advice" networks were stronger
among the plaintiffs and the judges than they were among the
399
defendants and the judges.
3.

What was so Different about the Rose Case?

One could argue that Kentucky's Rose decision differed little
from previous school finance litigations. There, the court struck
down the entire system of schooling in the state on the grounds
that it was inadequate and set forth broad parameters for what is
an adequate education. But that had been done before. Yet the
trial court's decision striking down the state's school system. Id.
395. Id. at 376.
396. Alexander, supra note 384, at 343.
397. See Dove, supra note 384, at 109-12; Vinik, supra note 13.
398. See Kuo, supra note 384.
399. Id.
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scholarly deluge after the Kentucky case would suggest that
something had changed.
Perhaps what is significant about the Kentucky decision is
nothing more than its timing. This case focusing on educational
quality arrived at a time when the policy climate favored such
quality-minded reform. Even if the legal and educational standards had been developed in earlier cases, the policy and scholarly environments were not yet prepared to embrace the
adequacy theory. With the confluence of the governor's summit
and the Rose case in 1989, the path was paved for educational
adequacy as a theory of school finance reform. Perhaps what is
equally significant about the Kentucky case is how effective the
court was in sparking educational reform. The court, in overturning the system and leaving its overhaul to the legislature,
read the tea leaves correctly. A significant constituency favoring
school reform had coalesced in the state and all that was needed
was the court order for the legislature to act. The Kentucky Supreme Court, not known for its leadership among supreme
courts, had carved out a new and potentially effective role for
the judiciary in state governance.
F.

The Judicial Aftermath of the Kentucky Decision

New Hopefor Reformers
Much like the Serrano decision, the Rose decision immediately affected opinions in other state supreme courts. Courts in
Alabama, 400 Massachusetts, 401 and New Hampshire 4 2 addressed
the constitutionality of their educational finance systems for the
first time and, citing the Rose decision, declared them unconstitutional under an adequacy theory. Each of those courts specifically relied on the Kentucky court's definition of "adequacy"
and sent the matter back to their legislatures to craft a remedial
1.

400. In Alabama, the trial court in Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt (Ala. Circ.
Ct., 1993) (published as an appendix to Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107
(Ala. 1993), found that the state's entire educational system violated the state constitution's equality provision, due process clause, and education article. Although the
case was not appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court because it was not yet an appealable order, the court issued an advisory opinion that the legislature was bound
by the trial court's decision).
401. See McDuffy v. Sec'y of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
402. See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997) (Claremont
IT).
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plan in accordance with that definition. 4 3 Moreover, the Wyoming Supreme Court again struck down its state's educational
finance system, specifically emphasizing the failure of the state
to define what is an adequate education and provide sufficient
funding for that education. 404
The first state supreme court to strike down its educational
funding system and adopt the Rose adequacy standard was the
Massachusetts high court. In McDuffy v. Secretary of Education,
the court set out to interpret the Massachusetts Constitution's
40 5
requirement that the legislature "cherish" the public schools.

After an extensive discourse on how the word "cherish" was
used in colonial times, the history of education in Massachusetts,
and the constitutional framers' intent, the court concluded that
406
the constitution required the state to provide an "education."
Apparently the meaning of "education" is not the bare minimum, but rather contemplates some level of adequacy. Yet the
court never analyzed the facts of the case pursuant to any specific standard. It merely declared the system unconstitutional,
articulated the broad guidelines developed by the Rose court,
and ordered the legislature to develop an educational system
that conforms to those guidelines.40 7
Hidden behind the court's opinion, however, was the fact
that the policy climate in Massachusetts favored school reform.
Indeed, the legislature had already passed a comprehensive
school reform bill that merely awaited the governor's signature
and was promptly signed after the McDuffy decision. 408 Moreover, according to the majority opinion, the defendants had
stipulated to the multitude of facts suggesting educational inadequacy, including crowded classes, reductions in staff, inadequate teaching, neglected libraries, inability to attract and retain
high quality teachers, lack of curriculum development, and lack
of guidance counselors. 4 9 Finally, the court relied heavily on the
legislature's 1991 Report of the Committee on Distressed School Systems and School Reform for much of its evidence of inadequacy.
By doing so, the court merely validated what the legislature al403. See Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d at 155; McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at
555-556; Claremont,703 A.2d at 1359-60.
404. See Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. Wyoming, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995).

405.
406.
407.
408.

615 N.E.2d at 522.
See id. at 548.
Id.
See Enrich, supra note 4, at 176.

409. See McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 554.
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ready knew, thereby facilitating passage of reform. The legislature's 1993 Education Reform Act had not been challenged in the
state's supreme court as of this writing.
In a 1997 decision in Claremont School District v. Governor
(Claremont II), the New Hampshire Supreme Court similarly
ruled that its constitution, which also required the legislature to
"cherish" its public schools, required the state to "prepare citizens for their role as participants and as potential competitors in
today's marketplace of ideas." 410 In its prior 1994 decision, the
court had sent the case back to the trial court for a full evidentiary hearing on whether the state had met that broad standard. 411 On remand, the trial court ruled that the state had met
that standard.41 2 But on appeal, the supreme court reversed the
trial court and, noting that the state ranked dead last among
states in support for local schools, held that the legislature was
required to develop specific standards for an adequate education and revamp its taxation and funding system to ensure that
taxpayers in property poor districts did not suffer from inequitable tax efforts. 413 In so doing, the court specified that the Kenshould
tucky standards were guidelines that the legislature
414
system.
finance
follow in crafting a new educational
Finally, an exhaustive review of the dismal conditions of
Alabama's schools, the poor performance of its students, and the
failure of all of the state's school districts to meet the department
of education's accreditation standards, a trial court judge had little difficulty finding that the state's educational system was not
providing a "liberal system of public schools throughout the
415 That trial court went a
state for the benefit of the children."
step further and found that the failure to provide an adequate
education to its children denied those children their liberty and
property interests in their education without due process of
law. 416 But the trial court's findings were aided by testimony
from personnel in the department of education and statements
410. Claremont, 703 A.2d at 1353, 1356, 1359 (quoting Claremont Sch. Dist. v.
Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993)) (Claremont II).
411. See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1994). (Claremont I
412. See Claremont, 703 A.2d at 1354 (Claremont 11).
413. See id. at 1354-55.
414. See id. at 1359-60.
415. Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So.2d at 146 (quoting ALA. CONST. art.
XIV, § 256).
416. See id. at 161-62.
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by then-Governor Guy Hunt that the schools were inadequate
and needed more money. 417 Following Kentucky's lead, the trial
court judge articulated the specific features of an equitable and
adequate education. Not only did the court benefit from the
Kentucky court's standard, it also benefited from the same climate of reform the Kentucky court enjoyed. But the Alabama
circuit court went a step further by ordering, not merely declaratory relief, but rather, an injunction directing the state to come
into compliance while the court retained jurisdiction. 418 By retaining jurisdiction, the trial court made its decision unappealable as it was not yet a final order. Under Governor Hunt,
compliance with the order appeared to be attainable. But the
remedial actions unraveled when Hunt was convicted on felony
charges and a a non-sympathetic Governor, Fob James, refused
to comply with the trial judge's order. 419 Governor asked the
supreme court to set aside the ruling several years later on the
theory that attorneys for the state had offered no vigorous defense, and that the decision was merely a "sweetheart deal" between the plaintiffs and Governor Hunt.420 James's appeal to the
supreme court was rejected as being untimely, but meaningful
reform had not taken hold as of 2001 in Alabama.421
2. The "Reversals"
Apart from the reformers' victories in those states in which
the school finance issue was one of first impression, plaintiffs in
the 1990's have been successful in convincing state supreme
courts to switch positions from those that they took during second-wave cases. High courts in Ohio422 and Arizona 423 both had
upheld their educational finance systems in the face of 1970's
challenges, but overturned those same systems in the 1990's. In
Idaho, 424 New York, 425 North Carolina, 426 and South Carolina,427
417. See id. at 111, 115-16.
418. See id. at 166.
419. See Vinik, supra note 13, at 75, 82-85. Lieutenant Governor Jim Folsom
served out the remained of Hunt's term and lost the governorship to Fob James in
the next election. Id. at 82-83.
420. See id. at 85.
421. See id.
422. Compare Bd. of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979), with DeRolph v.
State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997).
423. Compare Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973), with Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994).
424. Compare Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975), with Idaho
Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724 (Idaho 1993), later
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supreme courts all had ruled in favor of the state in the second
wave of litigation, but each of those courts allowed plaintiffs to
go forward against the state on different legal theories in the
third wave. These "reversals" are instructive because they may
provide insight into differences between second and third-wave
cases and may suggest factors that may have influenced judicial
decision-making in the two waves. 428 Unfortunately, however, a
careful analysis of the judicial opinions in the two matters in
each state clarifies little. There is one distinct difference between
the second-wave cases and five of the six third-wave cases. The
second wave decisions were all based on theories of equal educational opportunity, while five of the six third wave reversals
were all based on adequacy theories. But, as discussed below,
this trend tells us little about whether the adequacy theory
caused the courts' change of heart or whether the theory provided the desired flexibility for the courts to seek desired reform of the system in the face of unfavorable precedent.
The New York and Idaho cases are typical of the legal reasoning used in these reversals, while the final decisions in Arizona and Ohio provide some clues as to judicial thinking in the
cases. As discussed above, the New York Court of Appeals in
the Board of Education, Levittown v. Nyquist case accepted many of
the plaintiffs' allegations that children in poor rural districts receive fewer resources than those in wealthier districts and children in urban districts may not receive the same educational
opportunity as suburban districts due to their greater educational needs. 429 Plaintiffs argued that these disparities amounted
to a denial of equal educational opportunities and therefore a
violation of the state's equal protection provision and education
article. 430 The court disagreed and justified the disparities under
proceeding 912 P.2d 644 (Idaho 1996).
425. Compare Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359
(N.Y. 1982), with Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, 655 N.E.2d 661
(N.Y. 1995).
426. Compare Britt v. North Carolina Board of Education, 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C.
App. Ct. 1987), appeal dismissed 361 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987), with Leandro v. State, 488
S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997).
427. Compare Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988), with
Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. South Carolina, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1999).
428. It should be noted that in none of the cases did the court technically "reverse" prior precedent. Rather, the courts, using fuzzy standards, simply distinguished that prior precedent.
429. See supra notes 349-56 and accompanying text.
430. See Levittown, 439 N.E.2d at 361-62.
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the state's education article and a rational relation test by reasoning that all the provisions required was a "sound basic education" and that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that they were
denied such an education. 431
Just over two decades later, plaintiffs in Campaign for Fiscal
Equity v. New York used the Levittown decision as a roadmap for
their legal and factual allegations. 432 Initially, the trial court
dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, finding it barred by the Levittown decision.433 But on appeal, the New York Court of Appeals
reinstated the complaint by relying on Levittown for the proposition that a "sound, basic education" must be provided to New
York's children, and that plaintiffs were entitled to a trial to determine whether that quality of education had been provided. 434
Normally, courts are supposed to be reactive institutions that
only rule on issues and facts presented to them. But in a somewhat unorthodox judicial maneuver, the court of appeals went
further and provided guidance to the trial court and plaintiffs in
defining the minimum content of a sound, basic education.
"Such an education should consist of the basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable children to eventually
function productively as civic participants capable of voting and
serving on a jury." 435 What type of evidence would suggest that
such an education was not being provided? The court provided
suggestions on that point.
The State must assure that some essentials are provided.
Children are entitled to minimally adequate physical facilities and classrooms which provide enough light, space, heat,
and air to permit children to learn. Children should have access to minimally adequate instrumentalities of learning such
as desks, chairs, pencils, and reasonably current textbooks.
Children are also entitled to minimally adequate teaching of
reasonably up-to-date basic curricula such as reading, writing, mathematics, science, and social studies, by sufficient
personnel adequately trained to teach those subject areas. 436
Thus, where the Levittown court used adequacy to justify inequity, the Campaignfor Fiscal Equity court held, consistent with its

431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.

Id. at 369.
See Campaignfor Fiscal Equity, 655 N.E.2d at 664.
See id. at 664.
See id. at 669.
Id. at 666.
Id.
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predecessor court, that plaintiffs could make a viable constitutional claim based on a failure to provide the minimally ade437
quate education.
The Idaho Supreme Court's educational finance decisions
further demonstrate the legal gymnastics that courts may perform in the face of adverse precedent. In the 1975 case, Thompson v. Engelking, the Idaho high court interpreted the
legislature's duty to establish and maintain a "general, uniform
and thorough system of public free common schools," as one
that does not require that all services and facilities be equalized. 438 Specifically, the court found that the "uniformity" provision required only uniformity among school districts in the
system's essentials, including its curriculum, not equality in
funding. 439 Two decades later, the court again interpreted the
education article in the face of allegations of inequity and inadequacy. The second time around, apparently bound by Thompson,
the court rejected the equality allegations under the equal protection and "uniformity" provisions. 440 Notwithstanding the rejection of the equity claims, the court then focused on the
"thoroughness" provision of the education article and held that
it embodied a minimum quality of educational services. 441 On
that ground and consistent with the Thompson v. Engelking decision, the court remanded the case back to the trial court to determine whether a thorough education was being provided. 442
Like the New York Court of Appeals, the Idaho Supreme Court
provided some guidance to the trial court, but its guidance
evinced deference to the political branches. The court stated that
its "duty to define the meaning of the thoroughness require-

437. The Campaign for Fiscal Equity court also held that plaintiffs could go forward on their claim under the Title VI implementing regulations that the state's
educational finance system provided unequal opportunities to children in high minority population school districts compared to children in low minority population
school districts. Plaintiffs properly alleged, the court held, that the system disproportionately and negatively impacted minority youth. Since that ruling, however,
the Title VI theory has been largely denuded by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (eliminating the longstanding private right of
action under Title VI). Thus, a trial was necessary to determine whether a violation
of the Title VI regulations could be demonstrated.
438. Thompson, 537 P.2d at 648.
439. See id. at 652.
440. See Idaho Schs. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724,
736(Idaho 1993).
441. See id. at 734-35.
442. See id. at 735.
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ment... has been made simpler... because the executive
branch of the government has already promulgated educational
standards pursuant to the legislature's directive." 443 The court
then adopted the State Board of Education's rules and regulations dealing with "school facilities, instructional programs and
text books, and transportation systems" and held that the "thor444
oughness" clause required those standards to be met.

What changed the minds of the New York and Idaho courts
between the second and third waves? Wave theorists might argue that the emergence of the adequacy theory provided a persuasive basis for courts to overturn their educational finance
systems. But one could equally argue that it was all just a
change in attitudes among the justices on the court. 445 Either
due to a change in personnel or some environmental influence,
the judges now possessed a favorable attitude toward educational finance reform and were simply using the adequacy theory to circumvent adverse prior precedent and maintain the
integrity of their legal reasoning. Or perhaps it was neither the
adequacy theory nor a change in judicial attitudes, but rather a
recognition by the courts that policy elites in the state supported
educational finance reform but needed the catalyst of the judicial
branch to instigate reform. On the face of the opinions, it is difficult to determine which of these (or any other) explanations fits
best. But the opinions in the Ohio and Arizona reversals provide some insight.
In perhaps the most thinly reasoned educational finance reform decision of the past three decades, the Arizona Supreme
Court upheld the state's school finance scheme in the face of an
equity challenge in 1973 in Shofstall v. Hollins.446 Applying the
Rodriguez test for fundamentality, the court found that education
447
was a fundamental interest under the Arizona Constitution.
But the court also found that the education article's requirement
that a "general and uniform" system of public schools had been
met, because the state had set the minimal systemic requirements regarding the length of the school year, required courses,

443. Id. at 734.
444. Id.

445. See Joseph S. Patt, School Finance Battles: Survey Says? It's All Just a Change in
Attitudes, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 547 (1999).

446. See 515 P.2d at 590.
447. Id. at 592.
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qualifications of teachers, and selection of textbooks. 448 Because
the system was general and uniform and despite the alleged inequity in funding, the court found no infringement of the fundamental right to an education and applied the rational relation
test to uphold the state's system.449
Twenty-one years later in Roosevelt Elementary School District
No. 66 v. Bishop, the court was faced with the question of
whether "gross disparities" in school facilities, e.g., classroom
size and condition, and minimal or no library, laboratory, technology, and athletic facilities, constituted a violation of the
450
state's equal protection or "general and uniform" provision.
In a 3-2 decision, the Arizona supreme court held that such inequity violated the "general and uniform" requirement. While
the sole concurring justice felt that the state's facilities were both
inadequate and inequitable, 45 1 the two justices in the plurality
opinion and the concurring justice all agreed that the provision
of facilities was unconstitutionally inequitable. 452 Because this
decision was grounded in an equity theory, it cannot be argued
that the adequacy "movement" influenced the court. On the
contrary, the court specifically stated that "[e]ven if every student in every district were getting an adequate education, gross
facility disparities caused by the state's chosen financing scheme
453
would violate the uniformity clause."
What then may have made the difference between Shofstall
and Roosevelt? One commentator has suggested that the
"judges' attitudes toward education had evolved" in the time
between the two cases. 454 The evidence that the commentator
pointed to was the court's observation that education was the
"key to America's success" and its argument that "financing a
general and uniform public school system is in our collective
self-interest." 455 While the change-of-attitude theory may be correct, a better understanding of judicial attitudes on the Arizona
Supreme Court is necessary before that conclusion can be
reached. More telling, the court provided some other clues as to
its motivation. First, the State Superintendent of Public Instruc448. Id. at 592.

449. Id. at 592-93.
450. 877 P.2d at 808-09, 814.

451.
452.
453.
454.

See id. at 823 (Feldman, J., concurring)
See id. at 815-16.
Id. at 815 n.7.
See Patt, supra note 445, at 572.

455. Id.
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tion and named defendant, Diane Bishop, testified that the educational infrastructure was lacking and that "education is a state
responsibility and that all children of the state have the same
rights to education." 456 In addition, the Court explicitly noted
that "there is significant public support for reform and that the
Governor, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and some
legislators have attempted to take up the challenge." 457 Thus,
similar to Kentucky's Rose court, 458 the Roosevelt court was likely
acting in concert with what it thought was the elite and/or public opinion in the state to bring about educational reform.
Suffice it to say that, superficially, the educational conditions in Ohio were little different between the 1979 Board of Education v. Walter case, in which the Ohio Supreme Court upheld
the state's educational finance system on an equity theory, 459 and
the 1997 DeRolph v. Ohio decision, in which the court struck the
system down on an adequacy theory. 460 The state's educational
funding mechanism remained largely the same over the entire
period. 461 Glaring disparities in educational opportunities could
be demonstrated over the entire period. 462 And the political
branches in both cases vehemently opposed court-induced
school reform. A liberal "working majority" on the court in the
1990's was simply unwilling to permit the educational inequity
and inadequacy that its predecessors permitted in the 1970'S.463
Although available in the second wave, adequacy as a legal
strategy emerged as a factor in judicial decision-making in the
1990's. This emergence is perhaps most evident in those states in
which the supreme courts "reversed" earlier decisions. There,
the adequacy theory provided judges with the flexibility to distinguish the prior, adverse precedent.
Whether adequacy
"caused" the reversals is a more difficult proposition to demonstrate. Clearly, adequacy is not a necessary causal factor in thirdwave decision-making, as is demonstrated by the Arizona Supreme Court's decision to reverse itself on equality grounds. 464
456. Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist., 877 P.2d at 809.
457. Id.
458. See supra notes 383-99 and accompanying text.
459. 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979).
460. 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997).
461. Id. at 777-78 (Moyer, J., dissenting); see Koski, supra note 29 (discussing the
state's school finance formula that was adopted shortly after the Walter decision).
462. DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 757-68 (Douglas, J., concurring).
463. See Koski, supra note 29.
464. See supra notes 446-49 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, other factors may be influencing judicial decisionmaking in recent educational finance reform cases. Evidence
from the judicial opinions themselves suggests that courts may
be facilitating educational reform in those states in which reform
is already on the agenda for certain policy elites. And finally, it
is entirely possible that judicial attitudes have evolved over time
such that educational finance reform is supported by a judiciary
that has crafted a role for itself in state educational finance policy. Of course this proposition cannot be gleaned from the judicial opinions alone. What is clear is that the fuzzy standards of
adequacy and equity at least provide the court flexibility to intervene as conditions warrant.
G. The Tenacity of Equity
As alluded to above, the so-called "third wave" of educational finance reform litigation has hardly been the demise of
"equality of educational opportunity" as a theory of educational
reform. Although such equity theories may have seemed foreclosed in those jurisdictions with adverse second-wave decisions, advocates have continued to press such claims even in the
face of adverse precedent and even in the midst of the "quality"
and "adequacy" movement. The Arizona Supreme Court's Roosevelt decision is typical of the tenacity of equity.465 Even in a jurisdiction that had initially rejected an equity claim in the 1970's,
a different court, focusing on different facts, was able to find that
"gross disparities" in the provision of educational facilities offended the state constitution.466
Perhaps more striking, however, are decisions in those
states in which a fiscal equity theory still held sway because extreme fiscal inequity endured. Even though the second wave
was not particularly successful in terms of legal victories, reformers nonetheless enjoyed a great deal of success after Serrano
in persuading their legislatures to provide greater equalization
in funding among districts in their states.467 But not all states
heeded Serrano's warning. As a result, relatively small and rural
states - whose funding formulas were still largely driven by
foundation grants and local taxes - continued to suffer great fis465. See 877 P.2d at 806.
466. See id.
467. The State of Wisconsin, for instance, adopted a tiered tax-base equalization
system in the wake of Serrano that provided much greater revenue equity among
districts. See Koski, supra note 29, at Ch.4.
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cal disparities. 468 Irrespective of student need or municipal
overburden, some districts still could not raise enough money to
provide the same type of resources as their wealthier peers. 469
Tennessee was one state suffering such disparities. There, a
coalition of small, rural school districts challenged the state's
educational funding system on the grounds that the dramatic
disparities in revenues generated from local sales taxes (a primary source of school funding in the state) among the rural districts and metropolitan districts with their stronger commercial
base created unconstitutionally large disparities in educational
resources. 470 The rural districts provided evidence of spending
variations, resource inequalities (including facilities, qualified
teachers, curricula), and performance gaps between the poor rural districts and the wealthier metropolitan districts. 471 Significantly, a group of nine urban and suburban districts intervened
on behalf of the defendants in an effort to preserve the status
quo. 4 7 2 It was thus clear that this case was factually premised on
fiscal equality, not vertical equity or concerns about municipal
and educational overburden. Equally significant, the State Department of Education and the State Comptroller had each issued reports, detailing the level of financial disparity among
districts, and the Department and Board of Education both were
473
calling for reform.
The rural schools hung their claims on both the state's education article and the state's equal protection provision. 474 After
a trial court victory and an appellate court reversal, the plaintiffs
appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court.475 Although the supreme court found that the state's education article provided
some right to an "education," it explicitly refused to define the
substantive educational right that Tennessee's children enjoyed. 476 The court would not even go so far as to rely on the
Rose court's broad parameters for an adequate education. 477 In-

468. See, e.g., Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn.
1993); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. Wyoming, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995).
469. See id.

470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.

See Tennessee Small Sch. Sys., 851 S.W.2d at 139.
See id. at 144.
See id. at 141-42.
See id. at 144-45.
See id.
at 141.
See id. at 142.
See Tennessee Small Sch. Sys., 851 S.W.2d at 148-50.
See id. at 149.
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stead, the court looked to the equal protection provision and
found that it required the state to provide substantially equal
educational opportunities to its children. 478 Even under a rational basis test, the court found that local control could not justify the current funding formula, for it bore no rational
relationship to the needs of the districts. The court sent the matter back to the legislature to achieve equity in educational fund479
ing in the state.
Similar conclusions were reached in Vermont 480 and New
Hampshire, 481 two states that have strong traditions of local control and distastes for taxes and state intervention. Although the
New Hampshire Supreme Court in Claremont I did find a "right
to an adequate education mandated by the [state] constitution,"
it offered little by way of a definition of adequacy, stating only
that such an education must "prepare citizens for their role as
participants and as potential competitors in today's marketplace
of ideas" and must reflect consideration of the Kentucky principles.482 In Claremont II, the court was clearer about the state's
violation of the constitutional mandate that state taxes must be
"proportionate and reasonable," that is, "equal in valuation and
uniform in rate." 483 Finding that the "local" property tax is a
"state" tax for school funding purposes, the court directed the
legislature to achieve fiscal neutrality. 484
The Vermont Supreme Court's reliance on equity was even
more clear. There the court found that a "minimally adequate"
education was provided to children in the state, but such a
"minimal" or even "adequate" education could not justify the
property-tax generated inequality. 485 The court held that educational opportunities had to be made available on substantially
equal terms. 486 This equity-minded thinking was commonplace,
as courts in Montana, Texas, New Jersey, Tennessee, Arizona,
and Vermont (i.e., six of the twelve plaintiff wins in final decisions) all relied significantly on equity theories in the third

478. See id. at 153-54.
479. See id. at 156-57.

480.
481.
482.
483.

See Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997).
See Claremont, 635 A.2d at 1375 (Claremont I).
Id. at 1381.
Claremont, 703 A.2d at 1355-56 (ClaremontII).

484. See id. at 1356-1358.
485. See Claremont,692 A.2d at 1396-97 (Claremont 1).
486. See id. at 1397.
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wave.487
Courts in the 1990's have thus enjoyed the doctrinal developments of the early thinkers on educational finance reform and
the few rulings striking down educational finance schemes during the second wave. Nothing is particularly new in terms of
educational reform theories in the 1990's (save the novel racial
equality theory developed by Connecticut's Sheff v. O'Neill
court),488 but courts have creatively used fiscal neutrality, adequacy, and equality of opportunity to reach desired outcomes in
the face of current facts and "controlling" law. But the earlier
victories for plaintiffs in the 1990's often prompt commentators
and advocates to overlook the subtle shift in plaintiffs' fortunes
in the latter half of the decade.
H.

The Euphoria Subsides

From the perspective of school finance reform advocates,
the 1990's held an early promise of significant reform through
the courts, but ultimately closed with only modest success. Familiar second wave themes have begun to re-assert themselves
into judicial opinions as the third wave matures. Some courts
have rejected equity and adequacy claims on the grounds that
the state has provided its children a constitutionally adequate
education.489 Others that have been asked to revisit their second
wave decisions to uphold the state educational finance system
have stayed the course. 490 Finally, the institutional concerns of
the courts have begun to take an even more central role in judicial analysis as some courts have explicitly refused to enter the
school finance debate, citing the separation of powers and political question doctrine as legal justification for remaining on the
sidelines. 491 Even those who dared enter the debate are seeing
themselves in protracted "conversations" with their sister

487. See Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989);
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Abbott v. Burke,
575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139

(1993); Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994);
Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997).
488. 678 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1996) (holding that racial minority children in Con-

necticut's schools had been denied their right to equal access to a non-segregated
education).
489. See, e.g., infra notes 515-35 and accompanying text.

490. See, e.g., Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388 (Wis. 2000); Marrero v. Penn.,
739 A.2d 110 (Penn. 1999).
491. See, e.g., infra notes 536-42 and accompanying text.
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branches about what makes a constitutional educational sys492
tem.
1.

Judicial Setbacks for Reformers

Amidst the legal and educational journal articles and all the
press over the revolution that started in Kentucky, the fact can
be lost that plaintiffs in school finance cases still lost about as
many of the state supreme court decisions as they won during
the 1990's. Courts in Oregon, 493 Minnesota, 494 Nebraska, 495
500
499
498
North Dakota, 496 Virginia, 497 Maine, Rhode Island, Florida,
Illinois,501 Pennsylvania, 502 and Wisconsin 5 3 all upheld their
educational finance systems in the face of adequacy and/or equity challenges. Like their companion courts that used the doctrinal flexibility developed in the second wave to overturn their
states' educational finance systems, these courts that capitalized
on that flexibility to uphold their systems.
Compared to the national average and their sister states, the
states of the Upper Midwest perform relatively well on standardized tests such as the National Assessment for Educational
Progress. 504 Perhaps this success is why a trio of school cases
from Minnesota, Nebraska, and North Dakota were rejected by
their state supreme courts in part because children in the state
were already receiving an adequate education or the plaintiffs
had failed to allege that their children were not receiving an
adequate education. Minnesota's Skeen v. State505 was a lawsuit
492. See, e.g., infra notes 544-45 and accompanying text.
493. See Coalition for Equitable Sch. Funding v. State, 811 P.2d 116 (Or. 1991).
494. See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993).
495. See Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349 (Neb. 1993).
496. See Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994).
497. See Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994).
498. See School Admin. Dist. No. 1 v. Comm'r, 659 A.2d 854 (Maine 1995).
499. See City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995).
500. See Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680
So.2d 400 (Fla. 1996).
501. See Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996); Lewis v.
Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798 (Ill. 1999).
502. See Marrero v. Pennsylvania, 739 A.2d 110 (Penn. 1999).
503. See Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388 (Wis. 2000).
504. Wendy S. Grigg, Mary C. Daane, Ying Jin, & Jay R. Campbell, National
Center for Education Statistics, The Nation's Report Card: Reading 2002, Figure 2.4
(June 2003) (indicating that the states of Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota,
Nebraska, Kansas, Montana, Wyoming, and Idaho all earned higher than average
scale scores than the national average in fourth grade reading on the National Assessment of Educational Progress).
505. 505 N.W.2d at 302 (the districts satisfied with the school finance formula
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brought by "outer ring," semi-rural areas that have a stable or
growing student population rather than by the metropolitan districts of Minneapolis, St. Paul, or Duluth, or the "inner ring"
suburbs around Minneapolis-St. Paul or the rural "Iron Range"
districts. Although home values in these communities are not
low, these districts alleged that they suffered from fiscal inequity
due to a provision in the state funding scheme that required districts to provide a small portion of their financing through an
unequalized referendum levy. 506 But these plaintiff districts and
their children conceded that they were receiving an "adequate"
education and were compelled to complain only about the "relative harm" they suffered as a result of the per-pupil revenue
inequalities due to the referendum levy. 507
The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed that the children in
the state were receiving an adequate education. 508 "It is important to note," the court stated, "that 'adequacy' as used here refers not to some minimal floor but to the measure of the need
that must be met."5 09 The court then denied plaintiffs relief under both the education article theory and the equal protection
theory. 510 Minnesota's education article mandated both a "general and uniform" and "thorough and efficient" educational system.511 But relying on the educational finance cases from
Wisconsin, Oregon, and Idaho that mandated only a general and
uniform "system," as opposed to uniformity in educational services, the court found that such a general and uniform system
had been provided. 512 Then, surveying the cases that dealt with
the meaning of "thorough and efficient" such as West Virginia's
Pauley v. Kelly, 13 the court found that these cases focused on
only the "broad purposes of an education system and emphasize[d] that such a standardized system be established throughout the state."1 4 Stated differently, all that the state must do to
ensure a thorough and efficient educational system is provide a
standardized system aimed at achieving the broad educational
tended
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.

to have high property tax bases or declining enrollments).
See id. at 302.
See id. at 302-03.
See id. at 318.
Id. at 318.
See id. at 320.
See Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 315.
See id.
at 310, 316-17.
255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va. 1979).
Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 311.
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goals be promulgated by the state. Finally, although the court
agreed that children in Minnesota had a fundamental right to an
education, it specified that this right was to enjoy an adequate
education. 515 Because such a right had been honored by the
state, strict scrutiny was not the proper standard for the equal
protection analysis. 516 Despite the alleged and demonstrable inequity in Minnesota's system, it passed constitutional muster
because it was adequate.
From a technical legal perspective, the Nebraska Supreme
Court's decision in Gould v. Orr51 7 went even farther than the
Minnesota Supreme Court. In Gould, plaintiffs alleged that there
were severe disparities in spending and educational resources
among the districts in the state. 518 The Nebraska Supreme Court,
on appeal from the trial court's dismissal of the case, acknowledged the discrepancies, but argued that such disparities in
themselves were not unconstitutional. 519 According to the court,
the constitution only required that the quality of the education
that students received be adequate. 520 Because the plaintiffs did
not allege inadequacy and did not allege how those inequalities
affected the quality of their education, the supreme court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint. 521 What was striking from a
technical sense, however, was that courts typically give plaintiffs
the opportunity to amend their complaints to allege facts that
would give rise to a legal claim. However, the Gould court refused to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint and stated
that "no reasonable possibility" existed that plaintiffs could cure
their complaint by amendment. 522 Thus, the court effectively
ruled that no Nebraskan child in the plaintiff school districts
could allege that she was receiving an inadequate education because the state was, as a matter of law, providing an adequate
education. This ruling was judicial policy-making of an entirely
different variety.
In North Dakota, the state constitution requires that in order
for the supreme court to overturn state legislation, a supermajority of four of the five justices on the court must support the deci515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.
522.

See id. at 318.
See id. at 317-18.
506 N.W.2d 349 (Neb. 1993).
See id. at 351.
See id. at 353.
See id.
See id.
Id.
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sion to strike down the state law.5 23 In Bismarck Public School Dis-

trict No. 1 v. State, three of the five justices thought that the glaring disparities in revenues, facilities, resources, and curricula
amounted to a violation of the state's equal protection provision.5 24 Because two justices dissented from this opinion, how-

ever, the court could not constitutionally strike down the state's
school funding scheme.5 25 Of course, the two justices whose
opinion carried the weight of a majority, believed that there was
no equal protection violation.526 Especially noteworthy is that
the dissent, which actually was a three-person majority, and the
plaintiffs agreed that, at a minimum, the education North Dakota's children received was not "totally inadequate."5 27 Consequently, the state funding scheme was properly reviewed under
an equity theory. Although the three-judge opinion found that
the inequalities could not be justified under mid-level scrutiny,528 the two-judge opinion found that constitutional inequi-

ties did not exist because students received education that met
or exceeded the requirements of the legislature, because North
Dakotans performed at or near the top of the nation on the
NAEP and Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills, and because the
legislature had met its responsibility of providing a "basic education" to the state's children. 29 These facts were enough adequacy to defeat the equity theory.
The Skeen, Gould, and Bismarck School District No. 1 cases all
recalled the fuzzy and dual-edge of adequacy that was wielded
by both sides during the second wave. But reliance on adequacy
to defeat equity was not the only remnant of the second wave.
Witnessing the pitched and protracted battles between the New
Jersey Supreme Court and the state legislature, and recalling the
political question concerns of the federal district court's Mclnnis
and Burrus decisions, some third-wave courts simply opted out
of the school finance conflict by making the entire issue off limits
to the judiciary.
Most striking of these cases is the refusal of the Illinois Supreme Court to enforce the apparently demanding education ar523.
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.

See N.D. CONST., art. VI, § 4.
See 511 N.W.2d at 249, 261-62.
See id. at 262-63.
See id. at 270-72 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
Id. at 255.
See id. at 256-58.
See id. at 270-71.
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ticle of the Illinois Constitution. That article provides:
A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the educational development of all persons to the limits of their capacities. The State shall provide for an efficient system of high
quality public educational institutions and services. Education in public schools through the secondary level shall be
free. There may be such other free education as the General
reAssembly provides by law. The State has the primary
5 30
sponsibility for financing the system of public education.
Notwithstanding that provision and the concrete allegations
made by the plaintiffs in The Committee for Educational Rights v.
Edgar531 that their children suffered from unequal and inadequate funding, facilities, and curricula, the court specifically relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's Baker v. Carr test for political
questions to hold both that issues relating to the quality of a
child's education have been designated solely to the legislature
under the state's constitution and that such issues defy judicially
manageable standards.5 32 The court stated that:
What constitutes a "high quality" education, and how it may
best be provided, cannot be ascertained by any judicially discoverable or manageable standards. The constitution provides no principled basis for a judicial definition of high
quality. It would be a transparent conceit to suggest that
whatever standards of quality courts might develop would
actually be derived from the constitution in any meaningful
sense. Nor is education a subject within the judiciary's field
of expertise, such that a judicial role in giving content to the
education guarantee might be warranted. Rather, the question of educational quality is inherently one of policy involvfor
ing philosophical and practical considerations that call
533
discretion.
administrative
and
the exercise of legislative
In Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in School Funding v.
Chiles, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that an adequate education is a fundamental right under the Florida Constitution and
that the state had failed to provide its students that fundamental
right by "failing to allocate adequate resources for a uniform
system of free public schools as provided in the Florida Constitution."534 In reviewing a trial court dismissal of the plaintiffs'
530. ILL. CONST., art. X, § 1 (emphasis added).

531.
532.
533.
534.

672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996).
See id. at 1191-92.
Id. at 1191.
Coalitionfor Adequacy and Fairnessin Sch. Funding, 680 So. 2d at 402.
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complaint, the Florida Supreme Court made the somewhat rhetorical point that the "constitutional mandate is not that every
school district in the state must receive equal funding or that
each educational program must be equivalent." 535 But the court
also refused to analyze whether the state had provided the adequate education that plaintiffs alleged was obligatory.5 36 Rather,
the court raised the separation of powers doctrine as a bar to
plaintiffs' entire claim. 537 Florida, like many states, has a "separation of powers" provision in its constitution: "The powers of
the state government shall be divided into legislative, executive
and judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch shall
exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches
unless expressly provided herein."5 38 Pursuant to that provision
and the political question doctrine, the court found that judicial
intervention would usurp the legislative power to appropriate
funds, that striking down the funding scheme would infringe on
the legislative power to provide by law for an adequate and uniform system, and that there are no appropriately manageable
judicial standards to determine whether the alleged fundamen539
tal right to an adequate education had been provided.
Similarly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court in City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun recognized the broad plenary power of the legislature in education matters and a strong presumption of
constitutionality for legislative enactments in the field.5 40 Thus,
the court held that "the analysis of the complex and elusive relationship between funding and 'learner outcomes,' when all other
variables are held constant, is the responsibility of the Legislature, which has been delegated the constitutional authority to
5 41
assign resources to education and to competing state needs."
Coming full circle to Mclnnis and Burrus and invoking the specter of conflict with the legislature, the Rhode Island court concluded that:
We point out one additional caveat: the absence of justiciable
standards could engage the court in a morass comparable to
the decades-long struggle of the Supreme Court of New Jer-

535. Id. at 406.
536. See id. at 406-07.
537. See id. at 407.

538.
539.
540.
541.

FLA. CONST., art. II, § 3.
See Coalitionfor Adequacy and Fairnessin Sch. Funding, 680 So. 2d at 407.
See City of Pawtucket, 662 A.2d at 44.
Id. at 57.
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sey that has attempted to define what constitutes the "thorough and efficient" education specified in that state's constitution ....the New Jersey Supreme Court has struggled in

its self-appointed role as overseer of education for more than
twenty-one years, consuming significant funds, fees, time, effort, and court attention. The volume of litigation and the extent of judicial oversight provide a chilling example of the
thickets that can entrap a court that takes on the duties of a
Legislature.

542

2. InstitutionalWrangling
The New Jersey Supreme Court's struggle as monitor of
education in the state is, at this point in educational finance reform history, an epic tale.5 43 Beyond the 1970's standoff between
544
the supreme court and legislature in the Robinson v. Cahill litigation, the New Jersey high court has engaged in a dialogue
with its legislature throughout the 1990's in its Abbott v. Burke
litigation. 45 In Abbott, twenty-nine of the state's poorest urban
districts filed a lawsuit claiming that the state still failed to
equalize funding among those districts and the richest districts
and had failed to provide for the educational needs of children
in those districts as was required by Robinson.546 In response to
that lawsuit, the court ordered the legislature to raise substantially spending in those poor districts to the level of the wealthy
districts and required the state to provide additional supplemental services and resources to meet the educational needs of urban
547
children from disadvantaged backgrounds.
The legislative response to this judicial mandate was to increase significantly the aid to the twenty-nine "Abbott Districts,"
such that average per pupil expenditures in those districts rose
to 84% that of the richer districts whereas it was only 70-75%
that of the richer districts prior to Abbott 11.548 But that was not
enough for the New Jersey Supreme Court, which ordered in
1994 that spending in Abbott District should be substantially

542. Id. at 59.
543. The discussion of the New Jersey school finance saga relies heavily on the
work of Minorini and Sugarman. See Minorini & Sugarman, Educational Adequacy,
supra note 30, at 202-04.
544. 303 A.2d 273 (1973); see also, LEHNE, supra note 13.
545. See Minori & Sugarman, EducationalAdequacy, supra note 30, at 202-04.
546. See Abbott, 575 A.2d at 359(Abbott II).
547. See id. at 363.
548. See Minorini & Sugarman, EducationalAdequacy, supra note 30, at 202-04.

1294

SANTA CLARA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 43

equivalent to spending in the richer school districts by the 199798 school year.5 49 In addition, the court ordered that provision
should be made for the special educational needs of students in
those districts. 550 In reiterating its order that children from disadvantaged backgrounds in the Abbott Districts should receive
additional funding to meet their educational needs and responding to the state's claim that additional money would not help
these districts, the court quoted directly from Robinson v. Cahill:
"Obviously, equality of dollar input will not assure equality in
educational results ...[blut it is nonetheless clear that there is a
significant connection between the sums expended and the quality of the educational opportunity." 51 The court went on to state
that such extra funding for the Abbott Districts was necessary so
that all students will be given a chance, treated equally, and
"begin at the same starting line."55 2
Notwithstanding the grand rhetoric, the Abbott case would
end up in court again. The legislative response to the Abbott III
decision was a fairly thorough overhaul of the state's school finance and accountability system - the Comprehensive Educational Improvement and Financing Act of 1996.553 The anchor of
this new system was the state's education content standards.
The notion was that each of the schools in the state should be
funded to the level that would allow the schools and the students to meet the new standards. 55 4 From an adequacy and
standards-based reform perspective, this system theoretically
might ensure that all children learn and are prepared to be competitors in the marketplace of ideas. The state accordingly set
specific per-pupil funding levels for elementary, middle, and
high schools, and provided supplemental aid to the state's poorest districts to help them meet the needs of their disadvantaged
students. 55 5
But this legislation was soon challenged by the Abbott Districts as being in violation of the court's mandate to substantially
equalize funding and failing to provide for the needs of at-risk

549. Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575 (N.J. 1994) (Abbott III).
550. See id. at 577.
551. Id. at 580 (quoting Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973)).
552. Id.
553. See Abbott IV, 693 A.2d at 425-26; Minorini & Sugarman, Educational Adequacy, supra note 30, at 202.
554. See id.
555. See id.
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students. 556 Although the court approved of the state's new content standards and said that they appropriately defined a "thorough and efficient" education in the state, the court took issue
with the financing mechanisms that were purportedly tied to the
standards.5 57 In fact, they were not so tied. The court specifically found that the theoretical formula that was supposed to determine the necessary amount of funding to permit all children
to achieve the new content standards failed to adequately con5 58 Specifically, the court
sider the needs of the Abbott Districts.
faulted the state for failing to conduct a study of the needs of
children in the Abbott Districts and the costs of meeting those
needs.5 59 While frustrated with the legislature's lack of compliance with Abbott III and critical of the legislature's failure to develop a financing scheme that would provide all children the
opportunity to achieve the content standards, the court did nothing to remedy that deficiency directly. Rather, the court's interim remedial order, though unusually clear, specific, and
arguably intrusive, was a classic equity solution: By the 1997-98
school year, the legislature must equalize spending in the poor
urban districts and the wealthy suburban districts and ensure
that the Commissioner of Education spend such monies in fur560 Finally,
therance of the state's educational content standards.
the court remanded the case to the trial court for further factual
findings regarding the needs of at-risk youth and remedies that
would meet those needs.
The case returned to the supreme court one year later for
the court's consideration of a remedial scheme for disadvan5 61 The remedial scheme
taged children in the Abbott Districts.
presented by the trial court was largely shaped by Dr. Allan
562 Dr. Odden's
Odden, a nationally renowned education expert.
recommendations and the trial court's remedial scheme were
adopted almost entirely by the supreme court. Tellingly, in the
court that has had the most experience with educational finance
litigation over the last thirty years, the remedy ordered by the
556. See Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997) (Abbott IV).
557. See id. at 427.
558. See id. at 434.
559. See id.
560. Critics might argue that the simplicity of the court's interim remedy exposes the difficulty of designing a remedial scheme that meets the court's own
needs-based standard.
561. See Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998) (Abbott V).
562. See id. at 456.
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court was unusually detailed and prescriptive. 563
Perhaps heartened by the state's fundamental agreement
with the need for sweeping reform and seeming rather weary of
school finance battles, the court may have felt that its future involvement would be limited, stating, "this decision should be
the last major judicial involvement in the long and tortuous history of the State's extraordinary effort to bring a thorough and
efficient education to the children in its poorest school dis564
tricts."
The court was wrong. Two years later, the court was compelled to issue another order to enforce its prior order regarding
services for preschool studentss65 and, in a separate opinion,
clarified the state's responsibility to pay for the capital construc-

tion costs of the Abbott Districts. 566

V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS:
FUZZY STANDARDS AND POLITICAL-INSTITUTIONAL REALITY

The Dickensian school finance reform litigation in New Jersey is the stuff of judicial lore as described by the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, but it is hardly atypical. Supreme courts in
Wyoming, Ohio, and Arizona have been compelled to issue multiple rulings to urge their sister branches to comply with the
constitutional mandate of an equitable and/or adequate education. In Alabama, the trial court faced outright defiance from the

563. The court ordered as follows:
[T]hat the Commissioner implement whole-school reform; implement fullday kindergarten and a half-day pre-school program for three- and fouryear olds as expeditiously as possible; implement the technology, alternative school, accountability, and school-to-work and college-transition programs; prescribe procedures and standards to enable individual schools to
adopt additional or extended supplemental programs and to seek and obtain the funds necessary to implement those programs for which they have
demonstrated a particularized need; implement the facilities plan and
timetable he proposed; secure funds to cover the complete cost of remediating identified life-cycle and infrastructure deficiencies in Abbott school
buildings as well as the cost of providing the space necessary to house Abbott students adequately; and promptly initiate effective managerial responsibility over school construction, including necessary funding
measures and fiscal reforms, such as may be achieved through amendment of the Educational Facilities Act.
Abbott, 710 A.2d at 468-69 (Abbott V).
564. Id. at 455.
565. See Abbott v. Burke, 748 A.2d 82 (N.J. 2000) (Abbott VI).
566. See Abbott v. Burke, 751 A.2d 1032 (N.J. 2000) (Abbott VII).
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state's governor. 567 Experiences like these seem to have made
judges quite aware of their institutional limitations and their
ability to craft and implement equity or adequacy-minded reform schemes. While courts could undoubtedly employ education and educational finance experts to help them develop
remedial schemes that could theoretically pass constitutional
muster, the courts seem also to recognize that the implementation process could strip these schemes of their effectiveness. In
school finance litigation, it seems, the power of the court is by
and large the power to say "no."Sure, shutting down the system
is a theoretical option, but such an enforcement mechanism has
the perverse effect of harming those whom the court aims to
help, and it does not ensure long-term fidelity to the court's order as political tradeoffs inevitably erode the work of even the
most compliance-minded legislatures over time.
Couple this legislative erosion and evasion with the fact that
standards for compliance are malleable and subject to differing
interpretations and, as Coons, Clune, and Sugarman argued
568 Inthree decades ago, one has a recipe for very little reform.
deed, courts have alternately used the adequacy theory, even
when they strike down those systems on the grounds of adequacy, to uphold school finance systems in the face of equity
challenges and have largely refused to detail the components of
an adequate school system in any workable way. But a more
generous take on the fuzzy judicial standards for equality of
educational opportunity and adequacy, and the propensity of
courts to defer to the legislature for a remedy is that a workable
compromise between the judiciary and political branches can be
achieved with these methods. A fuzzy standard allows plaintiffs
to bring novel actions and permits the judiciary to invalidate
what it views as an unjust educational finance scheme, while
those same fuzzy standards permit legislatures to respond to the
law in the face of competing political demands. Law, under this
analysis, does little to shape legislative or executive behavior on
the books. It is not self-executing. Litigation and judicial intervention, however, can influence legislative behavior, but only to
a certain extent. Litigation and a court's decision to strike down
an educational finance system can serve as the catalyst for legislative reform, as they can provide the political cover for reform567. See Vinik, supra note 13, at 84-85.
568. See Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 1.
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minded policy-makers to act. And if the political branches do
not respond appropriately, the judicial "veto power" can again
be invoked. 569 Thus, the jurisprudence of educational finance
permits judicial intervention through its malleable standards,
when conditions warrant, but law and standards of adequacy
and equity do not, in themselves, seem to dictate judicial behavior.

569. Almost a decade after he called for a legal standard of "effective equality"
in the pages of the Harvard Educational Review, David Kirp wrote prophetically
about the role of the courts in educational policy-making after ten years of observing education reform litigation:
Subtle questions of distributive justice persist, but these cannot be decided
solely by reference to the Constitution. Because they typically involve allocative choices among claimants who are nominally equally deserving,
such issues may be better fit for political than judicial resolution. They
seem best fit for joint resolution, the courts initially defining minimal constitutional guarantees, the legislative enactments giving substance to these
definitions, and the judiciary subsequently clarifying statutory ambiguities.
David L. Kirp, Law, Politics, and Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Judicial
Involvement, 47 HARV. EDUC. REV. 117, 137 (1977). Though a far cry from the clarity
in judicial standards called for by Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, Kirp's limited role
for the courts, as this article argues, seems to have been our experience.

